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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the implementation of eleven strategic 
decisions in six organizations. The decisions concern the 
installation of new technology, the carrying out of various building 
programmes and the re-organization of organizational structures 
The organizations comprise a university, a water authority, two maii 
order companies and two chemical firms. 
The objective is to describe and explain implementation processes 
and outcomes. To this end, eleven independent variables and three 
dependent variables are distinguished. These conceptualise the 
success of implementation outcomes and define the factors which 
affect the level of success. 
Two groupings are isolated within the independent variables. 
The 'Enabler' group of variables Is concerned with how familiar 
people are with what has to be implemented, the priority of 
implementation, having enough resources available, having a 
favourable organizational structure and maintaining a flexible 
approach during implementation. All these factors help to secure a 
moderate degree of success. However the second grouping of 
variables - the 'Realizers' - are required to achieve the highest 
level of success in implementation. These are to do with being 
clear about what has to be done and being able to evaluate what has 
been achieved, enjoying favourable conditions and support inside the 
organization, and having a little luck along the way. 
Conclusions are drawn about the levels of risk associated with 
implementing different topics and the steps which managers can take 
to reduce risk and enhance the chances of success. 
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Preface 
Doing a PhD is a bit like going on a long country walk. You set 
out full of heart, strong of leg and with a good supply of vittles to 
sustain the journey. The first few miles are pleasant and relaxing 
and there is plenty of time to enjoy the scenery and savour the fresh 
air. In fact the urge to stop and survey your surroundings overtakes 
you on several occasions. After a while though there appear to be 
one or two obstacles along the path, a patch of uneven ground, a few 
holes and a few really beastly hills to climb. The end of the day 
finds you struggling along with a sense of urgency, anxious to get 
home before dark and aware that you have not come by the shortest 
route, nor have you ended up exactly where you intended. 
A PhD, like a walk, can be helped enormously by having some 
navigational aids and support along the way. I have been extremely 
fortunate in having David Hickson, Professor of International 
Management and Organization as my supervisor. His pertinent 
comments and advice have always been helpful and sympathetically 
offered and his wealth of research experience has been instrumental 
in making sure that this thesis stayed on course. His own interest 
and unfailing enthusiasm has been enormously encouraging. I could 
not have wished for kinder or more expert guidance. 
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I would also like to express my appreciation to all those 
employed in the organizations in which I carried out my research who 
gave up their time to talk about the making of various decisions and 
their implementation. Without such cooperation this thesis would 
not have been possible. 
Finally, I must thank John for his care and support, without 




Maybe now we'll get the time to do some proper 
March 1990 
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INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY 
This thesis arises out of a long-standing interest in the making 
of strategic decisions. Much has been written about how the 
important, far-reaching and consequential matters get decided in 
organizations. The process by which information is gathered and 
evaluated, the formal meetings, the informal interaction of 
participants and the political machinations which may take place have 
been well-documented in the literature. 
Yet it seems surprising that this literature often appears to 
stop short. Once a choice has been made the researchers fade 
away. Having detailed the process by which a decision is reached 
they appear reluctant to stay and follow up the consequences. Some 
questions therefore remain - what happens to strategic decisions once 
they have been taken? Are they always executed, and if they are, 
how are they put into effect? How successful are they - and why? 
Thus began an Interest in the implementation of strategic 
decisions, to follow up particular choices to see what the outcomes 
might be. After investigating this area for a short while it became 
apparent that researchers in other disciplines had already done some 
work here, however this was often only in particular types of 
organization - public institutions as a rule. So the broad aim of 
this study became to look at implementation in a wider range of 
organizations. This was achieved on a modest scale because it was 
- 
also felt that case study methods would be the most appropriate tools 
of investigation. 
The major objective was to try and distinguish ways in which the 
success of implementation might be characterised, together with 
concepts which might provide explanations for success. 
Eleven cases were chosen for study, in six different 
organizations. Data were collected by intensive interviews and 
document search. In all, 113 people were interviewed at all levels 
of the organization, from Chief Executives to shop floor workers or 
their equivalent, in meetings which generally lasted about an hour. 
The study identified three different ways in which successful 
implementation might be usefully conceptualised. Extensive analysis 
of the data indicated eleven factors which are significant In 
influencing implementation. 
These factors can be separated into two groupings of 'Enabler' 
and 'Realizer' variables. Enabler variables are concerned with the 
familiarity and priority of the matter to be implemented, the 
resources and structural characteristics of the organization and the 
degree of flexibility of the implementation process. These are all 
associated with successful implementation, but they are not 
sufficient to ensure the highest level of success. To achieve this 
requires much more of the 'Realizer' variables to a greater degree. 
These are to do with how precisely the implementation tasks are 
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specified and can be evaluated, how much backing there is during 
implementation, fostering the right organizational climate, and also 
having a little bit of luck. 
The conclusions of the research are that there are certain 
factors which help to ensure the successful implementation of 
strategic decisions, and although some of these are outside the 
control of managers, there are ways in which the chances of success 
may be enhanced. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
This work focusses on the more important and unusual, 
'top-level', decisions which are taken in organizations. It looks 
at the way these kinds of decisions are put into effect and the 
factors which influence their implementation. 
The purpose of this chapter is to set the scene for the research 
study, to explain the reasons for choosing this particular topic and 
to give the following chapters some kind of context. 
Research does not start in a vacuum. There are always preceding 
interests and perspectives. The researcher does not begin with a 
clean slate but is influenced by prior considerations, assumptions 
and paradigmatic frameworks. And it is perhaps useful to set these 
out at the beginning, on the one hand so that these antecedents may 
be made clear, but also because it is better to be open about any 
pre-existing influences, biases, and even prejudices, which may 
impact on the work. As Popper remarked: - 
"Observation is always selective. It needs a 
chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a 
point of view, a problem. " (1963, P. 46) 
My own reasons for studying decision-making can be separated into 
three broad and overlapping strands. Firstly, personal involvement 
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in the area, secondly academic interest and thirdly, pragmatic hopes 
for the research results. These are explained in more detail below. 
1.1 Personal involvement 
My own background in commerce and industry, having been a 
secretary/personal assistant for nine years, gave me a wide-ranging 
and well-focussed view of organizational life. It also fostered a 
curiosity about the way people behave and interact at their place of 
work. 
A secretary occupies a rather ambivalent position in the 
organizational hierarchy. As a 'Junior' early on in my career my 
status was extremely low (though of course a great deal higher than 
cleaners, shop floor workers and others engaged in 'manual' work). 
However, by the time I arrived at the top of my particular ladder, as 
personal assistant to the Managing Director, I was able to bathe in 
the reflected light of his status, which also provided me with more 
influence. It is well understood that one's relationship with one's 
superior is mediated by the ability to get on with the superior's 
secretary. 
Although secretaries rarely have a direct input into policy 
issues they are always in the background, taking minutes at Board 
meetings, filing (and reading) confidential documents and typing all 
manner of official memoranda. They will usually have a fairly good 
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picture of what is going on at the top of the organization and may 
even be privy to information unknown to their boss. Though they 
will not necessarily be players in the games that are played, they 
are close to the action and may have a critical role in organizing 
the fixtures and circulating the results. 
The making of decisions seemed to be given a central role in 
organizational activities. Meetings were held specifically to 
decide things, and follow-up meetings were then necessary to report 
on matters which had been decided and were being put into effect. 
Being a secretary to senior management often involved disseminating 
decisions taken at top level to those lower down in the hierarchy, 
and passing on middle managers' decisions for ratification from 
above. 
My early years with the BBC in the mid-1970's, working in many 
different departments for a number of managers, provided me with an 
insight into the operation of a large public corporation. Here, on 
occasions, decisions could be taken to achieve aesthetic and artistic 
outcomes as well as the vulgar goals of profit or turnover desired by 
more commercially-minded enterprises. It is perhaps doubtful 
whether I would find such a distinction between the Corporation and 
business firms in more recent times. 
On moving from the BBC to a steel fabrication works and from 
there to a small owner-managed flooring company it was apparent that 
the easy management style and cosy atmosphere of the BBC were not 
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universally-found characteristics. 
The steel fabrication company was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a 
large building firm and was suffering under a world-wide steel 
recession. There were hard decisions to be made concerning job 
losses and cut-backs. From my lowly seat in the stalls of the 
organizational arena, decision-making appeared to be less easy-going, 
more uncertain and contentious. 
In the flooring compay it was very apparent that all employees 
were dealing directly with the pounds and pence belonging to the 
owners of the company, who worked alongside them. Consequently, 
every penny was important and decision-making, even about trivial 
aspects of work-life, was highly centralised. In essence, the 
owners took all the major decisions and most minor ones and everyone 
agreed with them - at least, to their faces. 
Here it also became clear that decisions could have unforeseen 
consequences - outcomes which were only apparent during or after 
implementation. I remember a proclamation going out from one of the 
Managing Directors that because she believed a huge number of paper 
clips were being 'wasted' we were not to order any more. The result 
was that everyone hoarded these items like gold dust, using them so 
sparingly that papers were continually being lost or misplaced. 
Finally, more were surreptitiously obtained from the supplier and 
order reigned once more. 
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A more pertinent example of an unforeseen outcome arising from a 
seemingly innocuous decision is directly responsible for this 
thesis. This occurred when I overheard the male Managing Director 
comment that my colleague would never be promoted from her 
secretarial position because "she was a woman". (This was in spite 
of the fact that his wife, who had been his secretary, was now joint 
Managing Director of the company. ) The result of this, albeit 
unadvertised decision, was that I determined not to remain a 
secretary for any longer than could be helped. 
From these early beginnings it was apparent to me that the way in 
which decisions were made could vary in organizations, that decisions 
were taken to achieve different outcomes, and that the results of 
decisions in practice could sometimes be surprising. There did seem 
to be a certain amount of unpredictability about the whole business. 
On returning to education to take a degree in Organization 
Studies I had the opportunity to study behaviour in organizations at 
a more analytical level. It was here that these early interests were 
fostered and developed in a more academically oriented way. 
1.2 Academic Interest 
The study of decision-making forms an important strand in the 
general analysis of behaviour in organizations and, although it is 
also a core feature of disciplines such as economics, systems 
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analysis and psychology, my perspective is that of the organizational 
theorist, the frame of reference being that of the organization, 
which marks out the arena for the particular aspects of behaviour 
under study. 
My early research 
micro-level, that is, 
decisions. I was 
classroom setting madi 
content of lessons 
interaction. 
focussed primarily on decision-making at the 
how individuals in organizations made their 
particularly interested in how teachers in the 
a immediate, 'on the spot' decisions about the 
and the amount and type of pupil-teacher 
After graduating I took a Masters Degree in Business 
Administration, writing a final thesis which again took 
decision-making as its focus. However, in writing this work and 
re-examining much of the now familiar literature it became clear that 
there were certain aspects which had been neglected in the overall 
analysis. 
Most of the work appeared to look only at the process of 
organizational decision-making. That is, how people in organizations 
come together to make decisions, what kinds of meetings they hold, 
who takes part in discussions and the methods used to prioritise 
alternatives and select a final choice. 
However, upon reflection it could be argued that much of this 
work was heavily descriptive, useful in providing a rich context for 
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decision-making, but limited in its explanatory capacity. 
Furthermore, it was evident that descriptive (and even analytical) 
studies only told part of the story. 
When people make decisions in organizations it is reasonable to 
enquire about the results which follow when, and if, they are 
implemented. Is implementation always successful? What Is success 
in this context? Some are patently not successful - why is this? 
If decision-making has been characterised by argument and 
disagreement does this cease once a decision has been agreed? Or do 
feelings of discontent linger on and inhibit attempts to realise it? 
The point about these kinds of questions in that they can only be 
answered once the decision has been put into effect. Exclusive 
concentration on the decision-making aspects will not tell us whether 
in the long run they lead to successful decisions. It Is rather 
like investigating the performance of a yacht by looking only at the 
plans and drawings. These will not tell you whether it sank or 
floated. To see how well it sails you need to see it In action, 
taking into account the conditions of the sea, the wind speeds and 
the proficiency of the captain and crew. So it is with decisions, 
you need to see them enacted and look at the organization, the 
environmental context and the people involved. 
So studies of implementation are required to focus on the above 
issues. This research is therefore an attempt to contribute to our 
understanding of complex organizational processes in this area. 
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Additionally, as explained below, it is hoped that research of this 
nature will be of assistance in helping people in organizations make 
sense of their organizational environments. 
1.3 Pragmatic Possibilities 
Having worked with managers for many years it often appeared as 
though many managers 'managed' almost instinctively. Few of them 
had any formal training in management and any analysis of 
organizational processes depended almost entirely on their own range 
of experience. 
Although not a panacea for all organizational issues, management 
education can provide a theoretical and analytical context in which 
organizational processes can be examined. In this way a more 
considered and sophisticated understanding of specific organizational 
activities - such as decision-making or implementation - may 
result. At the same time such reflection may assist the manager to 
achieve a more holistic appraisal of his or her place of work and the 
interpersonal relationships within it. 
So research into activities such as implementation may feed back 
into management. This is particularly likely If the activity is 
central and critical to organizational functioning. If research is 
directly relevant to managers' experiences and can offer some insight 
and even some answers to puzzling questions then it is to be hoped 
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that organizations as a whole will benefit. 
Research to-date has not had a great deal to say about the 
implementation process. There is some work which details the 
problems which may be encountered during implementation and managers 
may have opinions about the general way in which decisions should be 
put into effect. But there is not a great deal of empirical research 
to substantiate such views, and there is even less work which 
attempts to provide some analysis of the factors which affect 
implementation. 
It is envisaged that the research documented here will go some 
way towards being able to offer empirical evidence for scholarly 
interest and also make positive suggestions about management 
practice. The aim is both to further theoretical debate about what 
goes on in organizations and discuss the pragmatic implications for 
organizational members. 
1.4 Outline of chapters 
Chapter 2 
Since this research emanates from a decision-making perspective 
relevant literature in this area is examined here. The 
intrinsically descriptive nature of many of the research studies is 
highlighted together with their predominant emphasis on processual 
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features. 
Chapter 3 
This looks more closely at the multi-faceted concept of 
implementation. Research which specifically investigates 
implementation processes is critically analysed. 
Chapter 4 
The initial pilot studies are summarised and discussed. The 
concept of implementation is expressed in terms of dependent and 
independent variables which are suggested by the pilot studies and 
relevant literature. 
Chapter 5 
The methodology is described here and information provided about 
the organizations and cases used in the study. 
Chapter 6 
This chapter explains in detail how the data were analysed to 
provide the final dependent and independent variables. 
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Chapter 7 
Each variable is profiled and illustrated by examples taken from 
the case studies. 
Chapter 8 
The grouping of independent variables into 'Realizers' and 
'Enablers' is described and an explanation of how they affect 
implementation success is provided. The effects of organization, 
implementation topic and process are examined. 
Chapter 9 
The main results of the research are identified and critically 
evaluated. Practical suggestions are offered about how to manage 
implementation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
This chapter aims to locate this research project within existing 
studies of organizations. In doing this it focusses on 
decision-making and examines why this is seen as a central 
organizational activity. 
Different types of decisions are distinguished and the nature of 
strategic decisions is discussed. Various studies of decision-making 
are examined to assess their implications for implementation 
research. 
2.1 Managerial activities 
The issue of what managers do all day is one that has fascinated 
writers and academic theorists. Whilst, any manager might be only 
too pleased to inform enquirers, he or she is often too busy 
attending meetings, answering the telephone, supervising subordinates 
and generally running the organization to do so. 
Mintzberg's (1973) pioneering work on the nature of managerial 
activities pointed to the importance of decision-making when his 
empirical findings suggested that managers had to cover roles in 
three broad areas - interpersonal, informational and decisional. 
- 16 - 
Stewart (1976) broadly agrees with this emphasis on 
decision-making. While pointing out that there are tremendous 
differences in managerial behaviour she notes that one definition of 
management is: - "deciding what should be done and then getting other 
people to do it" (p. 74). 
One of the earliest writers on organizational decision-making, 
Simon (1957), stressed that the business of management is 
administration and commented: - .... the administrative processes 
are decisional processes" (p. 8) and consequently he treats 'managing' 
and 'decision-making' as synonymous. 
But what is 'decision-making' in this context? A decision, put 
very simply, may be said to be the selection of one or more 
alternatives from a range of choices. Castles et al (1971) remark 
that "a decision is a conscious choice between at least two possible 
courses of action" (p. 11). Decision-making is therefore the process 
by which we arrive at the decision. Not 'what' we choose - this is 
the decision itself - but 'how' we choose. Although obviously the 
choice itself is also of interest to practising decision-makers and 
academic theorists. 
So it would appear that decision-making is a central managerial 
activity. But are all decisions the same? Simon (1960) 
distinguishes between the kinds of decisions which management have to 
deal with on a routine basis and which are usually about operational 
matters, and those which are more complex and unfamiliar. This 
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second type are "newer, unstructured and consequential" and are 
encountered less frequently. The former he labels 'programmed' and 
the latter 'nonprogrammed' decisions. All decisions therefore are 
not the same, although programmed and nonprogrammed decisions are 
usually understood to be on a continuum with decisions being either 
less or more programmed. 
Other writers have drawn similar distinctions between the more 
trivial and the more important kinds of decisions which are made in 
organizations. The label often given to these more important ones is 
strategic. Although the links between them are not explicitly stated 
(standardisation of terms unfortunately not being a strong feature of 
this field of enquiry), these would seem to be comparable to the 
nonprogrammed decisions of Simon's typology. It is also likely that 
such decisions would follow the 'unstructured' processes identified 
by Mintzberg and his colleagues (1976), where these are defined as 
"decision processes that have not been encountered in quite the same 
form and for which no predetermined and explicit set of ordered 
responses exists in the organization" (p. 246). 
Strategic decisions are thus about issues which are "relatively 
unusual, substantial, and all-pervading" (Hickson et al, 1986, 
p. 28). While there are few precedents for decision-makers to follow, 
such decisions commit substantial resources and are likely to set 
precedents for further decisions (Mintzberg et a], 1976). For 
Mintzberg and his researchers: - strategic simply means 
important in terms of the actions taken, the resources committed, or 
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the procedures set". 
To give an illustration of the two extremes, a more trivial, 
programmed decision might be to update an existing manual accounting 
system in a finance department, a more strategic/nonprogrammed 
decision might be to introduce computing systems and accounting 
software to replace all manual systems in this department. 
Managers may well be involved in making both types of decision 
but since strategic decisions tend to be taken at the top of 
organizations much will depend on Individual position in the 
hierarchy. Because these decisions are about important issues which 
have organization-wide consequences they are usually the province of 
senior management and are aligned to policy-making. The 'Bradford 
Studies' recount several examples of these in the book entitled 'Top 
Decisions' (Hickson et al, 1986). 
However, whilst strategic decisions may be taken in the upper 
echelons of the organization, their implementation may well be 
carried out by others in the middle or lower levels. Operational 
managers may oversee the process, supervising shop floor workers or 
other employees as they attend to the practical details. 
Strategic decisions are often, although not exclusively, about 
changing direction in organizational activities or taking new 
Initiatives. In this sense they are often innovatory, and mean that 
changes to ways of working may need to be introduced in order to 
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implement them. The management of change is seen to be a difficult 
area as management textbooks testify, and appropriate management of 
the implementation process may make the difference between whether a 
decision is seen as being successful or unsuccessful. 
Decision-making is therefore seen to be a central managerial 
activity in organizations. Within this broad area, strategic 
decisions are distinguished as being about the most important 
issues. It has been argued that the implementation of these 
decisions is a critical change process and its study is a logical 
next step in the field of decision-making research. 
2.2 Making decisions in organizations 
The importance of strategic decision-making in organizations is 
confirmed by the large amount of work which has been devoted to its 
study. However, as already Indicated, when the literature in this 
area is examined it can be argued that relatively little has been 
said about the implementation of such decisions. Most theorists 
have concentrated almost exclusively on the process of making 
decisions. 
Perhaps this is not surprising if 'decision-making' is taken to 
refer only to those activities which directly make up the 'deciding' 
part of the task. Such activities constitute what I will call the 
'pre-decision processes' and would include: - defining the matter 
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for decision, collecting and sorting information, selecting 
alternative desired outcomes, arranging outcomes in order of 
preference, choosing an outcome (making a choice). So if 
'decision-making' is thought of in this strictly delimited way, then 
anything which happens after the decision has been taken rightfully 
belongs to 'post-decision' or implementation processes and would be 
deemed to be extra to the topic of research. 
However, any study of post-decision processes must begin by 
understanding the pre-decision processes that led up to them. Hence 
some of the major studies in the field of organizational 
decision-making will now be examined in order to assess how the 
making of decisions has been linked to their implementation. 
2.2.1 Describing decisional-processes 
It seems that academic enquiry follows a discernible pattern. 
When a relatively new area of interest appears its characteristics 
are firstly described, sketchily at first and then in a more detailed 
way; it is then analysed to find out what causes these 
characteristics and why they occur in this form; finally both 
descriptions and analyses are enthusiastically disagreed about. 
Although this is undoubtedly a simplistic and somewhat cynical 
observation, it does contain a mote of truth. 
Much decision-making research, especially the earlier variety, 
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sought to give a description of how decisions were made in 
organizations. Often taking the so-called 'rational economic 
model' of decision-making provided by economists as its 'straw man', 
these studies attempted to show how social and organizational factors 
inhibited its workings in reality. Essentially, the model proposed 
that decision-making routinely followed a number of logical steps. 
That is, the identification of a problem or opportunity, a period of 
definition and diagnosis, a search for alternatives, evaluation of 
alternatives and, finally, an optimising choice. 
Simon (1957) is concerned to indicate how the limited cognitive 
capacities of the human decision-maker, together with the 
complexities and uncertainties of organizational life, militate 
against the efficient working of the rational model. He suggests 
that such decision-makers can only operate within a 'bounded 
rationality', being rewarded with 'satisficing' rather than 
optimising decisions as a result. 
As previously discussed, Simon's later work (1960) Introduced the 
concepts of programmed and nonprogrammed decisions and maintains that 
each type will require different decision-making techniques. These 
range from standard operating procedures and clerical routines to 
operational research and computer simulations for the programmed 
decisions, and from judgment and training to heuristic 
problem-solving techniques for nonprogrammed ones. 
The work of Thompson & Tuden (1976) partly confirms this line of 
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thinking. They propose that different decision-making strategies 
are appropriate for different types of decision depending on the 
amount of agreement about causation and preferred outcomes. The 
strategies mentioned comprise computation, judgment, compromise and 
inspiration. Macintosh (1985) adapts Earl & Hopwood's (1981) 
earlier work to provide a further matrix depicting decision-making 
under uncertainty which builds upon Thompson & Tuden's research. 
A link is therefore made between the type of decision problem and 
the techniques for solving It, although little illustration of how 
this works in practice is provided by any of the authors. Since the 
implementation of such decisions is not investigated, the 
appropriateness of these techniques can not be empirically proven. 
Simon's work essentially provides us with a manual of 
decision-making which amplifies the many elements which are 
involved. For example, issues of fact and value, communication, 
goals, the role of authority and the criterion of efficiency are all 
discussed, although how these elements interact to make up a dynamic 
process is not really explained. He does not show this process in 
action - how a decision will filter through an organization, the 
interest groups which will be involved or kept out and the more 
political aspects of interpersonal relations which may affect 
decision-making. 
The question of how these elements which are identified as having 
an effect on decision-making may in turn affect the process of 
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implementation is not discussed. No mention is made of whether 
nonprogrammed and programmed decisions are similarly distinguished at 
the implementation stage. Are more programmed decisions, because 
they are simpler and relatively familiar, easier to implement? 
Because nonprogrammed decisions are novel and complex does this mean 
that they are harder to implement and conspicuously less successful? 
Do nonprogrammed decisions, redolent as they are with uncertainty and 
unforseeability, exude the 'post-decision surprise' described by 
Harrison and March (1984)? 
We do not know because we are not told. Implementation is not 
discussed by these writers. Perhaps, implicitly, it is assumed that 
if the proper procedures and strategies are followed to make the 
decision then it will be implemented without further difficulty. 
Lindblom (1959) and Braybrooke & Lindblom (1963) too are 
primarily concerned about aspects of the decision-making process as 
is explained in the opening pages of "A strategy of decision": - 
"In this book, we want to describe what evaluators 
and decision-makers actually do in the face of 
policy problems. " (p. 6) 
Once more the emphasis is on describing what happens when the 
rational model (here called the 'synoptic model') cannot be 
followed. Again constraints are deemed to arise from the 
limitations of human capacities and from other factors which are 
external to, but impinge upon, the matter for decision. 
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However, Braybrooke and Lindblom are also aware that what happens 
after a decision has been taken needs to be considered. And it is 
precisely because the implementation of the decision may throw up 
unforeseen complications that they propose a 'disjointed 
incrementalist' method for making decisions. This involves 
simplifying the policy problem by focussing on a limited number of 
alternatives which are only marginally different from the status 
quo. An important feature here is being able to retrace one's steps 
during decision-making to 'undo' actions which are unsuccessful. 
This not only ensures that potentially harmful outcomes are arrested 
before they wreak too much damage, but also, because each 
decision-making 'step' on its own does not present too great a 
change, any unforeseen consequences should not be too severe. 
"Disjointed incrementalism copes at its best as 
effectively as can reasonably be demanded, with 
the various parts of the problems of 
consequences. It does not do so by relying on 
intuitions. Instead, it encourages an exchange 
of complaints and expectations among many 
different participants, limitation of debate to 
topics on which the community is likely to possess 
a concentration of information, and observance of 
the limits within which existing social 
institutions are prepared to alleviate results 
unfortunate but unforeseen. " (1963, p. 233) 
I 
Dror (1964) has argued 
(as Lindblom himself descr 
procrastination, maintaining 
adequate method if present 
all concerned, the problem 
that this process of 'muddling through' 
ibes it) is a recipe for inertia and 
that it can only be considered an 
policies are considered satisfactory to 
itself does not change and neither does 
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the means available to deal with it. Such comments have led 
Lindblom to amend and elaborate his original ideas (1982) although 
the main thesis remains much the same. However, he refutes the 
contention that incrementalism leads to inertia, arguing that: - 
one can make changes in the social structure 
as rapidly through a sequence of incremental steps 
as through drastic - hence less frequent - 
alterations. Psychologically and sociologically 
speaking, decision makers can sometimes bring 
themselves to make changes easily and quickly only 
because the changes are incremental and are not 
fraught with great risk of error or of political 
conflict. " (1969, p. 172) 
So events after decision-making are considered, albeit in a 
tangential way. Recognition of the problems of decision-making mean 
that outcomes are uncertain and this influences the decision-making 
process itself. However Braybrooke and Lindblom do not make a study 
of the implementation process as such, they do not follow through a 
series of decisions to see how they are implemented in order to 
justify an incremental approach. Although it is implicit in their 
work that such a process might well make the implementation of 
decisions easier since changes are not too radical and political 
conflict is reduced, this is not followed up by empirical study. 
Their conclusions are based upon observations of what 
decision-makers do in practice, and they are both descriptive and 
prescriptive. It is not only what decision-makers do, but what they 
ought to do, because it is patently the best way in the 
circumstances. Smith and May (1982) have noted the difficulties 
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inherent In combining normative and prescriptive postulates in a 
single model. 
It should also be re-stated that Braybrooke and Lindblom confine 
themselves to decisions which are about policy issues, in other 
words, policy-making. In addition, the organizations under study 
are exclusively in the public sector. It is not clear whether they 
believe that similar circumstances in other organizations will make 
the incrementalist approach either feasible or desirable, although 
Quinn's (1978,1980) studies in business organizations would add some 
empirical validity to this argument. Further research looking 
specifically at implementation in public sector organizations has 
been carried out by others and this will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
So while Braybrooke and Lindblom pay more attention than Simon to 
the process of making decisions and to the potential problems which 
may come to light during implementation, they too relatively neglect 
post-decision processes. The implementation phase itself is not the 
focus of investigation; what they do is suggest modifications to the 
decision-making process to increase the chances that it will be able 
to accommodate any aberrations which may occur at this later stage. 
There are a number of other, more explicitly empiricist, studies 
which seek to describe processes of decision-making. Mintzberg et 
al (1976) studied 25 "strategic decision processes" in 'unstructured' 
decision-making, noting that ambiguity is often a major 
characteristic here. They break down the structure of this kind of 
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decision-making into 12 elements: - three central phases, three sets 
of supporting routines and six sets of dynamic factors. The 
analysis is confined exclusively to these processes and the question 
of the implementation of such decisions is not discussed. 
Nutt's (1984) work analyses 78 case studies and identifies 5 
different ways of searching for ideas when making decisions. It is 
this searching which seems to shape the process of decision-making 
itself and Nutt confirms that managers do not make use of normative 
methods of decision-making, most decision processes being 'solution- 
centred'. This seems to "restrict innovation, limit the number of 
alternatives considered and perpetuate the use of questionable 
tactics" (p. 414). Whether in fact this makes any difference in the 
long run is not discussed. Once again, Nutt does not link the 
decision to its implementation. We are not informed which of these 
search procedures are likely to be more or less successful. Nutt's 
research confirms the now widely accepted view that there is more 
than one way of making decisions but does not say whether these lead 
to any particular difference in outcomes. 
I Anderson's (1983) analysis of the Cuban missile crisis In terms 
of U. S. decision-making describes a process in which sequential 
choices are made between a range of non-competing courses of action, 
goals are discovered during the course of decision-making, and 
participants are more concerned with avoiding failure than achieving 
success. Anderson dubs this "decision-making by objection", where 
alternatives are eliminated until one remains that does not draw 
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strong objections. This demonstrates that decision-making in 
practice can be far removed from the rational economic model. 
Whether this has any effect at the implementation stage is unclear, 
although the outcome of the decision is known in this case. 
Anderson's analysis is confined to a categorisation of the 
pre-decision processes, but whether these processes are peculiar to 
'crisis decision-making', as described by Rosenthal (1986), has not 
been tested. 
The main point to be made about the research described so far is 
that the focus of attention is on the process of decision-making. 
Researchers attempt to categorise different processes noting the 
similarities and differences between them, and how they vary from the 
rational economic model. Few links, if any, are made between the 
decision-making and implementation stages, indeed implementation is 
rarely discussed at all. 
Another problem with much of the above research is that it is 
long on description and rather short on analysis. Much work goes 
into describing how decisions are made but few reasons are given for 
differences in process. Although much is made of the problems of 
human and organizational limitations this only explains apparent 
deviation from the rational model. The particular variables which 
may provide some insight as to why different kinds of process occur 
are not researched. Mohr (1982) has drawn attention to the dearth 
of explanatory theory in these descriptive decision-making studies. 
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This is significant because it makes comparison between different 
studies problematical and also gives no leads as to where one might 
usefully begin to look for determinants of the implementation 
process. If we do not know what are the important factors which 
affect decision-making processes then little can be extrapolated from 
this when we come to examine the next stage. 
The studies by Hickson et al (1986) and Cohen et al (1972) are 
attempts to represent decision-making in a more analytical way. 
Although once again neither deals with the Implementation of stategic 
decisions, the work of Hickson et al is important in highlighting the 
particular variables which are of interest at the decision-making 
stage. Because of the dearth of analytical research on 
implementation this provides some guidelines as to what areas may be 
useful starting points. The research by Cohen and his colleagues is 
of interest because it presents a very different view of 
organizational decision-making and suggests that decisions and 
consequences are largely uncoupled. This has profound implications 
for any research in this area. Both these contributions are 
discussed in the following section. 
2.2.2 Explanations for process 
The work of Hickson et al (1986) - the Bradford Studies - is one 
of the largest and most comprehensive studies in this area, 
comprising ten years' research. The Bradford team studied 150 
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strategic decisions in 30 different organizations operating in 
service, manufacturing and educational sectors. 
Essentially the Bradford Studies provide us with a much expanded 
picture of decision-making, firmly rooted in and developed from 
empirical examination. They demonstrate that the decision process 
is largely determined by two sets of factors - the complexity and 
po-liticality of the matter for decision. 
Complexity results from the many problems which are often a 
feature of strategic decision-making. The rarity and 
consequentiality of what is being decided (where problems are novel 
and consequences radical, serious or widespread); the precursiveness 
of the decision which means that future decisions will then be 
constrained; and the possibility that there will be much involvement 
(many sources of information and advice to take account of) all 
contribute to this complexity. 
The politicality aspect refers to the fact that there will be a 
number of individuals and groups who will have an interest in 
strategic decisions. These are the 'decision-set'. Some will be 
more powerful than others, some will be more directly affected by the 
decision than others, and some will be given the opportunity to 
participate more fully in decision-making. Politicality here refers 
to "the exercise of influence in decision-making" (Hickson et al, 
1986). Its inclusion is a recognition that interests may not 
always concur, that there may be different interpretations of the 
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problem and solutions, and that conflict and discordance rather than 
harmony and consensus may be a feature of decision-making. 
It is explicitly recognised that as the organization itself is 
made up of interest groups, or dominant coalitions of powerful 
stakeholders (Cyert & March, 1963), these will set out the 
Pre-arranged 'rules of the game' (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977) within 
which decision-making will take place. Thus, part of the framework 
or boundary for each decision-making 'game' is set, some aspects of 
the process are already drawn up and the twin variables of complexity 
and politicality supply the remaining determinants. As Hickson et 
a] remark: - 
'The substance of the decision therefore offers a 
'dual explanation' for decision-making processes 
(Astley et al, 1982). A process takes shape both 
to encompass the complexity of the problems raised 
by the matter on hand and to accommodate the 
politicality of the implicated interests. " (p. 168) 
This leads to the distinguishing of three types of decision 
process: - sporadic, fluid and constricted; and three types of 
subJect matter: - vortex, tractable and familiar. Together these give 
three modes of decision-making: - vortex-sporadic, tractable-fluid 
and familiar-constricted. These are now briefly summarised. 
The vortex-sporadic mode of decision-making is: - 
one in which the managerial approach to a 
complex and political vortex-like matter is to 
turn to a wide range of sources for reports, 
estimates, advice and recommendat ions. " (p. 176) 
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The decision process is usually fairly long and drawn out and the 
process itself is "informally spasmodic and protracted" (p. 118). 
The tractable-fluid decision process is "less complex than a 
vortex decision and the least political of strategic decisions.... " 
(P. 180). Being less contentious than other types of decisions the 
process flows along more smoothly with involvement that is not too 
diverse. Although the consequences of the decision may be widely 
felt, they are not too serious and in the main, objectives are 
compatible with each other. 
Lastly, the familiar-constricted type of process refers to 
decisions of a kind which is already comparatively well known in the 
organization. Therefore, they are not novel and usually have only 
limited consequences. Since these consequences do not affect 
everyone, not all interests need to be involved, thus the process is 
of a constricted type. This is the least complex of the strategic 
decisions. 
The research lends weight to the argument that there is no one 
best way of making a decision, but that decisions are arrived at by 
many different routes, depending on the nature of the problem and the 
context of decision-making. In addition, all types of process are 
located in all types of organizations. Although certain types of 
organization are perhaps more likely to experience particular 
decision processes - for example, sporadic processes were found to be 
more prevalent in manufacturers - the type of organization was not 
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the predominant factor in deciding the type of decision process. The 
nature of the problem - or "matter for decision" - was of greater 
moment. 
Although the Bradford team did not extend their study to the 
aftermath of decision-making this research is a useful attempt to 
analyse pre-decision processes. The identification of complexity 
and politicality as important categories of independent variables is 
a significant step forward in depicting processual causal 
relationships. 
The research reported in this thesis also attempts to explain 
organizational processes. The aim here is to explain the outcomes 
of implementation with reference to independent variables 
distinguished in the implementation process. The Bradford Studies 
are an indication of the usefulness of such an approach and suggest 
two factors which may be also worth considering at the post-decision 
stages. 
The work of Cohen et al (1972,1976) Is very different. it 
proposes a most distinctive and controversial model of 
decision-making, which has implications for any research on 
implementation. 
Cohen et al present their 'garbage can model' of decision-making 
as a distillation of research carried out mainly in educational 
institutions. This kind of organization, they maintain, is 
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characterised by a great deal of uncertainty and ambiguity about what 
the organization is trying to achieve and how It means to do this. 
The name they give to organizations of this type is 'organized 
anarchies', and essentially they display the following: - 
(a) problematic preferences - the organization operates on the 
basis of a loose collection of ill-defined and inconsistent 
preferences; 
(b) unclear technology - organizational activities proceed by 
trial and error methods often based on past experience, and 
the mechanics of the organization are not fully understood 
by its members; 
(c) fluid participation - participants continually exit and 
enter the decision-making process and vary in the amount of 
time and effort (energy) they devote. 
This apparent confusion and disorganization leads to a seemingly 
equally confused process of internal decision-making - which they 
liken to a garbage can. Their model is fairly complex and is the 
result of computerised simulations. In brief, their thesis is that 
the garbage can contains a hotchpotch of decision-making components: 
problems/issues, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. 
These components flow in independent 'streams', but when compatible 
problems, solutions and participants coincide a decision can be made 
and a problem resolved. 
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In organized anarchies, decisions are made in three different 
ways: - 
(a) by resolution - where some choices do resolve some problems 
after a time; 
(b) by oversight - where if there is enough energy to make a new 
choice quickly this will then be made without reference to 
existing problems; 
(c) by flight - where problems may attach to new choices on 
occasions, leaving the path clear to make the original 
choice, but solving no problems. 
The authors maintain that the latter two ways (b) and (c), are 
the most common processes of decision-making in the model, although 
in the literature resolution is thought to be the most usual. 
This model of decision-making is a radical departure from much of 
the work on this subject. There is little rationality evident in 
decision-making processes and little chance of arriving at optimal 
choices. Furthermore, the decision process and the outcome are 
distinct, they are uncoupled, the latter not necessarily resulting 
from the former: - 
"There is a separation of process and outcome. 
Most of the things going on within the decision 
process have relatively little to do with the 
outcomes. " (1976, p. 373) 
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Cohen et al further assert that it is often "... hard to see the 
connection between organizational actions and their consequences" 
(p. 12). and that often the same organization will have different 
responses at different times. Although analysis does not extend as 
far as the implementation stage, it is argued that it Is misleading 
to think of decisions as the primary outcomes of decision processes 
(P. 351). Changes can occur without decisions being taken. 
In addition, implementation of the decision is not always 
important to decision-makers, what is important is participation In 
the decision-making process. In this way much behaviour during 
decision-making may be presumed to be symbolic - participants are 
more concerned about being included (or not being excluded) than 
about the matter under discussion. Decision-making in this sense is 
much more about political activity, the chance to strengthen old 
allegiances and form new ones, to settle old scores, enhance power 
positions and increase status. The point is supported empirically 
by Rodrigues (1980) who found that in universities and hospitals 
there was indeed more concern with participation in making a decision 
than with whether the means were available to implement it. 
obviously, this is an area which needs to be discussed and the 
issue of power and politicality is an important one which is attended 
to in the next section. 
The ideas of Cohen et al have serious implications for work in 
this area. If, as they say, decisions are uncoupled from their 
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outcomes, can the implementation process be legitimately viewed as a 
continuation or sequel to the activities of decision-making? 
Perhaps it is not meaningful to take a particular decision and see 
how it is Implemented? If the decision itself is not a result of 
coherent and purposeful activity and participants are not much 
interested in its implementation, then any post-decision processes 
too may be ambiguous, undirected and uncoupled. Is It therefore 
valid to investigate the implementation process as though it were a 
natural and logical progression from the act of deciding and a 
discernable social process in its own right? 
So the garbage can model throws uP difficulties for would-be 
researchers. Should processes be uncoupled, if they do appear 
superficially to be random, and if much of organizational behaviour 
is so ambiguous and unconnected, then research becomes a complicated 
task indeed. Organizational analysis is difficult enough but 
research in a world of garbage cans would appear to be even harder! 
March, one of the exponents of the garbage can model, has 
persisted with this theme in an investigation of the implementation 
of policy (Baier, March & Saetren, 1986) and this is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3. 
The research in this thesis has been undertaken with the 
assumption that it is possible to formulate some links between the 
decision and its implementation. BY this it is not meant that all 
the activities of Implementation are directly traceable to the 
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decision, and are undertaken in order to enact the decision in some 
way. Since the decision was originally taken the organization has 
moved on, both in time and in circumstance. There may be deviation 
from the prescribed implementation procedures which may be sanctioned 
or unsanctioned. 
All this may be so, nevertheless, it may be still possible to 
take a particular decision, investigate how it has been implemented 
and analyse the reasons for success or failure. Certainly, it must 
be said that informants in the organizations studied for this 
research found no difficulty in distinguishing between 
decision-making and implementation processes and could easily point 
out which activities had, in their view, been specifically undertaken 
by themselves and others to put these decisions into effect. 
The garbage can model may be too extreme, or empirically limited 
to certain situations. As pointed out, the model is derived 
particularly from organizations operating in the educational sector 
and it is not certain whether the results can be extrapolated to 
apply to other kinds of organizations. The Bradford Studies (1986) 
actually found a definite, though slight, tendency towards fluid 
types of process in educational establishments. This is not what 
might be expected, for if the garbage can model is an accurate 
representation one would expect to find more sporadic decision 
processes in these organizations. Because of this, Hickson et al 
(1986), and also Bush (1986), have queried whether these features of 
ambiguity and uncertainty hold true for all types of organizations, 
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or indeed, for any organization all of the time. 
The emphasis on participants and solutions tangled within the 
garbage can recognises the political nature of decision-making, and 
the Bradford Studies stress the politicality of the matter for 
decision as being an important feature of the process. This is 
unsurprising perhaps as obviously it is people who make decisions in 
an organization - and who implement them. The power to exert 
influence is seen as being of consequence both during decision-making 
and implementation. Much has been written about power in 
decision-making and this is the final aspect discussed in this 
chapter. 
2.2.3 Influencing decision-making 
The Bradford Studies point out that interests in the organization 
play an important part in shaping the decision process. Writers 
such as Bacharach & Lawler (1980) and Pettigrew (1973) have also 
drawn attention to the political aspects of decision-making and 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) looked at influences on decisions about 
resource allocation in their study of a university. 
The amount of power individuals hold and their subsequent ability 
to use it to influence matters in the organization is of great 
interest for organizational analysts. The authority structure Is 
usually clearly delineated by means of an organizational chart which 
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reflects the distribution of officially-sanctioned power, but power 
resources may also be accumulated by other means. As French & Raven 
(1959) have demonstrated, power may result from the ability to 
distribute sanctions or rewards, from having expertise in certain 
areas and from personal characteristics. However this last base of 
power should be treated circumspectly, as Hickson et al (1986) have 
warned that .. personalities without power bases are ultimately 
powerless" (p. 65). Power may also devolve to subunits who can secure 
or control scarce resources for the organization (Hickson et al, 
1971). 
So power and influence may result from various factors, including 
one's position in the organization and access to resources. How and 
why is influence exerted during decision-making and implementation? 
If it is accepted that organizations are collections of sub-units 
or interest groups and that they usually have multiple goals, then it 
must be acknowledged that there is scope for debate about where the 
organization is going and how it is going to get there. It follows 
that the potential exists for disagreement and conflict as well as 
harmony and consensus. Decision-making presents an opportunity for 
these interests to make their opinions heard and to attempt to secure 
their own preferred outcomes. This may not just be in order to 
boost their own power and status, but may be the result of genuine 
debate about the right path to choose. 
It is assumed that individuals or grogps who are able to exert 
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the most influence during decision-making will usually succeed in 
making the final decision concur with their own preferred choice. 
In short, if they are powerful enough they will probably get their 
own way. But this will also depend, to some extent, on what is 
being decided. For example, the Financial Director might reasonably 
be expected to have more potential influence in a decision about 
raising capital than the Sales Director. Similarly, the Marketing 
Director is likely to wield more influence in a decision about the 
introduction of a new marketing strategy, and so on. 
But what about the implementation stage? The criticism here of 
much of the decision-making literature has been that research stops 
once a decision has been made. If patterns of influence are an 
integral part of organizational decision-making, then what happens 
during implementation? Power does not Just disappear at this time, 
though it may move around. Some decision-makers may not be involved 
in implementing the decision so their power may recede, -while other 
interests may be brought into play at this time. In addition, the 
period of implementation may present a chance for those 
decision-makers who were not in agreement with the decision to make a 
comeback, either to change the decision or be uncooperative about the 
one which was taken. 
As the decision filters through the organization other groups and 
individuals will be required to carry out certain aspects of 
implementation and will therefore have a chance to exert some 
influence. Often it is those who are situated towards the bottom of 
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the organizational hierarchy who are most directly affected and who 
have to make it work. Middle and senior management will decide how 
the task is to be done and undertake the supervision but often It is 
at the 'shop floor' level that the decision is put into effect. 
Here are the people who, although not included in decision-making, 
nevertheless may be able to exert significant pressure at this stage. 
So the use of power does not cease once the decision has been 
taken. Its implementation is the second phase of the "match". 
Perhaps a goal has been scored on behalf of some interest groups, but 
the ball is still in play and there is still the chance for other 
interests to score, to nullify the victory or even win the game. 
This is why the second phase Is so important, and why this research 
needs to look at the activities of those involved at both the 
decision-making and the implementation stages. 
But research into the use of influence in organizations is beset 
with problems. Power is not overt but is manifested in certain 
behavioural patterns. Its presence it often assumed when forms of 
aggression, domination or coercion are detected. But it may not 
always be obvious to the researcher (or indeed to organizational 
members) when influence is being employed. 
Much has been written about the insidious use of power in 
decision-making, which can be exercised to prevent particular 
subjects from arising as potential issues. These so-called 
'non-decisions' are would-be decisions which are prevented from being 
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discussed by subtle, covert influences working beneath the surface of 
organizational life. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974) 
have drawn attention to how these can prevent certain matters from 
getting on the discussion agenda, so never becoming overtly 
recognised decision issues. These writers believe that political 
manoeuvrings permeate all organizational activity and that 
non-decisions are as worthy of attention by researchers as are 
decisions, if not more so. 
But while it is not doubted that non-decisions are important 
there are daunting problems in trying to research such covert 
activities. At the very least a researcher would need to be an 
organizational 'insider' to be privy to the more informal 
interactions. Even so, it would be impossible to hear the most 
private whisperings and be aware of the subtlest of pressures. it 
is not always easy to obtain valid data about levels of influence in 
decision-making, but to investigate influence on decisions which are 
not in existence is still more difficult, if not insuperably so. 
Nevertheless, this is not to deny that power and influence are of 
great significance in decision-making, and it is assumed that they 
will also be important features at the implementation stage. 
2.3 Summary 
This chapter has looked at the work of managers in organizations 
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and has concluded that decision-making forms a large and important 
part of their day-to-day activities. The making of strategic 
decisions is of especial interest since these are often more 
problematical for decision-makers, while at the same time being more 
critical for the organization as a whole. 
It is argued that most research in this area has concentrated on 
what have been termed the pre-decision processes, neglecting the 
post-decision processes of decision implementation. Further, much 
of this work is descriptive rather than explanatory and is primarily 
concerned with making modifications to the rational economic model. 
The Bradford Studies, in attempting to explain differences in 
process, are exceptions to this and their work represents a change of 
emphasis. Their conceptual analysis leading to the suggestion that 
politicality and complexity are significant determinants of the 
decision-making process provides both a means of comparison and the 
beginnings of an explanation for these processes. The research 
presented in this thesis is also an attempt to provide concepts and 
explanations for implementation. 
The work of Cohen et al (1972) has been summarised to demonstrate 
the breadth of debate in this area. Their view that process and 
outcome are not necessarily linked poses an intriguing conundrum for 
work on implementation. 
The issue of power and influence during decision-making was 
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discussed. Some authors clearly see it as being the key aspect of 
organizational behaviour. Perhaps whether or not the researcher 
sees decision-making - and implementation - primarily in terms of the 
political manoeuvrings of participants depends upon his or her 
particular perspective. Allison (1969) has drawn attention to the 
implicit conceptuals models which we all use to make sense of data 
and so form our interpretation of events, locating observations In a 
pre-existing contexual framework. 
Certainly, the use of influence needs to be taken into account 
during investigations into implementation. Whether the story is one 
of intrigue and power play - or not - empirical research is required 
to provide the initial data from which 'meaning' can then be 
inferred. 
So what happens at the implementation stage? Though this has 
not really been addressed by the literature reported here, it has 
been given more attention by researchers from other disciplines. 
The next chapter examines the work of authors who focus more directly 
on this topic. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MAKING DECISIONS WORK - THE 'PROBLEM' OF IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter first looks at how the concept of implementation has 
been defined by theorists. Various studies which focus on 
implementation are then assessed. It is noted that much of this 
work is on the boundary of the material discussed in Chapter 2 and 
comes from areas which broadly fall under the labels of policy 
studies or strategic management. Within this literature there is a 
debate about the distinction between formulation and execution 
processes and this is addressed in section 3.2. 
The next section highlights some of the characteristics of 
implementation, together with those aspects which are claimed to have 
an effect on the implementation process. These form a basis for 
the independent variables utilised in this research which are 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
Finally, the research is evaluated and it is argued that there is 
a need for some conceptual analysis to provide an indication of the 
features which comprise implementation together with the factors 
which influence it. 
3.1 Defining implementation 
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The concept of implementation is not always clearly defined in 
the literature. Many studies discuss it in a general way, no doubt 
assuming the dictionary definition where to implement means 'to carry 
out', or 'to give practical effect too, Implementation is thus 
often understood to mean 'putting something into effect', 'enacting' 
or 'realising' something. 
But most writers do not define it precisely. As will be shown, 
there is material which recounts the difficulties of implementation, 
chapters which tell managers how to manage it and reports which point 
to the consequences of implementation failure. But what 
'implementation' actually refers to has to be abstracted from these 
writings as little detailed analysis is provided. 
For example, Part 4 of the Open University reader 'Planning & 
Managing Change' (Mayon-White, 1986) is entitled 'Implementation' and 
covers such items as 'How to implement strategy', 'Implementing new 
technology', and 'Successfully implementing strategic decisions', but 
neither the editor nor any of the authors feel it necessary to 
outline what the term refers to. 
In Mumford & Pettigrew's (1975) book 'Implementing strategic 
decisions' the Preface indicates that: - 
"The book is a research study into a fundamental 
management problem: the planning, organisation, 
and putting into operation of major, new 
projects. " (P-xi) 
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Further on we are told that the theme of the book is the politics 
of planning, the Foreword says that the research covers the way 
organizations cope with uncertainty, and the opening chapter explains 
that the book is about the relationship between innovation and 
uncertainty. This gives some indicatation of the breadth of issues 
which may be connected with implementation. 
Baier, March & Saetren (1986) also suggest areas which may be 
covered when they relate that: - 
"One of the oldest topics in the study of 
organizations Is the relation between policy and 
practice, the way general directives and programs 
adopted by legislatures, boards of directors, or 
top managements are executed, modified, and 
elaborated by administrative organizations. " 
(p. 197) 
So, while there would seem to be an opinion that implementation 
refers to putting some kind of decision into practice, this reference 
to 'modification' and 'elaboration'. suggest there is room during 
implementation for changes to be made to what has been decided. 
Indeed, they go further than this, maintaining that policy 
formulation and implementation are fused and not distinct 
processes. This premise is discussed further in section 3.2. 
Heller et al (1988) see implementation as being part of the 
decision process. They break this down into four phases with 
implementation being the fourth and final phase, covering ....... the 
period between finalization and the final operation of the decision 
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or its failure" (p. 4). 
This identifies a fairly definite period of activity. According 
to Heller et al, implementation starts when the decision has been 
made and finishes when the decision is either working or seen to be 
unworkable for whatever reasons. However, it has proved 
notoriously difficult to put very exact start and finish times on 
decision-making, so it may be the case that the beginnings and ends 
of the implementation phase are not always so obvious. 
one problem with finding a suitable definition is that 
implementation issues are covered by authors dealing with change in 
organizations, strategic analysis and planning, policy-making, 
business policy and innovation. And most of these topics suffer 
from similar definitional confusion. Pennings (1985) in particular 
has noted and commented on this. 
one reason for this is that strategic decisions are often linked 
to policy issues, and can involve the organization changing in some 
way. So, although the connections between strategic decision-making 
and policy-making are not explicit (does policy-making always involve 
making strategic decisions? ) the idea of deciding something which 
must then be put into effect is a common theme. 
Thus, Hage (1980), talking about four key stages in the process 
of change has implementation as the third stage. The full process 
is: - evaluation, initiation, implementation and routinization. 
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Utilising a systems framework he maintains that 'evaluation' refers 
to the function of pattern-maintenance which allows any 'performance 
gap' to be recognised. 'Initiation' is essentially a search for 
resources, in terms of adequate funding and personnel and "the goal 
achievement functional problem is the implementation stage" 
(P. 209). Furthermore: - 
"Almost everyone has agreed that the next stage 
should be called implementation. This phase 
starts with the first attempts to manufacture the 
new output or to provide the new service. " 
(p. 211) 
The 'routinization' stage is where the innovation is either 
rejected, or accepted by the dominant coalitions and finally 
integrated into the organization. 
But writers are not always clear about what activities constitute 
implementation and they even change their minds during the course of 
their work. Pressman & Wildavsky (1973), who attempted one of the 
earliest studies, are not always consistent In their usage of the 
term. They looked at the problems encountered at local level in the 
U. S. when attempting to implement a federal programme. One of their 
first discussions of implementation would seem to refer to the 
achievement of successful outcomes from a policy decision: - 
"Let us agree to talk about policy as a hypothesis 
containing initial conditions and predicted 
consequences. If X is done at time ti, then Y 
will result at time t2.... Implementation would 
here constitute the ability to achieve the 
predicted consequences after the initial 
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conditions have been met. " (p. xiv) 
They then maintain: - "Implementation may be viewed as a process 
of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to 
achieving them. " (p. xv). So implementation is used to refer both 
to process and outcome. 
As Dunsire (1978) points out in a very comprehensive chapter on 
definitional issues: - 
"Using the same word in two, or even three, 
distinct senses without noticing is not an unusual 
feature of discussions on themes like this. If 
'implementation' is the name of what follows the 
setting of goals - the choosing of action, the 
moving into action, and the effect induced by 
action, - the same applies to 'execution'. It is 
the arranging for the death sentence to be carried 
out, the carrying out of the death sentence and 
the death-sentence-having-been-carried-out. The 
synonyms for each word also (curiously) bear the 
same ambiguity: consider words like completion, 
fuflfilment, and accomplishment. One word stands 
for process, output and outcome. " (P. 69) 
So implementation is a process of carrying out something, an 
attempt to achieve something, a way of closing the gap between an 
existing state affid a desired state. It is also the outcome of 
these processes - that which is achieved or carried out. 
Importantly too, it is also a social process, that is a person or 
a number of people are required to carry it out, to make it 
happen. As one might expect where people are required to act 
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together in this way there is room for a variety of perspectives and 
value-systems, which in turn may lead to ambiguity, confusion, 
disagreement and conflict. 
Bardach (1977) gives an intimation of the potential for political 
activity in his definition of the implementation process: - 
"To summarize, then, the 'implementation' process 
is: (1) a process of assembling the elements 
required to produce a particular programmatic 
outcome, and (2) the playing out of a number of 
loosely inter-related games whereby these elements 
are withheld from or delivered to the program 
assembly process on particular terms. " (p. 57) 
In this definition Bardach is using the game metaphor in a 
similar way to that of Crozier & Friedberg (1977), and he expands on 
this as follows: - 
"The idea of 'games', therefore, will serve 
principally as a master metaphor that directs 
attention and stimulates insight. It directs us 
to look at the players, what they regard as the 
stakes, their strategies and tactics, their 
resources for playing, the rules of play (which 
stipulate the conditions for winning), the rules 
of 'fair' play (which stipulate the boundaries 
beyond which lie fraud or illegitimacy), the 
nature of the communications (or lack of them) 
among the players, and the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the possible outcomes. The game 
metaphor also directs our attention to who is not 
willing to play and for what reasons, and to who 
insists on changes in some of the game's 
parameters as a condition for playing. " (p. 56) 
Thus, in many ways the implementation process is seen to share 
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similar attributes to the pre-decision processes of decision-making 
discussed in the last chapter. Both may be viewed as arenas for 
the exercise of influence and power. The games and activities which 
are brought under the spotlight during decision-making also continue 
afterwards, though of course they may begin long before this and are 
played elsewhere at other times. 
But in many ways this is the time when actions (and inaction) 
really begin to count. In some ways the decision is Just the 
shouting before the match. Implementation is when the decision is 
made tangible and its consequences start to manifest themselves. 
It is surprising then that this topic has received such 
relatively little attention. As Heller et al (1988) have 
remarked: - 
"The use of implementation as a separate phase for 
measuring events, has previously been largely 
ignored in the literature but, as will be shown, 
it is a very important part of the decision 
process. " (p. 4) 
And they continue: - "Contrary to our expectation more time is 
spent on implementation than on any other phase. And this is a 
phase that has not previously been investigated. " (p. 9). But they 
have little more to add on the subject after this comment. 
This point is further noted by Skivington & Daft (1988): - 
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"A growing body of research suggests that most 
organizations formulate some type of deliberate 
strategy which is then implemented, yet there has 
been little published research into how strategy 
implementation takes place. " (p. 1) 
Also Brunsson (1985): - 
"In particular, great efforts have been put into 
prescribing how the 'best' choice should be made, 
given a specific problem, specific alternatives 
and specific information. .... Less attention has been paid to other phases in the 
decision-making process, or the implementation of 
the decision once made. (P-16) 
So, it is argued here that the topic of implementation Is an 
important area in organizational terms and a logical extension to the 
on-going research into pre-decision activities. We have seen that 
there is some discussion about exactly what activities implementation 
refers to. And even whether it is part of the decision process as 
Heller et al assert, or something which can be separated from it. 
It is the intention of this thesis to define this concept in 
greater detail. The aim in doing this is firstly to bring some 
clarification into an area of confusion and ambiguity, and secondly, 
to operationalise the term in order to make it a researchable 
issue. The next chapter is devoted to this exercise. 
However, it must be said that this topic is the subject of much 
debate in the literature and this helps to explain why some confusion 
about definition exists. Some authors would not agree that such 
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conceptual clarity is either necessary or feasible, and that 
decision-making and implementation can not be divorced from each 
other in this way. This obviously has implications for research, as 
was noted in the previous chapter. Some of the debate emanates from 
the area of policy studies and this is discussed in the following 
section. 
3.2 The fomulation and execution of policy 
As the literature on decision-making has indicated it is not an 
easy task to determine where any one decision-making process starts 
and finishes. It is often possible to trace decisions over many 
years but the 'beginnings' are frequently lost in the mists of 
time. The matter to be decided may undergo several re-definitions 
until few can remember exactly when things were first triggered 
off. So, one assumes, it must be with the implementation process. 
One does not expect to be able to locate clear beginnings and 
endings, and it is quite possible that separate parts of a decision 
may be implemented at different times. Mintzberg and his 
colleagues have drawn attention to the somewhat circuitous routeways 
which decisions may take (1976). It would not therefore be 
particularly surprising if the implementation process too were not 
straightforward. 
Developing this theme, various writers have suggested that 
decision-making and implementation processes cannot be meaningfully 
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separated but are collapsed together. Equating decision-making and 
implementation with policy formulation and execution, the view is 
that policy is continually being made and re-made, reinterpreted and 
re-defined as decisions are put into effect. Therefore decisions 
are taken throughout the process, and these may clarify or change the 
original objectives, identify appropriate means and incorporate 
changing organizational and environmental circumstances. 
March (1981) in a discussion on organizational change notes that 
organizations are continually changing but this change cannot be 
.. arbitrarily controlled", in fact, "Organizations rarely do exactly 
what they are told to do". (p. 563). Hence people are not as much in 
control as they would like to think. Making things happen in 
organizations is not as straightforward as is believed. 
Barrett & Hill (1984) expand on ideas put forward in Barrett & 
Fudge (1981) and argue strongly that "implementation must be regarded 
as an integral part of the policy process rather than an 
administrative 'follow on' from policy making". They continue: - 
"The political processes by which policy is 
mediated, negotiated, and modified during its 
formulation and legitimation do not stop when 
initial policy decisions have been made, but 
continue to influence policy through the behaviour 
of those responsible for its implementation and 
those affected by policy acting to protect or 
enhance their own interests. " (p. 220) 
This leads them to the opinion that it is undesirable to view 
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policy as emanating from the top of organizations as this is based 
upon a notion of a traditional, pyramidal hierarchy which may be 
incorrect. They argue that classical organization theory provides a 
very mechanistic and instrumental perspective, seeing policies as 
being decided by top management and subsequently put into effect by 
subordinates and agencies which are the instruments of 
implementation. There is thus a separation between the 'deciders' 
and the 'doers', similar to the distinction between mind and body 
which Marxist and Labour Process theory writers have discerned. 
This perspective is based on notions of 'rationality' and leads to a 
focus on aspects of communication and control to ensure that what has 
been decide by the powers-that-be is implemented properly. 
Barrett & Fudge and Barrett & Hill maintain that it is necessary 
to take a more politically aware view of the process. Many of the 
so-called problems encountered during the implementation process and 
the 'failures' of policy are explained by recognition of the fact 
that the implementation process is a political process. 
Implementors may act in a self-interested may which may confound 
intentions at the top of the organization. 
The authors cite the work of Strauss (1978) and the concept of 
'negotiated order' to draw attention to the continual negotiation 
which is endemic in the process. They also stress that attention 
needs to be given to the linkages between actors, questions of 
control and coordination, and issues of conflict and consensus (1981, 
P. 29). Much depends on "the degree to which different actors and 
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agencies share value systems and objectives and are thus more or less 
willing to support and execute particular policies and programmes" 
(p. 21). Therefore there are questions of control but also questions 
of consensus to be investigated. 
This has implications for how the 'success' of PolicY is to be 
measured. If it is crucial that action must conform to the stated 
policy then any deviation or compromise may well be viewed as 
failure. If, however, it is merely a question of getting something 
done, then performance rather than conformance is a central objective 
(P-21) and negotiation, interaction and bargaining turn the 
implementation process into "the art of the possible". 
Essentially these authors are wary of a 'managerialist' thesis 
which accepts the perspectives and goals of senior management and 
they draw attention to the way that power may be used by others in 
order to achieve objectives. 
In many ways this echoes Bardach's thesis and emphasises the 
potential for actors to engage in political activity. Barrett & 
Hill note too that the game may open up to different players as it 
continues: - 
"Conflicts which probably started early in the 
life of the policy continue. Furthermore new 
interests, which were not able to participate in 
those early stages, may also become involved. 
The crucial issue here is the degree to which one 
group of actors is in a position to control, 
coerce or influence the behaviour of others, when 
conflict arises between them. " (p. 227) 
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Another important point in their discussion centres on the idea 
that policy may not always originate at the top of the organization 
to be subsequently implemented by those at the bottom of the 
hierarchy. They maintain that this traditional 'top-down' view of 
the implementation process is unnecessarily restricting. It is also 
possible to see policy as being a response to problems and pressures 
which are at 'ground level', that is which emanate from the bottom of 
the organization. Policy may also be made as a result of actions or 
innovations which subordinates initiate. As they say: - "At any 
point in time it may not be possible to say whether action is 
influencing policy or policy action" (1984, p. 219). 
This has important consequences for research in that this 
argument substantiates the feasibility of taking a 'bottom-up' 
perspective as advocated by Elmore (1982) and others. This is where 
the researcher starts with the manifestations of policy as they 
appear at the ground level and then works back up the organization to 
see where and how they originated. This topic is discussed in 
detail when the whole question of methodology is addresssed in 
Chapter 5. 
To sum up the discussion so far, these authors propound that the 
distinction between policy formulation and implementation is an 
artificial one. Mainstream perspectives on the implementation 
process are inherently based on too rigid notions of rationality and 
see policy as being formulated solely by senior management and 
enacted by surbordinates. They pay too little attention to the 
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process of reinterpretation and negotiation between actors and to 
political behaviour. Consensus, control and compliance are too 
often treated as a problem for managers to contend with, a managerial 
issue, rather than a political issue. 
However, an important point to note here is that these writers 
are primarily addressing the question of policy-making in public 
authorities. Although they make use of concepts and ideas from 
organization theory they are talking specifically about organizations 
which operate in the public arena. Indeed, Hjern & Porter (1981) 
have argued that a multiorganizational analytic perspective is 
necessary when discussing policies which are implemented by clusters 
or parts of public and private organizations. They put forward the 
idea of an 'implementation structure' as a unit of analysis, and 
suggest that analytic frameworks which focus on single organizations 
(or individuals) lead to "distorted and exaggerated" perceptions of 
implementation deficits (p. 211). 
But it is not at all clear whether decision-making in other kinds 
of organizations (individual private business firms for example) will 
automatically follow the precepts outlined by these writers. One 
important difference is noted by Barrett & Hill themselves: - 
"However a central thesis ...... was that the implementation of much public policy is dependent 
on action by groups that are relatively autonomous 
and not subJect to the direct authority of those 
making policy. In these situations particularly 
other influence mechanisms have to be brought into 
play, hence the emphasis on negotiation and 
bargaining, and the likelihood of policy 
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modifications as a part of the process. " 
(1984, P. 226) 
Whether the implementation process is the same as that 
encountered by Barrett et al when strategic decisions are formulated 
and executed in the same organization, is a question for the research 
reported in this thesis. It may well be that the scope for such 
negotiation is reduced when control can be exercised nearer to the 
point of execution. 
A further point to note about this kind of implementation 
research is that it is, as Elmore as pointed out, "long on 
description and short on prescription" (1982, p. 16). This may well 
be because the studies are also short on analysis. There is almost 
no detailed analysis of the implementation process itself and little 
in the way of conceptual clarification. Implementation studies 
share with research on decision-making a basic absence of theoretical 
foundation; they are essentially descriptions of how things happen. 
But it must be acknowleged that the work of Barrett and her 
colleagues is rooted in empirical enquiry and does attempt to provide 
a more sophisticated appraisal of implementation problems. 
However, even these researchers achieve little systematic analysis of 
why things happen as they do - apart from the implicit assumption 
that it is the result of a particular (capitalist? ) way of organizing 
and 'self-interested' behaviour. 
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As they themselves point out (1983) and as noted here in the last 
chapter, there are significant methodological problems in trying to 
research this kind of political activity. And there is also the 
possibility that research framed within such a perspective will be 
inevitably coloured with a political hue. 
So this literature raises some interesting issues. Is 
negotiation and power-bargaining a feature of all implementation 
processes in organizations, or is it primarily connected to the 
execution of policy decisions? Is the implementation of strategic 
decisions and policy the same, or because the former are located 
within the boundaries of one focal organization, does this mean the 
process is more 'held in' and restrained, with less possibility for 
negotiation of this kind? 
Baier, March & Saetren (1986) begin with a similar premise about 
the undesirability of separating out policy-making and implementation 
processes. In essence their argument is that the oft-cited 
Ppolicy problem' - in other words the tendency for policy as 
implemented to differ from policy as adopted - is more a problem of 
perspective and interpretation. They point out that two reasons 
often given for policy failure are the incompetence of bureaucratic 
mechanisms which are supposed to do the implementing and the conflict 
between interest units. However, these reasons often mask the 
underlying features of much of policy-making where it is the 
ambiguity of the processes which are important. 
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This assumption is similar to the underlying reasoning behind the 
garbage can model of decision-making which March and others have 
already put forward and which was described in Chapter 2. In the 
garbage can model decision-making was described as taking place under 
uncertainty and ambiguity. When it comes to implementation 
ambiguity also plays an important part. 
Baier, March & Saetren maintain that policies are often ambiguous 
because of the very nature of the process of policy-making. When 
policies are being decided there is often little consensus, therefore 
coalitions are formed, matters are negotiated and there is much 
'horse-trading'. This is unlikely to result in coherent plans and 
logical policy. The main problems are likely to be that the adopted 
policies are too optimistic, that is, their expected benefits will be 
oversold in an attempt to make them attractive. In addition, the 
real level of support for the policies may well be exaggerated in 
order to attract yet greater support. Finally, the policy as chosen 
will be intentionally ambiguous because this gives room for many 
interpretations to ensure backing at the adoption stage and 
discretion in implementation. 
Thus: - 
Official Policy is likely to be vague, 
co, 
ýt, 
radictory, or adopted without generally shared 
expectations about its meaning or 
implementation. " (P. 206) 
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A further consideration is that sometimes policy formulation may 
be symbolically more Important than its actual implementation. As 
in the garbage can model people may sometimes be more concerned about 
participating in policy-making (and being seen to participate, and be 
actively 'for' or 'against' certain policy) than in making sure that 
policy is implemented. Participants are anxious to create and 
maintain a positive image and can become skilled in impression 
management. 
1. An interest in the support of constituents, 
whether voter or stockholders or clients, leads 
policy makers to be vigorous in enacting policies 
and lax In enforcing them. " (P-198) 
Baier et al appreciate that administrative deficiencies may also 
contribute to implementation problems. They note that administrative 
systems (especially bureaucracies) may not be able to cope with the 
size or scope of new responsibilities, may not have adequately 
skilled or trained staff, and may experience self-interested or 
political behaviour by sub-units. In addition they may be given 
policies which cannot be feasibly implemented, or require the 
coordination of several other organizations. 
These are all valid reasons for Implementation failure but the 
authors are concerned that too much emphasis is placed on these 
factors and not enough attention given to the way policy is made. 
Policy is arrived at through a complex process of negotiation and 
arbitration, and the resulting policy measures are not clear, 
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consistent or stable. Because of this it is unsurprising that there 
is considerable ambiguity about what is to be implemented and how 
this is to be achieved. 
This perspective is important and provoking. It highlights the 
differences of opinion between those who believe that the way forward 
is to devise better management practices to ensure that policy is 
able to be implemented without major problems, and those others (in 
the 'booing section', as Janis puts it, 1985, p. 158) who believe 
there Is no such way forward. As Baier et al end their paper: - 
"Any simple concept of implementation, with its 
implicit assumption of clear and stable policy 
intent, is likely to lead to a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the policy process and to 
disappointment with efforts to reform it. " 
(p. 209) 
To sum up this section it has been shown that much of the 
material which looks at policy implementation is concerned with the 
'problems' of policy. The major debate is about how these problems 
should be seen. on the one hand there is a literature which 
describes implementation difficulties and sees these as management 
issues of control, communication and coordination. On the other hand 
writers such as Barrett & Fudge, Barrett & Hill and Baier et al point 
to the complexity of the implementation process and the political 
arena in which the games of implementation are played. They argue 
strongly for a more complete view of implementation which takes 
account of the processes which lead to policy, maintaining that 
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policy formulation and its enactment are not separate but are part of 
the same set of activities. 
This does lead to potential research problems. One difficulty 
lies in untangling such complex threads of interwoven processes where 
behaviour is not what it seems and much organizational activity is 
covert. Some of the inherent problems in empirical investigations 
of this kind have already been discussed in Chapter 2. Another 
practical research problem is that if pre- and post-decision 
processes need to be considered as a whole, then the time period 
needed for research may be very protracted. More will be said about 
these issues in Chapter 5. 
Since this thesis is to investigate how strategic decisions are 
enacted, what can be extrapolated from the foregoing about the 
factors which affect Implementation? What helps implementation, 
what hinders it and what, if anything, can be done by organizational 
decision-makers to make implementation less problematical? This 
last question is posed with the awareness that it may open the poser 
to criticism about 'helping one side (i. e. managers) to win' (Barrett 
& Hill, 1983). 
The next section looks at this question and examines further work 
to see what has been written explicitly about the factors influencing 
implementation. 
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3.3 Reasons for implementation success and failure 
Although the writers referred to in the previous section deplore 
a too simplistic notion of implementation there are a number of 
factors which many authors agree can have a significant impact on the 
implementation process. This section investigates these with a view 
to providing a basis for the independent variables used in this 
research, and which are further discussed in Chapter 4. 
One potential problem is that there may be ambiguity and conflict 
about the matter for, and means of, implementation. This may be due 
to the nature of the decision-making process itself, the intrinsic 
complexity of what is to be put into effect, or the deliberate 
strategies of self-interested groups or individuals. 
A consideration here is that it is not always possible (or 
desirable) for decision- or policy-makers to be able to specify in 
complete detail what needs to be done during implementation. There 
is therefore some discretion at 'street level' (Lipsky, 1980). As 
Stephenson (1985, P. 152) notes, there is likely to be some 
improvisation in even carefully planned decisions. However, Elmore 
(1982) proposes that such discretion may be beneficial, allowing the 
implementors to make changes necessary for policy success: - 
"Nowhere in this view is serious thought given to 
how to capitalize on discretion as a device for 
improving the reliability and effectiveness of 
policies at the street-level. Standardized 
solutions, developed at great distance from the 
problem, are notoriously unreliable; policies 
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that fix street-level behaviour in the interest of 
uniformity and consistency are difficult to adapt 
to situations that policy makers failed to 
anticipate. " (p. 26) 
Again this refers to policy-making in large bureaucracies and it 
is not certain how far this can apply to all organizational 
decision-making. Nevertheless, one of the main reasons for 
implementation problems in organizations is deemed to be the 
inability (or unwillingness) of people to carry out implementation 
procedures in the prescribed manner. The usual management advice to 
deal with this is to exercise better methods of communication and 
control. However it could be argued that changes need to be made by 
those 'at the sharp end' when confronted by the realities of 
implementation. 
Baier et al (1986) suggest that this lack of specificity is 
endemic in the policy process. Even so managers may try to increase 
the clarity, precision and comprehensiveness of policy. Bishop 
(1981) has drawn attention to the importance of 'briefing' - the 
process by which what is required during implementation is 
communicated by one agent to another - and has argued that 
inadequacies in this can be responsible for implementation failure. 
Much of the literature from public policy is concerned with 
policy which emanates from the central government and has to be put 
into effect by local government, often involving links between a 
number of organizations. Pressman & Wildavsky (1973) note the 
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difficulties inherent in this kind of network and this is echoed by 
Baier et al (1986), Barrett & Hill (1984) and Bardach (1977). The 
essential worry is one of coordination. Although this may not be 
considered to be such a major problem in organizational 
decision-making there may still be difficulties in coordinating 
sub-units. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) were among the first to 
stress the need for integrating mechanisms in complex organizations 
to overcome the hazards of differentiation. 
Stephenson (1985) has noted that implementation may be hampered 
if decisions require particular sub-units to depart from established 
procedures to perform unprogrammed tasks. He maintains that 
implementation in such circumstances can only be successful if the 
rewards are substantial and clearly identifiable, although he cites 
no empirical research to substantiate this. However, Owen (1986) 
has suggested that payment systems in organizations are often geared 
to past achievements rather than future goals. 
It is often assumed that motivation and commitment are required 
to facilitate successful change strategies (Brunsson, 1985; Radford, 
1986). Radford comments as follows: - 
"Experience in the management of change shows that 
it is essential that a certain number of people 
within the organization need to be committed to 
the changes required before the desired results 
can be brought about". (p. 194) 
Daft (1986, p. 288) too advocates the formation of teams to 
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oversee the implementation of major decisions. The ideal would 
appear to be full and public support from the top of the 
organization, a team to supervise implementation plus an 'idea 
champion' (Skivington & Daft, 1988). This last is the choosing of 
an individual who is deeply commited to the decision and will whip up 
enthusiasm and commitment from others. The clear allocation of 
responsibility and accountability for the successful implementation 
of strategy is also a necessary factor (Owen, 1986, p. 222). 
In fact, the whole concept of participation is deemed to be very 
important. It is often remarked that people dislike change 
(Radford, 1986; Bardach, 1977; Mumford & Pettigrew, 1975) and may 
suffer from 'myopic blockages' (Lorange, 1985, p. 451) which are 
caused by being trapped in the traditional way of doing things. 
Participation is often seen to be a key way of trying to overcome 
such resistance by involving those affected by the change in aspects 
of pre- and post-decision processes. According to Hage (1980, p. 212) 
"The more radical the change, the more prolonged and difficult the 
implementation period and the greater the conflict and resistance by 
the members of the organization". 
Therefore involvement in the discussions about what is to be done 
and the way it will be tackled is often seen to be a way of ensuring 
commitment during implementation. Good communication and education 
of staff are of help here (Radford, 1986; Daft, 1986). Daft also 
promotes the idea of 'incremental implementation' (1986, p. 289) to 
allow each stage to be managed more easily and to allow 
- 71 - 
organizational members to see the first signs of success (and so be 
motivated to commit themselves to the rest). This incremental 
method of implementation also has the advantages which Braybrooke and 
Lindblom (1963) foresaw in that if a decision is poor only a few 
resources are lost. 
Schilit's (1987) study on the influence of middle level 
management in the formulation and implementation of strategic 
decisions, found that their influence was more prevalent during 
implementation than formulation though their success depended to some 
extent on an already established good working relationship with 
superiors. His conclusion was that because of this, middle level 
managers needed to be included more at the formulation stage. 
Mumford & Pettigrew's (1975) research on innovation, uncertainty 
and the implementation of strategic decisions emphasises that the 
human factor is the most important area for management: - 
"The conclusion is reached that the successful 
implementation of major strategic innovations such 
as the introduction of large-scale computer 
systems depends largely on management's handling 
of the human problems which arise. " (P. xii) 
So many studies from different areas of enquiry agree that 
research must focus on the human side of implementation. it is 
clear that interest groups can either help or hinder 
implementation. The implementation stage can see a continuation of 
conflict and hostilities begun earlier on, with the additional 
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complication that other interest groups (the limplementors') can 
enter the stage at this time. 
Even if there exists a modicum of consensus about what a decision 
is attempting to achieve and the means by which it will be enacted, 
there is room for ambiguity and confusion. Lack of precision about 
implementation can lead to areas of discretion which may be to the 
organization's benefit or to individual advantage. 
Finally, even if everyone in the organization is agreed, 
committed and motivated, there is still the necessity for some 
overall coordinating mechanisms to ensure that the stages of the 
process are harmonized. 
Much of the above may seem very much like common sense 
platitudes, since it does not tell us under which circumstances 
organizational members are more likely to be hostile or 
enthusiastic. Are some decisions inherently more contentious, and 
is participation always the answer? Such questions await further 
investigation in this study. 
Strategic decisions and policy-making share the same tendency to 
commit a substantial amount of organizational resources. Change 
and innovation do not come cheaply as a rule and resources must be 
made available to match the requirements of implementation at each 
stage. Radford (1986) reports that a resource allocation plan 
should be drawn up in close cooperation with the individuals who are 
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to carry out the activities. This does not refer only to financial 
resources but: - 
"The specification of resources available for 
implementation are made with respect to each level 
in the organization in terms of financial, 
technological, and human categories. " (p. 197) 
Therefore there is a need for personnel who are adequately 
briefed and trained - and enough of them to carry out the tasks 
envisaged. There is also a need for appropriate administrative 
systems (some of which may be completely new) to cope with the 
activities of implementation, monitor these as over time, and cope 
with any new organizational needs afterwards (Lorange, 1985). Owen 
(1986) notes that one of the reasons why strategy may not materialise 
is because the information available for monitoring implementation is 
not adequate. 
Financial resources are particulary critical, especially as they 
are usually scarce and there is competition for them. Text books on 
strategic management are particularly adept at providing guidance on 
budgeting in such circumstances (for example, Bowman & Asch, 1987, 
196). 
Another aspect which may be considered as a resource is time, for 
too little time may hinder success. Stephenson (1985) notes that 
"though assessments of requirements may be made, these can be found 
wanting" (p. 152). Alexander's (1986) questionnaire survey of 93 
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private sector firms asked which implementation problems were most 
frequently encountered and found that the fact that implementation 
took more time than originally allocated was top of the list. The 
difficulties caused by coordination of implementation tasks, other 
competing activities and the skills and training of staff were also 
problems which occurred to most of the organizations questioned. 
It may not always be easy to estimate the duration of 
implementation and an imposed deadline may only increase the pressure 
on implementors to no avail. Dutton (1986) and Rosenthal (1986) 
have drawn attention to the differences between decision-making under 
crisis and non-crisis conditions where the heightened sense of 
urgency during a crisis may lead to increased centralization and 
improvised reactions. This may in turn be supposed to have serious 
repercussions for the post-decision processes. 
Thus, in addition to the 'people factors' which may influence 
implementation, there is also the need for adequate resources. 
Finally, there are the factors which emanate from outside of the 
organization itself. These can affect implementation even more 
critically, may be less foreseeable, and are certainly less 
controllable by organizational members. 
Alexander's survey, mentioned above, gives some dramatic 
instances of unexpected external events which impede implementation. 
one firm suffered the unwelcome attention of a hurricane which tore 
off the roof of a new plant and damaged equipment; a strike bY 
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airline traffic controllers and a reduction in flights reduced demand 
for another firm's new jet-pull-out tractor, and a surprising upturn 
in sales hampered a firm which was attempting to move three plants 
into one new modern facility. 
Stephenson (1985) has the following comment to make on this 
subject: - 
"Decisions will only be implemented as long as 
external circumstances do not impose crippling 
restraints on their activation. The problem here 
is that these circumstances are frequently outside 
the control of the managers. " (p. 152) 
Of course, some unforeseen events may prove to be advantageous 
for the organization but there has been little research on this 
aspect - the recording of disasters being perhaps considered more 
newsworthy. 
One unforeseen event which did prove particularly advantageous to 
one person in an organization is recounted in the opening chapter of 
'Top Decisions' (Hickson et al, 1986). This is where two directors 
in a chemical company were locked in argument over whether to use the 
high pressure steam produced by the plant to generate its own 
electricity. Because it required the purchase of a new boiler the 
project was initially shelved but a fortuituous offer of cheap coal 
from the National Coal Board meant that a new boiler had to be 
purchased anyway. This inadvertently made it feasible for the 
company to go ahead and generate its own electricity. The director 
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who was favourable to this therefore got his own way, he became 
Managing Director, and eventually the decision was a huge success 
because other energy costs fortuitously rose! 
This case clearly shows the impact which unforeseen eventualities 
may have in helping to implement certain decisions. 
This section has now looked at how people in organizations may 
influence implementation; how human, technical/administrative and 
temporal resources may affect it, and finally, how external 
circumstances may help or hinder its course. To finish, a brief 
resume is given of one of the few more analytical attempts to define 
a model of implementation. 
Skivington & Daft (1988) note that there are two perspectives of 
strategy-making. One Is that strategy is deliberate and Intended. 
It is formulated by top level decision-makers and implemented 
downward through the organization, utilising the existing structural 
framework and operating systems. This kind of implementation is 
expected to occur in "machine bureaucracies and other organizations 
characterized by central control and tight coupling" (p. 1). The 
other perspective focusses on the informal structure of the 
organization, viewing strategy as emerging from the largely 
autonomous decisions made by different parts of the organization. 
In this second perspective, strategy results from the interactive 
processes of organizational members and may be more evident in 
loosely coupled adhocracies (here they draw on Mintzberg & Waters, 
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1985). 
These two perspectives of implementation (as being either 
'deliberate' or 'emergent') give rise to two ways of implementing 
business-level strategies. The first utilises a 'framework 
modality', the second a 'process modality'. Skivington & Daft claim 
that these are useful in providing: - 
.. *-* a way to understand the diversity of implementation mechanisms within organizations and 
why implementation may occur through the reshaping 
of the formal blueprint or through the creation of 
mew meaning and values within the organization. " 
(P. 8) 
They look at the implementation of two types of business 
strategy: - 'low cost' (increasing competitiveness by reducing 
operating costs) and 'differentiation' (offering distinctive 
products) to see which perspective provides a more accurate picture 
of the way in which implementation is carried out. The results, 
which were obtained by a single interview with a top manager in each 
of 60 firms, indicate that elements from both framework and process 
modalities were used to implement each kind of strategy. Strategy 
was therefore put into effect by means of formal and informal 
structural elements - it was partly deliberate and partly emergent. 
This suggests that the two perspectives of implementation may not 
be absolutely separate and that a combination of elements from each 
may provide a more meaningful picture of reality. 
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However the researchers tell us that their research deals with 
smaller discrete strategic decisions". It is difficult to 
understand what a small, yet strategic decision might be since 
strategic decisions are usually, by definition, the larger and more 
important ones in organizations. The decisions studied seem to 
cover a wide range of activities and the level of 'strategicness' is 
not always easy to estimate. Nevertheless, this study is important 
in its attempt to distinguish and analyse implementation processes. 
It is one of the few research projects which endeavours to look 
beneath the surface of implementation and start to specify concepts 
and relationships. The authors do not provide a complete set of 
conceptual or theoretical insights, nor do they provide conclusions 
about the success or failure of the implementation strategies they 
describe, however their model is a useful starting point for more 
theoretically based discusssions. 
3.4 Summary and conclusions 
Although there would appear to be several studies of 
implementation, few of them provide much in the way of an explicit 
explanation of the implementation process, with the possible 
exception of Skivington & Daft's work. Hood (1975) some time ago 
made reference to the lack of detailed analysis in the literature: - 
"Several writers have drawn attention to the lack 
of balance in the standard administrative and 
business literature between the emphasis on 
planning and decision-making on the one hand, and 
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the lack of a systematic discussion of 
implementation processes on the other hand. " 
(P. 190) emphasis added 
Williams (1982) reports that "no dominant theoretical framework 
has emerged" (p. 13), and although he is optimistic about the answer 
he also poses a question: - 
(are implementation studies) "anything more than 
warmed over public administration, or 
organizational theory revisited often by people 
who do not seem to have a very firm grasp of the 
massive work done on organizations in the past? " 
(P-15) 
Mumford & Pettigrew (1975) claim to present at least one theory 
concerning implementation and strategic decision-making (p. 105). 
Essentially though, what is presented are rather general, descriptive 
statements about political behaviour and uncertainty. 
Thus there is a distinct lack of theoretical advancement, and 
progress is hampered by the lack of conceptual definition of the 
features and outcomes of implementation. The literature covered in 
this chapter therefore suggests a number of areas which require 
further research. 
Additionally, this chapter has highlighted some particular 
research problems. Initially, there is the decision whether to 
study public sector 'implementation structures' or whether to 
concentrate on relatively unitary organizations. Many studies have 
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shown that implementation in the public sector requires a great deal 
of inter-organizational collaboration and coordination. In 
contrast, it has already been suggested that the implementation of 
strategic decisions in single organizations may well be less complex 
and problematic. Decisions which have originated, and will be 
broadly enacted, within the compass of one organization may be 
different from those described in the foregoing literature. It may 
even be that the complexity of public sector research in fact hinders 
theory formulation. If this is so, then the decision to focus on 
unitary organizations for this study may make it easier to discern 
explanations. 
Another issue is the fuzzy distinction between the making of 
policy and the making of decisions. Many authors cited here have 
attended specifically to the making and implementation of (public) 
policy. But are the processes they describe to be found in the 
implementation of strategic decisions? Or, is policy something 
larger and more amorphous, inherently more ambiguous and 
problematical to make and put into effect? The study reported in 
this thesis looks at strategic decisions. These are part of 
organizational policy, although it may be argued that they are often 
more to do with putting policy into practice. They can be viewed 
as the sub-decisions which are made in order to to carry out 
previously stated (or unstated) policy decisions. They are made 
within the context and framework of overarching negotiation about 
what the organization is trying to do and where it is going. 
Therefore it is not certain that implementation in relatively unitary 
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organizations follows a similar path as that mapped out by policy 
research. 
A further issue is whether a way can be devised of 
conceptualising 'implementation' in order to make it 'researchable'. 
Definitions of implementation are uncertain and confused and 
implementation activities are under-specified. A major purpose of 
this thesis is to attempt to operationalise implementation in ways 
that are usable in empirical research. This attempt is the subject 
of the next chapter. 
Another question that arises is from whom to collect data. Does 
the researcher see 
shop floor workers? 
decision or those 
at the top of the 
'bottom-up' (Elmore, 
briefly alluded to 
Chapter 5 when the 
discussed. 
top managers, middle or lower level managers, or 
Does she concentrate on those who make the 
who Implement it and does it matter if one begins 
organization or the bottom? 'Top-down' and 
1982) methods of enquiry have already been 
and these are discussed in greater detail in 
methods used in this research are presented and 
The final research area relates to the factors which may affect 
implementation. The literature described above often draws 
attention to the 'problems' of implementation, its confusion and 
ambiguity, the difficulties of coordination and conflict between 
interest groups, the question of obtaining resources, the possibility 
of unforeseen events. Is implementation always a problem? Is 
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the picture always one of difficulty or is that only so on some 
occasions, most instances being rather more tranquil and 
straightforward? What makes implementation like it is? 
This chapter has tried to outline the picture of implementation 
given to us by researchers so far. Whilst Chapter 2 demonstrated 
that organizational decision-making research has largely ignored 
post-decision processes, this chapter has argued that those few who 
have looked at implementation have left some important research 
questions unanswered. Pettigrew (1985) neatly sums up the state of 
play in decision-making and implementation research at present: - 
....... the literature on the content of strategic 
decision making and change ..... has developed 
rather separately from the more behavioural 
theories of choice and yet relies on a rational 
theory of choice long since discarded by process 
analysts as being divorced from the empirical 
reality of how decisions and changes are actually 
made. The process theorists, in consequence, have 
abandoned artificial distinctions between the 
formulation and implementation of strategy, while 
those more interested in the content of strategy 
struggle to develop yet more sophisticated 
analytical techniques, which often flounder in the 
political and cultural mosaic of large 
organizations. " (P. 270) 
Bardach (1977) has commented that "It is the fragmentary and 
disjunctive nature of the real world that makes a 'general theory of 
the implementation process ...... unattainable and, indeed, 
unrealistic", (p. 57). While being prepared to find that this may 
indeed be true, it is the purpose of this research at least to see if 
the general debate can be given more precise terms of reference, and 
hopefully to go further by beginning the formulation of theory. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Having discussed prior work on implementation, this chapter 
re-states the focus and objectives of this study, reviews pilot case 
studies, and derives the variables which frame the research. 
4.1 objectives of the research 
The intention is to identify particular features of the 
implementation process and see how they affect final outcomes. it 
has already been noted that there is some confusion here because the 
word 'implementation' can be used to indicate both process and 
outcome. For this study the term 'implementation process' refers 
to the events and activities which are connected with putting the 
decision into effect. Whilst implementation processes have been and 
will be loosely referred to here as post-decision processes, it is 
recognised that some aspects of implementation may have their 
beginnings during decision-making, or before. The use of such terms 
is a shorthand method of referring to temporal periods and it is not 
implied that particular activities are rigidly demarcated. The 
term 'outcome' is used to distinguish the results or consequences of 
implementation processes. 
As the objective was to learn as much as possible about what goes 
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on during implementation, it was decided that data would be collected 
from different organizations by means of in-depth interviews with a 
series of informants. This meant that a research framework had to 
be devised beforehand in order to direct questioning and data 
collection. This was done by attempting to distinguish sets of 
dependent and independent variables with which to delimit 
implementation outcomes and processual features. Thus the dependent 
variables defined what aspects of implementation were being 
investigated, and the independent variables were those factors which 
might be deemed to have some effect during implementation. 
Together, these would provide concepts by which implementation 
processes and outcomes could be compared within and between 
organizations. 
It must be stressed that this was a provisional set of 
variables. The intention was to provide a loose framework which 
would give some guidance for research but would not impose a 
straightjacket on empirical investigation. The most important 
consideration was to be able to re-define and modify variables using 
information collected from the study. 
4.2 Pilot studies 
Although the literature cited in Chapters 2 and 3 provided some 
suggestions for suitable variables, it was felt desirable to carry 
out a number of pilot investigations in order to test ideas and 
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assumptions, and possibly offer further factors for consideration, 
before the main work. These, too, influenced the conceptualization 
of variables. 
Two pilot studies were carried out, one in a university and one 
in a mail order company. The main points to be extrapolated from 
these are detailed below. In addition several managers from other 
organizations were interviewed on a more ad hoc basis to provide 
additional background data. These managers were from a building 
society, a steelwork company, a college and a large conglomerate 
specialising in business and commercial services. Altogether 8 
people were seen at this stage. 
It should be mentioned here that one of the pilot studies, the 
case of the mail order company, Easyshop, proved to be exceptionally 
interesting and so was followed up in greater detail and eventually 
included in the main research studies. A full narrative account of 
this case is included in Appendix B. 
The university case was about how resourcing cuts instigated by 
the University Grants Commission (UGC) in the early 1980's had been 
put- into effect in one northern university. In response to the cuts 
the university in question decided to close a number of small 
departments and to ask various academics to consider early 
retirement. Although this decision was unpalatable, and the issue 
was much debated amongst senior academics, it was finally agreed by 
all except the Social Science faculty. However, as this faculty 
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could offer no acceptable alternatives to the decision - apart from 
suggesting a policy of 'equal misery' which no-one else wanted - in 
the end the decision was implemented as intended and the university 
made its savings. 
This case highlighted the importance of interest units in the 
implementation process. Much self-interested behaviour was 
identified, and it seemed that Social Sciences failed to affect 
implementation outcomes because they could not offer any satisfactory 
alternatives and were not powerful enough on their own to change the 
course of events. It was probably also significant here that there 
was little choice about whether or not to implement, only about how 
to do it. The university had to reduce spending since Its resources 
had been cut by forces outside its control. 
The case of the mail order company centred on the problems 
encountered when attempting to instal a new computer system. 
Implementation did not go well. One reason for this was the 
opposition of the Computer Director who did not want to update the 
existing system. He was able to impede implementation and hinder 
its success by withholding necessary information and access to 
resources. The organization also suffered from an external 
eventuality -a takeover bid - which delayed implementation and 
contributed to its lack of completion. 
This case, too, underlines the significance of interest units in 
helping to make implementation smooth or contentious. In both 
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examples, the possibility that alternative courses might have to be 
taken if the decision was not agreed to by all parties, and the 
potential for unforeseen external events to influence matters, were 
obvious. These features are developed further in the next sections 
which outline the dependent and independent variables used to guide 
the main case studies. 
4.3 DeDendent variables 
Beginning with the quality of the implementation, in other words 
with the performance of the implementation process, five attributes 
were defined. These are the completion, success, legitimacy, 
acceptability and ease of implementation, and are discussed below. 
These were given preliminary definitions, prior to fieldwork, which 
were later improved, after empirical research. 
The completion of implementation 
The first and perhaps most obvious outcome is whether all aspects 
of the decision were implemented. Discussions of successful 
implementation are predicated on the assumption that the decision is 
enacted. However, it is always possible that some parts of the 
decision are implemented while others are not, and this may well be 
one reason for an unsuccessful or unintended outcome. 
Either only some of a composite series of activities are 
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implemented, or implementation as a whole stops short of what was 
intended. Hence this dependent variable is concerned with how far 
the decision was actually carried out. Was the decision implemented 
fully, or only partly. 
The definition of completion is as follows: - 
"the degree to which implementation is finalised". 
Successful implementation 
If implementation is unsuccessful then the organization and its 
members may be seriously affected, and the existence of the 
organization itself may even be threatened. But what is success in 
this context? 
The whole issue of successfulness is a vexed one as Rodrigues 
(1980) has pointed out. A successful decision may be one which 
improves the organization's performance in some way, renders it more 
effective, or achieves the goals or objectives of its members. But 
even if there is consensus about the broad indicators of success, 
there are still awkward problems about how these are to be 
measured. For example, if it is agreed that an improvement in 
company performance should be the measure for a successful decision 
in a business firm, there is still the dilemma of which particular 
performance indicators should be considered. Do profit or turnover 
provide the best evidence for improvement, or should it be 
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demonstrated by market share, cost-savings, or even employee 
turnover? 
But this thesis is concerned directly with the implementation 
process. The issue being addressed is not so much a question of 
whether a particular decision was a good one for the organization in 
the short or long term, but whether implementation outcomes matched 
the objectives which the decision was meant to achieve. In other 
words, was the implementation process itself successful in realising 
the decision? 
This raises the further issue of who sets these objectives and 
from whose perspective success is to be judged. Since strategic 
decisions are taken by senior management it is reasonable to 
investigate the aims they had in mind when making their choice. 
Hence, at this stage, this research defines success against the 
objectives of the authorising body, in terms of what they intended 
the decision should achieve. 
It is not assumed that all decision-makers will be totally in 
harmony about this, sharing the same goals and expectations. Since 
it was the intention to interview all the major decision-makers in 
each case it was felt that any differences of opinion would be picked 
up. 
The definition of this variable is: - 
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"the degree to which implementation achieves the objectives which 
the authorising body intended". 
The leqitimacy of implementation 
It is possible for a decision to be made and steps taken to enact 
it but the actual implementation follow a different path from that 
anticipated by decision-makers. 
The reasons for this are many and need not be discussed here, 
however it has already been pointed out that it is usually the case 
that the decision-makers are not the implementors. This allows much 
re-interpretation and transformation to take place as each level in 
the hierarchy transmits requirements to others below. Even though 
the decision may be implemented completely and achieve all its 
objectives, the way it is done may not be approved by the authorising 
body which took the decision. Questions are therefore posed about 
how far the implementation process went according to plan. 
Legitimacy is defined as: - 
"the deqree to which implementation follows the course Prescribed 
by the authorisinq body". 
The-acceptability of implementation 
This dependent variable represented an attempt to ask wider 
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questions about different perceptions of what happened. As 
strategic decisions are organization-wide they may affect many 
different groups, not all of whom may be happy about the way the 
decision was put into effect or its consequences for them. Not 
everyone will stand to gain from such decisions. 
Since other dependent variables primarily take the perspective of 
the decision-makers, this recognises the others who may be affected 
by implementation and tries to examine more general reactions in the 
organization. It is defined as: - 
"the degree to which implementation processes and outcomes are 
satisfactory to those involved in, or affected by. 
implementation". 
The ease of implementation 
The final aspect of performance to be examined is that of the 
ease of implementation. Again this is viewed from the perspective 
of the authorising body. Even though the decision may be 
implemented completely, and as intended by the authorising body, and 
be considered a success, it may still be considered a difficult 
decision to implement. 
The question here is why should some decisions be easier or 
harder to implement. Why should some implementation processes be 
relatively smooth and straightforward while others may be fraught 
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with problems? 
The definition of ease is given as: - 
"the degree to which the authorising body oerceives 
imDlementation to be problematic. " 
4.4 Independent variables 
This section sets out the independent variables which are 
postulated to have some effect on the dependent performance variables 
outlined above. Because most work on decision-making has stopped 
short of the implementation stage many of these independent variables 
do not arise directly from previous theoretical perspectives or 
empirical research. Although some of these ideas may be implicit in 
the assumptions of other writers, they are primarily the result of 
reflection about the issues in this area and the early pilot 
studies. As such, they await validation during the course of this 
research. 
Four broad groups of independent variables are described. 
These concern the interests involved in implementation; the 
existence of alternatives; the availability of necessary resources-, 
and the effect of unforeseen eventualities. 
Interests 
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The significance of interest groups during the decision and 
implementation process has already been discussed at length in 
Chapters 2 and 3. It was noted that these groups or coalitions 
will attempt to use their influence during decision-making to ensure 
the selection of their preferred decision choice. Such 'power 
play' was likely to continue when the decision was being realised, 
and extra interests might be drawn in to the game at this time. 
It was assumed that those interests who were able to exercise the 
most influence might have a better chance of achieving their 
objectives, both during decision-making and implementation. Thus, 
if influential groups were not in favour of the decision they might 
cause problems at this time. One example of this was given by the 
Easyshop pilot study, in which the Computer Director managed to 
disrupt implementation by non-cooperation. His actions directly 
affected both the completion and success of Implementation. 
It is recognised that interests are not only internal to the 
organization but that external interests may influence the process. 
This is illustrated by the other pilot study where the UGC provided a 
powerful impetus to ensure that the decision to cut resources did 
have to be implemented. This external pressure forced the 
completion of implementation. 
Thus internal and external interests are important determinants 
of implementation and the crucial aspect would seem to be their 
degree of influence and favourability towards implementation of the 
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decision. If all interests are in favour it is assumed that the 
effect on the dependent variables is likely to be positive. Thus 
implementation will have more chance of being complete, successful, 
legitimate, acceptable and easy. 
The effect of interests was defined as: - 
"the degree to which influential interests are favourable towards 
implementation". 
The existence of alternatives 
This inclusion of this idea was prompted especially by the 
university pilot study. Here it was found that because no other 
feasible ways of administering the resource cuts were evident the 
decision was finally implemented with very little trouble. This was 
in spite of the fact that the decision was not welcomed by the 
university and that one influential interest was vehemently opposed 
during both the pre- and post-decision processes. 
It would therefore appear that a lack of feasible alternatives 
will help to ensure realization of the decision. Dependent 
variables are assumed to be affected in a positive way. The 
explicit nature of the relationship between this variable and 
specific dependent variables is not clearly understood at this stage. 
The definition of this concept is as follows: - 
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"the degree to which there are feasible alternatives available to 
the chosen decision". 
The adequacy of resources 
Most authors in this area have drawn attention to the need for 
adequate resources in order to implement strategic decisions. Such 
resources may take the form of finances, personnel or time. 
Implementation is likely to be negatively affected if money is 
short or staffing is insuffient. Problems may also be caused if 
too little time is allowed for implementation or an over-strict 
deadline is imposed. Mallory (1987) has commented on the 'pace' of 
decision-making, showing that the speed of decision-making as 
perceived by members of the organization is often distinct from the 
temporal duration of the decision. Thus individual perspectives may 
be a significant determining factor here - the issue may be more to 
do with how rushed the implementation feels to those who are involved 
or who witness it, rather than how long it actually takes. 
Issues to be examined in this context are to do with whether the 
level of resources required for implementation match those which are 
available and the definition is: - 
"the degree to which the resources-.. required match those 
available". 
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unforeseen eventualities 
The effect of unforeseen eventualities has already been discussed 
in Chapter 3. Since decision-makers are constantly making plans 
and predictions about future activities there is always the chance 
that something unforeseen will occur later on. 
Such eventualities may emanate from either inside or outside the 
organization, but here they are all held to be external to the 
process in question. 
An example of an event coming from outside the organization 
occurred during Easyshop's attempt to instal a new computer system. 
As mentioned, a threatened takeover bid from a rival mail order 
company delayed implementation here. Apart from the general 
disruption which occurred while Easyshop attempted to fight the bid, 
the primary reason for the delay was that the bidder already had a 
sophisticated computer system of its own which would be set up in 
Easyshop in the event of a takeover. 
But it is recognised that such events can also have a positive 
effect on implementation. They may actually facilitate completion 
or success or effect outcomes in other ways. Favourable events can 
actually help post-decision processes to be smoother and less 
difficult and thus make implementation easier. The crucial aspect 
of this variable is therefore the favourability of these unforeseen 
eventualities, or, very simply, whether there is a little 'luck' from 
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the point of view of those concerned. 
The definition used here is: - 
"the degree to which unforeseen eventualities favour 
implementation". 
4.5 Summary 
Five dependent performance variables and four groups of 
independent variables have been identified in this chapter and are 
depicted in Table 4.1. These are initial pointers to the way in 
which implementation outcomes might be conceptualised and the factors 
which may impinge upon them. 
It is stressed that these represented tentative first attempts at 
defining the areas of interest. They were used to give the research 
some focus, not to confine empirical effort too closely. The terms 
dependent and independent variables should not be taken to imply a 
detailed level of specification, since, as has been said, further 
elucidation and definition come from the data obtained. 
Therefore the temptation to venture explicit hypotheses about the 
way in which certain variables affect others has been resisted. The 
main aim of this chapter has been to show how thinking became 
focussed upon potentially fruitful areas of research. Chapter 7 and 
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Table 4.1 Preliminary identification of dependent 






unforeseen eventualities Acceptability 
Ease 
8 explain how these initial concepts were altered by subsequent 
investigation and give the final list of variables. 
The way in which data were collected in order to do this, and the 
organizations, case studies and informants used are described in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION 
Chapter 4 outlined the main ideas which broadly framed this 
thesis. This chapter now describes how the sample was chosen and 
the data collected. 
5.1 Methodological issues 
This project was begun in a climate of fierce debate and 
intellectual ferment in the field of Organization Theory. The 
comprehensive discussion of sociological and organizational paradigms 
by Burrell & Morgan (1979) was still provoking responses (Donaldson, 
1985; Reed, 1985) and theoretical issues were very much to the 
fore. This was a stimulating time to begin research, but also a 
rather daunting one. For the main issue seemed to be that 
researchers should be very sure of their theoretical assumptions 
before they started research, and be alert to the far-reaching 
implications of various paradigms and methodologies. 
This is nothing new of course. Researchers have always had to 
consider their methodology most carefully and be prepared to justify 
their chosen ways of working. But whether to carry out large-scale 
surveys, detailed case studies, or a single case study, is sometimes 
presented as a choice guided by little more than an act of faith, or 
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a dogmatic belief in the 'right way' to tackle organizational 
research. 
In reality, the choice of methodology depends on what the 
research is intended to illuminate. The focus of study and the 
'research question' will, to a large extent, frame the selection of 
investigative methods. For example, it is likely that the use of 
mailed questionnaires will not provide an intimate picture of the 
developmental pattern of a decision issue over time. Similarly, the 
case study approach might not be the first choice for a study of 
buying behaviour in the general population. This is not to say 
that either may not be used, merely that each will provide data which 
differs in its depth, span and focus. 
In the area of decision-making, single case studies have been 
notably successful (Pettigrew, 1973; Allison, 1969), as have larger 
samples (Mintzberg et al, 1976; Nutt, 1984). The largest study 
to-date, the Bradford Studies (Hickson et al, 1986), though using 
multiple informants in some organizations, used single informants in 
the majority, but backed this up by a number of intensive case 
studies. This use--of a multiplicity of methods can be seen as a 
methodological strength, but of course the task took ten years and 
utilised a team of researchers. Nevertheless, if time and resources 
allow, some form of triangulation can be very productive (and may 
well be easier to defend). Notwithstanding, each project mentioned 
has made a unique contribution to knowledge in this area, by 
providing richly detailed descriptive studies or more generalised 
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hypotheses about fundamental characteristics of decision-making. 
Hence no method of data collection is ruled out of this field of 
research. 
The aim of this thesis was to furnish detailed observations about 
the implementation process and its outcomes. It was paramount that 
these observations should be obtained from multiple informants, based 
on the premise that each person would have a slightly different 
perspective and would add to the whole. It was intended that data 
analysis should further develop general concepts which could be used 
to describe, compare, and hopefully explain, the implementation of 
strategic decisions. So the decisions to be investigated had to be 
largely completed, and information about implementation had to be 
gained by talking to organizational participants and observers. 
These requirements indicated that case studies, in more than one 
organization, were called for. 
Although it would follow that the appropriate research tools thus 
selected themselves, this is rather over-simplifying matters. My 
inherent preference for qualitative methodologies had already 
determined the focus of research to a large extent. 
Nevertheless, it may be argued that case studies are an eminently 
appropriate medium for providing suitable data for the derivation of 
concepts, although it is not suggested that larger-scale quantitative 
surveys can not be used. It is felt however, that smaller studies 
of this kind are useful starting points when the field of enquiry is 
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particularly conceptually and theoretically barren. Although the 
recent paper by Eisenhardt (1989) was published after this research 
was largely completed, it does confirm the utility of case study work 
for theory-building. Mintzberg's (1979) earlier remarks give a 
somewhat more partisan view of their suitability: - 
"... we shall never understand the complex reality 
of organizations if we persist in studying them 
from a distance, in large samples with gross, 
cross-sectional measures. We learn how birds fly 
by studying them one at a time, not by scanning 
flocks of them on radar screens. " (p. 240) 
A final point before the methodology is explained in detail. One 
objective throughout the study was to try and keep the research as 
flexible as possible in order to allow concepts and ideas to develop 
as work progressed. So work did not begin on day one with a clear 
idea of how many organizations would be studied, what kind of 
organizations they would be and how many interviews this would 
entail. The pilot studies were extremely useful in helping to focus 
the area of interest and to formulate initial ideas about how to 
conceptualise implementation processes and outcomes. Nevertheless 
progress was achieved in rather 'Lindblomian' fashion, by taking a 
succession of small steps while constantly reviewing the path already 
trodden and the way ahead. 
It is a suspicion that in fact much research is like this, 
however much it is represented to have operated in a 'rational' way 
after the event. Indeed, this speculative approach may even be the 
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more fruitful, as Daft (1983) has postulated: - 
k 
scholarly research is a craft and 
significant research outcomes are associated Wit*ý 
the mastery of craft elements in the research 
process ...... 
The significant discoveries, the good science, 
require us to go beyond the safe certainty of 
precision in design ....... One should start with incomplete facts, with ambiguity, and plan 
experiments 
, 
on the basis of probability, even bare 
hunch, rather than certainty. Then look for 
surprise. " (p. 539-40) 
5.2 Organizations 
Since it was intended to discover whether general trends could be 
distinguished in the implementation process, and to try and learn by 
comparison, it was decided that more than one case should be 
investigated in more than one organization. In this way comparisons 
could be made between cases in an organization, as well as between 
organizations. Athough it was realised that the sample of 
organizations would inevitably be small, it would be better to have a 
heterogeneous rather than homogeneous sample. It was felt that this 
would enable conclusions to be ventured for a range of organizations 
rather than just, say, manufacturing companies or welfare 
institutions. 
It must be stated immediately that the use of the word 'sample' 
in this context is perhaps misleading. The group of organizations 
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in this study was not selected by any scientifically rigorous 
procedures. ' To be blatant about it, they selected themselves, or 
rather their Chief Executives did by agreeing to take part. In 
research of this kind, when the researcher requires access to an 
organization in order to take up large amounts of time asking vague 
and awkward questions, she is not always guaranteed a welcome. So 
research must be flexible enough to cope with rebuffs. I wanted 
four or five organizations, preferably not too far from where I 
lived. I was prepared to manage with one or two if matters proved 
intractable. In the end I approached seven organizations, was 
accepted by five and, as mentioned, used one of the especially 
interesting pilot studies to arrive at a total of six 
organizations. Research does need a little luck at times and the 
relative ease with which cooperative organizations were located 
certainly helped enormously. 
But although the 'selection' process depended upon the goodwill 
of management, as indicated, it was clear that a range of 
organizations was required. Because of a personal interest in 
educational institutions which had been developed by the university 
pilot study, and also the significant work already carried out in 
such organizations (Cohen et al, 1972; Hickson et al, 1986) it was 
felt that at least one university should be included. Another 
consideration was that many studies of implementation had been 
undertaken in public sector institutions (see Chapter 3). For this 
reason a Water Authority was approached. Since it had already been 
decided to include one of the pilot organizations -a mail order 
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company - in the main study, and another mail order company was 
coincidentally situated in the same locale, a letter of enquiry was 
also sent to them. Their agreement to be part of the study made 
possible what turned out to be an illuminating comparison between two 
very similar organizations, directly comparable in size, industry, 
and to a very large extent history, and (as it later transpired) 
implementation topic. The Bradford Studies (Hickson et al, 1986) 
had already exposed differences between decision-maklng processes in 
public and private sector organizations, and between manufacturing 
and services industries. Finally, therefore, two privately owned 
chemical manufacturers were selected to allow comparisons between 
both of these forms of organization. 
The final set of organizations is shown below in Table 5.1. All 
names of organizations (and of personnel mentioned in the cases) have 
been changed to preserve anonymity. All organizations are based, or 
have their headquarters in the north of England. 
Contact with organizations was initially made by letter, 
addressed personally to the Chief Executive. The one exception to 
this was the pilot organization used in the study where contact was 
established through a personal introduction. A COPY Of the letter 
can be found in Appendix A. 
Brief sketches of each organization are provided below, further 
Information, together with a full narrative account of each case, are 
contained in Appendix B. 
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Table 5.1 Research organizations 
Organization 
Vale University 
Central Water Authority 
Easyshop Mail Order 
Great Northern Mail Order 
S&D Chemicals Ltd. 









Vale admitted its first students In 1963 and today has 
approximately 3,800 students and 14 academic departments. About 
half of all the students are studying science and technology-related 
subjects. It is built on collegiate principles which has greatly 
influenced the structure and character of the university. 
Central Water Authority 
One of the 10 regional Water Authorities serving England and 
Wales, responsible for the supply of water and disposal of sewage. 
It serves four and a half million people over a wide geographical 
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area. It has undergone many structural changes but currently is 
divided into four local Divisions plus a Rivers Division. Central 
Water's total income is in the region of E320m and operating costs 
about E130m per annum. It was studied prior to privatization. 
Easyshop Mail Order 
An established company with a long history and tradition founded 
in 1910. It enjoyed great success in the 1960's but went through 
some very difficult times in the 1970's and 1980's. It now employs 
about 3,000 people and has about half a million 'agents' (usually 
housewives who sell to friends and family from the mail order 
catalogue). In 1988 the turnover was given as 2189m and trading 
profit ("profit before tax and exceptional items") E5.5m (Company 
Accounts). The company is still experiencing difficulties and falls 
behind Great Northern in market share and profitability. 
Great Northern Mail Order 
Another long-established company, Great Northern was founded two 
years after Easyshop, in 1912, and now employs over 3,000 in its mail 
order operation. Being in the same region and industry Great 
Northern shared a similar pattern of success to Easyshop, making good 
profits in the 1960's when trade was booming and suffering in the 
1970's and early 1980's. Profits picked up in the mid-1980's and 
the company merged with another retailing organization at this 
time. Figures for 1986 (just prior to the merger so the last period 
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for which separate figures are available) show turnover to be E226m 
and profit (before tax) to be E16m. At this time it was fourth out 
of the five largest mail order companies, having a 9% share of the 
market. (It should be noted that the largest two companies in this 
industry have 72% of the market between them and are very much 
bigger, having many interests beyond mail order. ) However, a period 
of instability and uncertainty followed the merger and the company 
saw a downward trend in profits. This is still continuing. 
S&D Chemicals Ltd. 
This company is a subsidiary of a large multinational 
organization based abroad. The parent company was formed in the 
early 1900's and the first overseas operation was established in 
1911, in England. S&D has two operating divisions (one involved 
in Chemicals, the other in Pharmaceuticals) and one 
Finance/Adminstrative division in the UK and employs 800 people in 
total. The research was conducted in the Dyes and Chemicals 
Division which is the largest, being twice the size of the 
Pharmaceuticals Division, and employs 400 people. Here they 
manufacture dyestuffs and pigments. The total turnover for the UK 
operation is in the region of E140m. 
Wharf Chemicals Ltd. 
This organization is a part of a larger group, Wharf Holdings 
Ltd. Wharf Holdings is a rapidly expanding private company 
- 109 - 
(although steps are being prepared for its flotation) which has grown 
by acquisition. It has six divisions which are divided into three 
groups of core activities - Commercial Services, Personnel 
Recruitment and Distribution. Together, these cover a wide range of 
interests, office support systems and technology, insurance broking, 
specialist staff recruitment, shipping and chemicals being Just a 
few. Wharf Chemicals division came about by amalgamating a number 
of acquired firms all of which were in the chemicals industry. It is 
located in the Distribution section of the group. Turnover of the 
whole group is in excess of MOm (1988 Company Accounts). Wharf 
Chemicals turnover is in the region of E75 - E125m and it employs 
about 740 people. It is involved in both the manufacture and 
distribution of chemicals. 
It will be seen from the above that the final selection of 
organizations provides both comparison and contrast. There is a 
range of private and public organizations, in both service and 
manufacturing. This aspect of homogeneity within a heterogeneous 
sample proved to be advantageous in enabling data to be compared, as 
will be shown in Chapters 7 and 8. This was further enhanced by the 
similarity of cases in each organization, and these will now be 
described. 
5.3 Cases of implementation 
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As discussed already, from the researcher's point of view, it was 
necessary to try and retain some control over the subject matter 
being investigated. It was crucial that decisions had been 
substantially implemented. They could not be studied as they were 
being carried out. There was too much risk that either 
implementation would take too long for the research timetable, or 
that decisions, although already taken, would not in fact be 
implemented at all. 
Additionally, the researcher had to rely on each organization to 
provide suitable cases to study. It was not possible to specify 
particular decision 'topics' and in most instances there was no 
choice in the cases suggested. Indeed, most Chief Executives had 
difficulty in thinking of significant cases which had been 
implemented recently enough to be easily recalled. As in the 
Bradford Studies (Cray et al, 1988) respondents were asked to provide 
instances of 'strategic decisions', without any precise statement as 
to what this might mean. When some qualification was required, 
informants were told that the larger, more important decisions were 
required and this proved to be readily understood. 
In order to try and isolate factors which helped and hindered 
implementation two cases in each organization were requested, one to 
be an- example of a relatively easy implementation, the other a more 
difficult one. The distinction between 'easy/difficult' was used 
rather than 'successful/unsuccessful' because it was reasoned that 
Executives might be unwilling to label implementations as being 
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unsuccessful, thereby showing their organization in an unfavourable 
light. The aim was to obtain contrasting implementations in each 
organization. 
However, it is not clear how sharp the contrast was. It is of 
course perfectly possible to have difficult implementations which are 
successful and easy ones which are not, the level of ease and success 
do not necessarily correlate. In addition respondents did not 
specify what criteria were being taken into account in order to 
arrive at their evaluation. Nevertheless, the aim was to obtain 
some diversity and in every organization it is possible to argue that 
one implementation is more successful than another (using the 
definitions of success distinguished in this study, see Chapters 7 
and 8), but the difference is more marked in some organizations than 
others. 
It is impossible to say whether the most difficult 
implementations were in fact revealed, although it is likely that the 
easier or more successful ones were. Some confirmatory evidence for 
this Is provided by the computer installation at Easyshop. The 
Managing Director who provided the initial contact had retired and 
was happy to talk about some of the problems involved. However, 
when research expanded to include interviews with other senior 
managers inside the organization the problems proved to be more 
serious and intractable than the retired executive had made clear. 
Managers joked with the researcher that "this was not a case she 
would have been offered" if the normal course of access had been 
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pursued. 
A further point is that some decisions were labelled as being 
easy or difficult by senior managers, but lower level personnel did 
not always agree with such a diagnosis. Much depended on how close 
the Chief Executive was to the operational side of his organization, 
how much he really knew of what was going on at the 'grass roots' 
level. A good example of this is when the Corporate Planning 
Manager at Central Water suggested that one case (to build Langden 
Water Works) was relatively straightforward, being completely unaware 
of the difficulties between departments and outside contractors 
during implementation. Here it is to be expected that the largely 
separate, administrative pore of the organization might be detached 
from the 
,, goings-on at 
Divisional level. Often it was felt that 
senior management glossed over difficulties which were nonetheless 
very real to those in the lower echelons of the organizational 
hierarchy. 
In the final analysis it is clear that the selection of cases was 
ad hoc rather than 'random'. The researcher was dependent on senior 
management to provide access and cases and had little choice in the 
topic which was offered. It must be said, however, that few 
constraints were evident once access had been obtained and I was free 
to interview anyone I wanted to and ask any questions I liked. 
The complete list of cases is shown in Table 5.2, noting the 
relative ease of cases as perceived by the Chief Executive who 
- 113 - 
suggested them. It will be seen that only one case was studied in 
Easyshop. As explained, this case was provided by the retired 
Managing Director. The new Managing Director was preoccupied with 
trying to sort out Easyshop's serious financial difficulties and felt 
unable to accede to my request for a second case. 










Level of difficulty 
as given-by C. E. 
Heating and energy conservation system Easier 
Building of university & campus Less easy 
Building of Langden Water Treatment Works Easier 
Installation of CAD system Less easy 
Installation of new computer system Not easy 
Building of new warehouse Easier 
Installation of new computer system Less easy 
New transport and distribution system Easier 
Installation of new computer system Less easy 
Merger of two divisions Easier 
Formation of Wharf Chemicals Less easy 
A brief summary of each case is given in Table 5.3. The matter 
for decision is outlined, together with a statement of its objectives 
- what it was intended to achieve. These are taken from the accounts 
of decision-makers, or from appropriate documents (for example, the 
Development Plan drawn up for the building of Vale University) where 
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these were available. An indication of the tasks of implementation, 
the way in which implementation was carried out and the outcome is 
also given. This is necessarily a very short synopsis: fuller 
accounts are contained in Appendix B. 
Table 5.3 Case summaries 
CASE DECISION IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS/OUTCOME 
VALE UNIVERSITY 
Heating Upgrade boiler house, alter to Instal chosen systems. Train Made savings 
automatic functioning and instal operatives and launch energy- and increased 
Energy Management System. saving campaign in university. efficiency. 
Objectives: to save money and Smooth imple- 
energy. mentation and 
very success- 
ful case. 
Building To create a collegiate, integrated To design a campus to promote Collegiate 
university. objectives: to promote these objectives, Decision system a 
the integration of academic discip- implemented in less direct mixed success 
lines, academics and students; to be ways by all staff and Some flex- 
collegiate (architects translated students from first day to ibility. Buil- 
this as providing a social structure present. dings were 
in which living/working/leisure ready. 
activities were combined and which 
facilitated the formation of small 
groups of students); to provide 
students with a 'memorable exper- 
ience"; to be flexible enough to 
cope with future demands; buildings 
to be ready for first students. 
CENTRAL WATER 
Langden To build a new water treatment works. Liaise with contractors and Conflict with 
Objectives: to improve water quality oversee construction, and the contractors. 
and service to customers. Complete design, installation and Technically 
to specified deadline. commissioning of the process met deadline 
equipment. Train operatives. but some prob- 
lems after. 
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CASE DECISION IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS/OUTCOME 
CENTRAL WATER cont'd. 
CAD To instal Computer-Aided Draughting Instal systems, train staff. Objectives 
system in 5 Development and I Oper- mostly reached. 
ating sections. Objectives: to Some operatives 
improve quality and standardisation unsure of 
of drawings, reduce costs and time, new system. 
compete with outside agencies, aid 
integration of Development sections. 
EASYSHOP MAIL ORDER 
Computer To computerise administrative Write systems and instal on Very difficult 
systems. Objectives: to reduce computer. Train staff. implementation 
costs and staff and increase Much conflict, 
efficiency and management information. and delays. 
Still not 
complete. 
GREAT NORTHERN MAIL ORDER 
Warehouse To build a large new warehouse. To design new systems and Pressured 
Objectives: To instal modern choose technology. Oversee process, Had 
labour-saving, efficient processes construction of building. to build on 
and allow the company to expand. 'expansion' 
sites. 
Computer To computerise all company administ- Train computer staff to Frantic pace 
ration systems. write programmes in new but all objec- 
computer language. Instal tives achieved 
systems, train other staff. to deadline. 
S10 CHEMICALS LTD. 
Transport/ To centralise distribution and use Close satellite branches, Made savings, 
Distrib. outside carriers, Objectives: write carriers' specification but some prob- 
provide next-day service to and monitor their operation, lems with own 
customers, reduce costs and labour. drivers and 
carriers. 
Computer To up-date administrative systems Write systems and train At first 
Objectives.: Reduce costs, labour personnel. a disaster 
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CASE DECISION IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS/OUTCOME 
WHARF CHEMICALS LTD. 
merger To merge 2 manufacturing divisions To combine the Commercial 
into one Bulk Products division. function, then Production, 
Objectives: to increase profits standardise practices. 
and rationalise the business. 
Not a smooth 
process, clash 
of cultures and 
practices. 
Objectives 
took time to 
achieve. 
Formation To amalgamate approx. 20 companies, Conform with legal require- Difficult to 
Objectives: increase power in market- ments. Standardise proce- implement. 





It can be seen that although the choice of decision topic was not 
controlled by the researcher, there is a reasonable diversity of 
issues as well as some tentative groupings of cases. Decisions 
about new technological systems (Vale University, Central Water, 
Easyshop, Great Northern and S&D Chemicals) clearly still preoccupy 
organizations in the 1980's, as do decisions which involve new 
building works (Vale University, Central Water, Great Northern) and 
structural reorganizations (S &D Chemicals, Wharf Chemicals). 
5.4 Informants 
There is much debate about how to collect organizational data, 
and from whom to collect it. It has already been mentioned that, in 
the first instance, an approach was made to senior managers in order 
to gain access. This proved to be a successful method, not only in 
- 117 - 
gaining entry, but also in providing the researcher wit4i some 
legitimacy once in the organization. The fact that the research was 
proceeding with the sanction of the Chief Executive ensured 
cooperation from other personnel, although it was carefully 
emphasized to respondents that the work was independent, confidential 
and anonymous. 
Thus the Chief Executive was always the first person to be 
interviewed. After this the researcher asked to see all other 
decision-makers - those who were Involved in actually taking the 
decision. Each respondent added to the account of decision-making 
and implementation, and confirmed or modified the story. During the 
course of interviews respondents were asked about significant others 
involved and this way research fanned out to encompass any other 
major actors who were active in implementing the decision. For ease 
of reference this group was labelled the implementors. Finally, a 
selection of individuals who were directly affected by implementation 
- the implementees - were interviewed. In this way three broad 
groupings of respondents emerged: decision-makers, implementors and 
implementees. Of course these categories are not always mutually 
exclusive as it is possible to be both a decision-maker and an 
implementor or even implementee. However, generally speaking, 
decision-makers were those at the top of the organization, 
implementors were usually middle management and implementees were 
operatives or shop floor workers. 
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In this way research 'snowballed' down and across organizational 
hierarchies, gathering new data and modifying existing stories as it 
went. 
This 'top-down' method of data collection has been the subject of 
much criticism (Barrett & Fudge, 1981) in the study of policy 
implementation. Elmore (1982) refers to it as "forward mapping" and 
suggests that a weakness of this approach is its: - 
"implicit and unquestioned assumption that 
policy-makers control the organizational, 
political and technological processes that affect 
implementation ..... Moreover, forward mapping, as 
an analytic strategy, treats only a narrow range 
of possible explanations for implementation 
failures. " (p. 21) 
In other words this method assumes that policy-makers are 
responsible for controlling the process of implementation and that 
implementation issues are therefore concerned with ensuring 
compliance from implementors and implementees. 
Elmore suggests an alternative method of investigation, that of 
"backward mapping", which in effect takes a 'bottom-up' approach to 
research. This begins with "a statement of the specific behaviour at 
the lowest level of the implementation process that generates the 
need for policy". Essentially it starts with what implementors are 
doing and then works back up the organization, asking questions about 
the nature of objectives and the effect of implementors' actions. 
The emphasis is therefore on what actually happens at the lowest 
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level of implementation, not on the intentions of policy-makers. 
While this is certainly an innovative approach it is questionable 
as to whether it would be an improvement for this project. It can 
be argued that the formulation and execution of organizational 
decisions are rather less vaporous than the enactment of policy. A 
decision to instal a new computer system or build a warehouse may 
undergo some modifications in terms of type or make of computer or 
size or location of warehouse, but at the end of the day the topic is 
still very much the same. It is still reasonable to assess the 
success of implementation by seeing if the computer and warehouse are 
in place and producing the required results. 
Furthermore, although the implementations studied for this 
research did sometimes require the participation of external interest 
groups, for the most part activity was kept within the boundaries of 
the focal organization. This is unlike the policy implementations 
studied in public authorities to which Elmore is referring. It is 
acknowledged that In the public sector 'the complexity of joint 
action' (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973) may blur the processes and 
control mechanisms which the researcher Is investigating. 
It is suggested that for this study, the evidence obtained from 
informants would have differed little whether beginning research from 
the top or the bottom of the organization, provided all levels were 
covered to some extent. 
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One strength of this research lies in the fact that a large 
number of informants, at all levels of the organization, were 
interviewed at length. Some studies of organizational 
decision-making and implementation (for example, Lyles, 1987; 
Skivington & Daft, 1988) collect data from senior managers only. it 
is felt that such a perspective may be rather limiting, particularly 
for a study of implementation processes which may involve many others 
in the hierarchy. The information provided by any one individual 
may be incomplete, incorrect or in some way partial. It is only by 
talking to others that a more rounded and accurate narrative can be 
pieced together. In one case, that of Easyshop, the importance of 
multiple respondents was made very clear when it became apparent that 
one informant (the Computer Director at the centre of the contentious 
computer case) had provided an account which omitted his own mistakes 
and conflicts. 
The total number of informants interviewed for the study 
(excluding pilot cases not used in the main research) was 113. The 
total number of interviews carried out was 129, since some informants 
were interviewed more than once. 
Some cases were more diverse than others and involved more 
organizational members. A breakdown of informants across cases is 
given in Table 5.4 and a full list of informants can be found in 
Appendix C. on some occasions the same individuals provided 
information about both cases in their organization which explains the 
discrepancy between the number of informants per case and the number 
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Table 5.4 Number of informants interviewed in each case 
NUMBER OF DIFFERENT 
ORGANIZATIONS INFORMANTS INFORMANTS PER 
PER CASE ORGANIZATION 
Vale University: Heating 8 
Building 16 22 
Central Water: Langden 15 
CAD 20 32 
Easyshop: Computer 88 
Great Northern: Warehouse 19 
Computer 14 22 
S&D Chemicals: Transport T 
Computer 12 13 
Wharf Chemicals: Merger 9 
Formation 8 16 
of different informants in each organization. 
As a final point it must be mentioned that in the early months of 
planning this thesis one intention had been to conduct two interviews 
with each informant, the second taking place six months or so after 
the first. This was to try and overcome the potential problem of 
capturing data at one point in time only. Obviously the 
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repercussions from implementation may be felt over a long period and 
it was thought that this might avoid getting only a 'snapshot' 
picture and provide data of a more dynamic, processual nature. 
However, the final number of informants grew considerably which made 
it impossible to carry out second interviews for all respondents. 
But several second interviews were carried out with the original 
informants, and the fact that data collection continued for a year 
did mean that the implementation process could be monitored. 
5.5 Interviews 
As can be seen from Table 5.4. a large number of interviews was 
carried out in each organization. Typically, each interview lasted 
an hour, although some lasted longer (up to 2 hours) and a few lasted 
less than an hour (but none shorter than half an hour). 
In addition to the most significant people involved in making and 
implementing the decision, representatives of external interest 
groups were also interviewed, for example the building and design 
contractors for Central Water's Langden project, the construction 
firm and a member of the University Grants Commission who were 
involved with the building of Vale, and the Project Management 
company and construction firm concerned with Great Northern's new 
warehouse. Where organizations had different divisions which played 
a part during implementation (Central Water, Wharf Chemicals) these 
were also visited. Efforts were made to trace particular 
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individuals who had left the organizations. For example, the 
retired Registrar and Vice-Chancellor of Vale were contacted, as were 
other members of the academic staff who had moved to different 
jobs. The data collection period spanned one year and involved 
extensive travelling. 
Before turning to a discussion of how interviews were conducted 
it should be acknowledged that there is a potential problem of 
'hindsight bias' when asking respondents to recall past events. The 
implication of this is that the memory may distort events, 
selectively recalling episodes which are therefore not a balanced 
representation. This was accepted as a potential problem for this 
study, but, as mentioned, the necessity of retaining control over the 
case material was pre-eminent. Even with direct observational 
methods a researcher cannot be everywhere at all times and 
information still needs to be pieced together from others at a later 
period. As Cray et al (1988) have remarked: - 
"The difference between shorter recall in 
concurrent cases and the longer recall tapped in 
interviews is that the story becomes less 
cluttered and relatively simpler, not that it 
changes. With longer hindsight, the main 
pathways of the process are recalled and less 
attention is given to the byways and dead ends. " 
(p. 23) 
Again, the use of multiple respondents is an added safety factor 
in this study, providing some degree of cross-referencing and 
corroboration. Additional checks on the accuracy of the data were 
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carried out by asking informants with the most experience of each 
case to read the full case biographies and make modifications where 
necessary. These and other reliability mechanisms are described in 
further detail in Chapter 6. 
The interviews were intended to provide information about a 
number of issues. A full and detailed account of how the decision 
was implemented was required. This entailed gathering information 
about who was involved, what they had to do, and the problems and 
opportunities encountered along the way. 
For the earlier interviews, a lengthy interview schedule was 
compiled which attempted to encompass all the issues highlighted in 
Chapter 4 which might possibly affect implementation. Thus it 
included questions about influence patterns of internal and external 
interest groups (with Likert-type ratings to aid precise 
measurement); the consensus within and between interest groups about 
the correctness of the decision; the objectives-of the decision and 
how they were to be measured; the ease, duration and pAce of 
implementation; the resources required and the eventual outcomes of 
implementation. A complete copy of the schedule can be found in 
Appendix D. 
The aim of this interview schedule was to try and cover all 
points of interest using both open questions to obtain qualitative 
data, and closed questions to provide more precise answers which 
could be directly compared and, to some degree, quantified. A 
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schedule was tested during the pilot studies and it was found that 
some alterations to the wording of questions, and additional 
questions, were required. 
Though the instrument was revised four times in the course of 
these pilot studies and the early Interviews of the main research, 
problems still remained. The main difficulty was that the schedule 
was too long and interrupted the flow of interviews. Informants 
were usually enthusiastic about recounting the course of events and 
it was found that they generally answered most questions In their 
discourse. Interrupting them to ask precisely worded questions 
tended to inhibit the flow of conversation. 
Furthermore, many informants were not aware of everything that 
was done during decision-making or implementation. Decision-makers 
were often not involved in implementation and many implementors and 
implementees were far removed from the boardroom where decisions were 
made. Thus answering questions about the relative influence of 
interest groups or individuals was neither practical nor possible. 
The most fruitful course of action was therefore to conduct a 
more unstructured interview, allowing the informant to discuss the 
process of implementation in a more discursive way, although of 
course with additional promptings and questioning from the 
interviewer to keep the conversation on course. The schedule was 
retained but more for guidance to ensure that important areas or 
issues were not overlooked. The rating scales were not continued as 
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they could not be completed with sufficient accuracy and did not seem 
appropriate methodological tools for the data. 
Ten trials were carried out using the schedule and a great deal 
t 
of time was sper& in revisions. It was only discarded when it was 
shown to be less effective than a more open interview. What it did 
mean was that data analysis was a lengthier and less straightforward 
process, than it would otherwise have been. However the increased 
confidence in both the data and the results of analysis more than 
outweighed the extra effort involved. 
The intention was that every interview should, if possible, 
include all the following aspects: - 
a) Decision-makinq 
Who was involved in decision-making, how the decision was 
made (by which committees, individuals, how much 
consultation, any opposition), what the decision was 
intended to achieve and how it would be evaluated. 
Implementation 
Who was involved in implementation, what was done and how 
clearly this was specified in advance, what hindered and 
helped implementation, how long it took, the pace of 
implementation (rushed, leisurely, with a deadline or not), 
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and whether implementation was completed and achieved what 
was intended. 
A great deal of information was gathered in this way, not all of 
which was required at the data analysis stage. All interviews were 
noted in shorthand during meetings. A tape recorder was not used as 
It was felt that this might unduly inhibit informants. Notes were 
typed up, in full, as soon as possible after interview, usually on 
the same day or the day after. At this stage they were written up 
with as little alteration or abbreviation as possible. This was to 
try and retain the specific words used and capture the atmosphere of 
the interview, to make it easier to recall the exact meaning and 
context of the statements during later data analysis. Notes were 
also made about the manner and appearance of the informant, his 
office, staff and organization for the same reason. 
Thus to some degree the researcher also acted as an observer In 
the organization. Although the data collected from interviews 
concerned events now in the past, data were also obtained about the 
current state of the organization - the atmosphere and 'culture' as 
perceived by the researcher. The manner and appearance of reception 
personnel (whether there was a security guard or attractive, 
well-dressed female staff), the decor and surroundings of the 
entrance and offices (run-down and shabby or newly painted, friendly 
or imposing) and general managerial 'styles' ('authoritarian' or 
Yconsultative', distant or approachable). These general impressions 
formed a background of qualititative material which was written up as 
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a research report a kind of cultural profile for each 
organization. These reports are described further in the next 
chapter and are reproduced in full in Appendix E. This source of 
data provided a context in which to locate interview notes and was a 
useful reminder of the importance of symbolic aspects of 
organizations. 
A final source of data for each case was found in written 
documentation located by the researcher and made available by 
informants. For all cases there were reports, minutes of meetings, 
and so on which helped to define how information was gathered for 
decision-making and how implementation progressed. For some cases 
the organizations themselves had carried out post-implementation 
appraisals which were made available. For example, Central Water 
had produced a report on the operation of Langden Water Works which 
contained a review and some recommendations, and Vale University had 
surveyed its students to find out how they perceived the campus and 
environment at Vale. 
This documentation and the research reports were useful 
additional sources which could be utilised to back up and 
substantiate case data. Essentially though, the main source of 
information was the interviews and it was these which provided the 
raw material for data analysis as described in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSING THE DATA 
By the end of the empirical work a large quantity of data, in 
various forms, awaited analysis. To recapitulate, the material 
consisted of extensive notes for each interview plus various 
documents, letters and reports from the organizations studied. The 
task was to compress this into a more manageable form, and to throw 
the salient features into relief. 
More than that, variables had to be defined, working them out 
from the data and from the broad ideas enunciated in Chapter 4, a 
step by step interaction of data and concepts. 
This chapter explains how this was done. Before this 
explanation, two points should be stressed. The first is to do with 
how analysis is carried out, the second with how it is rationalised 
afterwards. 
Every research project has to be analysed in its own particular 
way. There can be peculiarities and idiosyncracies in studies which 
require some forms of analysis which are particular to themselves. 
Each investigation is individual, has its own objectives and needs 
specific methods of data manipulation. 
This is perhaps especially true of case studies. These are rich 
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in qualititative data, for which there are less clearly defined and 
less immediately obvious techniques. Methods do exist of course, 
but there is no exact equivalent to the handbook of statistical 
methods which is the bible of quantitative studies. Careful reading 
of other case study-based research seldom reveals the intricacies of 
the researcher's analytical techniques. In this way, the craft of 
investigation has to be re-created anew for each study. In part, 
because each study is distinct, but also because there is little else 
to go on. 
For the research discussed in this thesis therefore, the methods 
of analysis are, in their details, largely of my own development. It 
can be argued that this may be a weakness, in that they do not follow 
a tried and tested format, although of course they do not differ 
radically from what others have attempted. There is a limit to the 
ways in which data can be sorted. However, it is suggested that, 
far from being a weakness, these methods of investigation are a 
strength of the research, in that they are tailor-made, having been 
initiated and developed specifically for this work. They are 
therefore appropriate tools of analysis since their creation evolved 
as the analysis progressed. 
The second issue alluded to above concerns the observation that, 
inevitably, in the end research is hardly ever carried out precisely 
in the way intended at the beginning. Hence, alterations and 
enhancements were made to methods of analysis along the way. What Is 
recounted here is a representation of an ordered and sequential path 
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of events, smoothed of the trials and circumnaviqýtions inherent in 
such journey. 
6.1 Restatement of research objectives 
As discussed, the intention of the study was to distinguish the 
factors which affected the implementation of strategic decisions in 
various organizations. The data would be used to develop a set of 
dependent and independent variables to describe and explain the 
process and outcomes of implementation. Preliminary attempts in 
this direction have already been referred to in Chapter 4 when 
dependent variables of Completion, Success, Legitimacy, Acceptability 
and Ease were outlined, together with independent variables of 
Interests, Alternatives, Resources and Unforeseen Eventualities. 
It was always expected that these initial ideas would be changed 
and modified by subsequent empirical investigation. Thus the 
empirical data were examined for appropriate variables without 
attempting to force the findings into a preconceived theoretical 
framework. It was intended that research should be data-driven and 
that any resulting theory would be expressly built on information 
collected during the study. 
The story of the unfolding analysis is now recounted. it 
begins with the construction of implementation biographies, and 
continues through content frequency analysis, concept elucidation, 
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methods of paired comparisons and case rankings, and the final 
definitions of variables. Details of various reliability tests 
carried out in order to try and ensure accuracy and completeness are 
also described. 
6.2 Implementation bioqraphies 
Kimberly (1984) describes how 'organizational biographies' 
provide a retrospective account of major transitional periods in the 
life of an organization: - 
"Good biography will appreciate the interplay of 
individual personalities, organizational culture, 
identity structure, process, and connections with 
the external environment. It will necessarily 
counterpose micro and macro levels of analysis, 
and it will embrace rather than ignore history and 
context. " (p. 236) 
In order to build up and retain a full story of each case it was 
necessary to write 'implementation biographies' of the eleven 
decisions. Biographies are reproduced in full in Appendix B. 
Each is about 3-4 pages long and opens with a description of the 
company giving areas of business interest and financial details. 
This is followed by a piece on each of the cases studied in that 
organization. 
These accounts represent the movement and activity of 
implementation processes. They give brief notes about pre-decision 
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processes - how the decision was made, and by whom; and fuller 
details of what happened, post-decision, during implementation. For 
example, who was involved, what had to be done, how this was carried 
out, and the results for the organization and its members. 
The purpose was to provide a full, coherent and fairly definitive 
account of each case. This would avoid an over-reliance on the 
researcher's memory and help to ensure that details were not 
forgotten or overlooked during subsequent analysis. In addition, 
the biographies give an easy to read and more digestible summary of 
the studies for others interested in this project. 
The biographies were then used as a back up for further 
analytical techniques. Whilst subsequent analysis utilised the raw 
data of interview notes, the biographies provided useful confirmatory 
information if required. In addition, they enabled the reliability 
tests described below. 
First reliability test: cross referencing and corroboration 
Biographies were distilled from the information obtained from 
many informants. Each is a precis of what happened, pieced together 
from different sources. More (or perhaps less) than this, each is 
the researcher's interpretation of what is said or written about what 
happened. 
The question is, how to tell one story from so many individual 
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recollections. By talking sequentially to a number of respondents 
at various levels of authority, cross-referencing could be employed 
to see if discrepancies did exist. Because interviews were 
open-ended, questions could be explicitly framed to follow up points 
if it appeared that one respondent's account differed substantially 
from another's. 
In the event the stories told were generally the same as far as 
the main facts of each case were concerned. Hence, most were in 
broad agreement about the main reasons why a decision was taken, the 
leading personnel involved in decision-making and implementation, 
what was done during implementation, and the approximate sequence and 
timing of events. 
So, there was consensus regarding the bones of the story. Where 
there were differences these largely concerned the features of 
implementation. These 'fleshy parts' serve to give it an overall 
profile as being easy or difficult, acceptable or unacceptable, 
successful or unsuccesful and so on. For example, it was quite 
possible for a decision-maker and implementee to agree entirely about 
why a decision was taken and what happened when during 
implementation, but to have different opinions about whether this was 
a good or bad decision for the organization and its employees. More 
will be said about this in the next chapter when the results are 
discussed. For the present it should be noted that the methods of 
data collection and analysis allowed for these differences in 
perspective to be recorded, and that such differences added to the 
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story, rather than detracting from it. Diversity of opinion was 
considered to be important data in its own right. 
Case study based research is often the subject of criticism. 
This is because so much depends on the researcher to ensure the 
accuracy of the case he/she is recording and analysing. The 
researcher tells the story and the reader has no means of checking it 
out. This means that biases, distortions, omissions and even 
inaccuracies may be hidden from the view of others. 
To try and minimise this potential weakness each case biography 
was sent to an informant in the organization concerned for checking 
and corroboration. The informant was chosen on the basis of his 
knowledge about the whole case. In the majority of instances he was 
a senior decision-maker who could evaluate both the cases in his 
organization. Telephone contact was made beforehand to ask for 
assistance and a covering letter was sent with the biography 
(Appendix F). Details are given below in Table 6.1 on page 136. 
Individuals were asked to read the accounts and encouraged to 
make any alterations or additions considered necessary. A stamped, 
addressed envelope was included for reply. 
Everyone replied and reassuringly few amendments were deemed 
necessary. In fact the Regional Director at Wharf Chemicals 
commented: - "Your account of the company is accurate and it makes 
interesting reading to an ex-'Laytons' man. Did this really happen, 
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Table 6.1 List of informants who checked biographies 
COMPANY CASE BIOGRAPHIES 
CHECKED WITH: 
Vale University: Heating Bursar 
Building Bursar 




EasyshoD Mail Order: Computer 






S&D Chemicals: Transport/Distr. Divisional Manager 
Computer Divisional Manager 
Wharf Chemicals: Merger Operations Director 
Formation Regional Director 
I ask myselfl! " It is perhaps to be expected that the most 
amendments came from the academic institution! Here the biography 
was circulated by the Bursar to several people at the university for 
their comments and modifications, and it was talked over between 
them. 
In general, the very few alterations which were made concerned 
name changes to protect anonymity and one or two minor 
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clarifications. This is particularly pleasing since the biographies 
described stories which were not all flattering to the organizations 
concerned. (one respondent confined himself to an exclamation mark 
at a particularly telling passage which commented on the lack of 
expertise in his organization, but made no modifications). 
This was the step in data analysis and helped to recall each case 
in detail. It not only provided verified case histories but also 
prepared the ground mentally for further examination. 
6.3 Research reports 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, in order to retain all details which 
might be useful in the future, a short research report was written 
for each case. These are to be found in Appendix E. The report is 
a personal recording of research in each organization, how access was 
obtained, the help received, the problems faced and so on. In 
addition, general impressions about the organization are recounted - 
the 'culture' which pervaded, the apparent morale and attitude of 
staff (not just the ones formally interviewed but also secretaries, 
receptionists and commissionaires). 
This served two purposes. Firstly, to provide a written 
reminder -of impressions and perceptions of the organizations as a 
whole, and of carrying out research within them. This was used to 
'think myself back' into the cases - an aide-memoire of what it was 
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like to do research in organization 'x' or gyp. Secondly, these 
accounts were used as a source of organizational data, and notes were 
sifted for potential variables which might affect the implementation 
process. 
6.4 Content frequency analysis 
Thus far the case histories and my personal recollections had 
been written up. What was now required was some way of condensing 
all the data to sift out the factors which appeared to have some 
effect on the implementation process or denoted specific outcomes. 
The objective was to go through the content of each item of data, 
select potential implementation-relevant factors or variables, and 
then see which factors appeared with the most frequency within and 
across cases. This required scanning of all the raw data - 
interview notes, documents and reports. 
Of course, respondents did not arrive at the interview armed with 
a ready-made list of such factors. They talked about the decision 
and implementation in general terms and answered questions. So 
potential factors had to be extrapolated from discussions. Since it 
was not yet at all certain what these implementation-relevant factors 
might be, every statement made during the interview was considered 
and all main points noted to avoid leaving out any items which might 
possibly be of relevance later on. Similarly, all documents were 
scanned thoroughly for additional or corroborating content. 
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So the major preoccupation was to not leave anything out of this 
condensation which might conceivably be of interest. At this early 
stage ideas were too unformed - and deliberately so - to be too 
ruthless in discarding seemingly less useful or more trivial data. 
Each case in each organization was scanned in turn and points 
noted on Analysis Sheet I. An example of this is given in Table 
6.2. 
Table 6.2 Analysis Sheet I- Content frequency analysis 
Great Northern Mail Order : ComPuterisation 
Deduced Details Informant 
Concept Status 
Importance/ Company in financial difficulties, M. D. 
priority of losing money prior to decision. d-m 
implementation. Had to upgrade systems to get the 
business onto a sound foundation. 
Agreement/ Everyone agreed on what was to Personnel 
Conflict/ be done and the way to do it. Director 
Backing People who did not agree left d-m 
the company. 
Success/ The final system was a strength Personnel 
Achievement of the business which allowed Directo 
them to build up a data base, d-m 
a credit reference agency, 
telephone sales and direct 
mail systems. 
Familiarity The new M. D. came from a rival Computer 
mail order company and had Directo 
already installed a new computer d-m 
system there. 
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Details of each point were noted, and attributed to a particular 
respondent. For example it can be seen that the first point on 
Sheet I given here concerns the fact that Great Northern Mail Order 
company was losing money and that new computer systems were seen as 
the way to get the company back onto a sound foundation. This was 
mentioned by the Managing Director. His status as a decision-maker, 
implementor and/or implementee (d-m, Imp, impee) is also given. 
A conceptual deduction was then made. For the statement given 
above - this was the 'importance/priority of implementation'. The 
intention was to conceptualise in a form which could be used to cover 
other statements of a similar nature, in the same case and In other 
cases. This is therefore the gradual filling out of the ideas In 
Chapter 4, and the early beginnings of the final variables discussed 
in the next chapter. 
At first a comparatively large number of concepts was used - each 
a potential variable or variables. Sometimes different concept 
names were used for' similar kinds of statements, for example a 
statement referring to the importance of the computer system to Great 
Northern would be given the label 'Importance' on one occasion, 
'Criticality' on another, and 'Priority' on a third. This was 
purposeful, since at this stage it was not certain which would be the 
most accurate description of the final variable. 
On occasions it was not always immediately clear what the concept 
ought to be because the particular significance of the statement was 
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uncertain. An instance of this is a statement made by the Computer 
Director that there was no time to train a new management team in 
order to implement the computer decision. This was firstly given the 
concepts of 'Training' and 'Crisis', but eventually, after further 
consideration of all cases, it was decided that this was really a 
matter of resource availability (the resource here being 'time') and 
was subsumed under this variable in the final analysis. 
The list of deduced concepts was very long by the end of this 
stage. For example, Great Northern's case mentioned above provided 
approximately 30 loosely defined concepts covering both independent 
and dependent variables. Obviously many of these were also found In 
other cases and as analysis progressed the 'keyword' for the concept 
gradually became clearer. For example, the concept of 'Priority' 
seemed a more appropriate variable label which could be applied to 
more cases. This meant that other labels such as 'Importance' or 
'Centrality' were dropped in later stages. However, each case added 
perhaps one or two additional concepts which had to be considered. 
All these were to undergo continual redefinition and development 
during the ensuing stages of analysis. 
It should be noted that, at this stage, no systematic attempt was 
made to report the effect of each potential independent variable on 
implementation outcomes. Naturally, some factors did obviously have 
a more positive effect on implementation than others. At Great 
Northern it was clear that the 'Familiarity' of the Managing Director 
(and other Computing staff) with similar computer systems elsewhere 
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helped implementation a great deal. But neither the implications of 
variables nor possible links between them were explored at this 
time. (Subsequent further analysis of the positive/negative effects 
of each independent variable was carried out using Analysis Sheet II 
as explained in the next section, while possible correlations between 
independent and dependent variables are discussed in Chapter 7. ) 
The final results of these condensations were eleven reports (one 
for each case), usually of about 16 - 20 pages in length. This was 
from raw data for each case which could comprise 100 pages or more. 
By the end of this stage of the analysis it was felt that the 
'richness' of the data had been retained, little of relevance had 
been lost and the information had been organized to make it easier 
for subsequent investigation. Nevertheless, the original data were 
scanned at least twice more during analyses to check for omissions or 
oversights. To confirm both the methodology and the results of this 
analysis, the following reliability test was carried out. 
Second reliability test 
In an effort to ensure that deduced concepts derived from these 
reports were an appropriate representation of the content a 
reliability test on one of the cases was performed. The completed 
Analysis Sheet I for Easyshop's computer installation was re-examined 
by the research supervisor who considered the concepts and checked 
them, as independently as possible given his continual familiarity 
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with the work. 
Obviously the test might have been more rigorous if the tester 
had been able to condense the raw data himself. However, in the 
circumstances, this would have taken too long a period of time. 
Nevertheless, even though the concepts had already been developed in 
some form, the supervisor was able to offer useful modifications and 
suggestions. In fact, there was general agreement concerning 
two-thirds of the concepts, and modifications or alterations were 
made to a third. 
The real importance of this reliability test was to provoke 
further discussions about the variables and many hours were spent 
talking through concepts and ideas. In this way the analyses 
themselves provided useful vehicles for further consideration and 
reflection. Discussion's with interested colleagues and formal 
presentations at the university and elsewhere also stimulated efforts 
to distinguish and clarify concepts. 
Since the concepts derived from each case, though similar, were 
not the same, the next move was to compare concepts and data across 
cases to see whether generally applicable variables could be 
formulated. The way in which this was carried out is explained in 
the next section. 
6.5 Elucidation of concepts 
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All the deduced concepts were listed in order to be able to see 
at a glance the concepts derived from each case. By comparing and 
contrasting concepts within and across cases it was hoped that some 
standardisation and assimilation would be possible. In this way, the 
very large number of concepts could gradually be refined and honed to 
produce a smaller number of key variables. 
The analysis of independent variables was carried out using 
Analysis Sheet II, an example of which can be seen in Table 6.3 on 
page 145, and Analysis Sheet III, shown in Table 6.4 on page 148. 
The analysis of dependent variables was carried out in a similar way 
using Analysis Sheet IV, shown in Table 6.5 on page 149. A detailed 
account of both analyses now follows, beginning with the independent 
variables. 
After some reflection, it appeared that some of the factors which 
appeared to affect implementation were essentially concerned with 
what was being implemented; others were to do with the 
organizational context in which implementation was being carried 
out; a few were linked to exogenous events which impinged upon 
implementation; and the remainder appeared to refer more 
specifically to the process of implementation itself. Thus, some 
loose groupings began to emerge. 
The framework used by Whipp, Rosenfeld & Pettigrew (1987) to 
analyse strategic change processes was modified and used to produce 
three groupings of variables. These are 'Content', 'Context' (which 
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Table 6.3 Analysis Sheet 11 - Conceot elucidation : independent variables 
Great Northern Mail Order - Computerisation 
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W: * Indicates whether informant is decision-maker (d) and/or implementor M, implementee (e) 
st Indicates abbreviated title of informant. From left to right informants are: - 
Managing Director; Personnel Director; Warehouse Director; Computer I Distribution Director; 
Group Marketing Director; Computer Planning Director; Director (Catalogue); Director 
Database Marketing; Systems Manager; Finance Director; Project Manager; Personnel Services 
Manager; Personnel Manager (Industrial Relations); Supervisor (Telephone Orders) 
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is further subdivided) and 'Process' (see Analysis Sheet IM 
Under the heading of 'Content' are grouped those variables which 
appear to particularly concern the matter for implementation. Hence 
the concept of 'Complexity' was placed under this heading. 
Complexity refers to the difficulty and interrelatedness of 
implementation tasks, which was considered to be the result of the 
kind of topic being implemented. These definitions and arguments 
will be developed more fully in the next chapter. 
The category of 'Context' refers to the situation, both inside 
the organization and outside in the environment in which 
implementation had to take place. Various organizational factors 
which affected implementation had been highlighted by the Content 
Frequency Analysis. For instance, the adequacy of resources in the 
organization was a possible factor in facilitating implementation, as 
were particular cultural features. These were clustered under the 
label of 'Inner Context' as they were primarily to do with internal 
organizational matters. The concept of 'Familiarity', was also 
placed in this section as it referred to the extent to which 
knowledge about what was being implemented was available In the 
organization. External factors which impinged upon implementation 
were seen as being concerned with the 'Outer Context' of 
implementation and were grouped accordingly. This covered external 
events which affected implementation, such as the takeover bid from a 
rival company which delayed Easyshop's computer installation, and the 
offer of a cheap gas supply which was made to Vale university from 
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the Gas Board while they were upgrading their energy systems. it 
will be noted from Table 6.3 on page 145 that a feature of Great 
Northern's case is the lack of significant exogenous factors. 
Finally, the category of 'Process' was used to group those 
independent variables which appeared to be more concerned with the 
actual process of implementation. Therefore, variables to do with 
the way in which implementation was carried out featured here - 
whether there was flexibility and room to manoeuvre during 
implementation or not, whether there was general cooperation or 
conflict, and so on. 
As Table 6.3 shows, variables were identified as emanating from 
data given by particular informants who were distinguished as being 
decision-maker, implementor or implementee (d, i, e) and were given 
more than one label if roles overlapped. This helped to keep track 
of concepts and trace their origins. Furthermore, any variance 
between informants showed up. Hence if one person mentioned that 
the 'Priority' given to implementation helped its success, but 
another considered that it hindered success by putting too much 
pressure on implementors, then this variance could be noted. 
Factors which were generally considered to be favourable for 
implementation were marked with a plus sign, "+", under the 
appropriate informant's column, while factors considered negative 
were marked with a minus sign, "-% Where both signs appear ("+/-") 
this signifies that respondents held mixed views. Hence at Great 
Northern, the Database Marketing Director believed that general 
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familiarity with computer systems at his previous company helped 
installation at Great Northern, but he also pointed out that he was 
unfamiliar with Great Northern's particular routines which took time 
and effort to learn. 
The function of Analysis Sheet II was to facilitate a reduction 
in and standardisation of variables, influenced by the degree of 
support each had in the data from informants. 
To check back that revised concepts fitted all cases and 
encompassed all the data, an Analysis Sheet III was compiled for the 
independent variables for each case. It showed the data denoted by 
each variable. Table 6.4, below, gives a brief example of some of 
statements made for Great Northern. 
Table 6.4 Analysis Sheet III - Conceptual origins 
Great Northern Mail Order : Computerisation 
CONTENT: Complexity A colossal job to re-write 
systems in new language and using new 
methods of working. 
Priority Crucial to the company's 
survival, central to its operations. 
Company partly in crisis because 
administrative systems were so poor. 
CONTENT (inner): Familiarity Of great help that main 
decision-makers had already installed a 
major computer system previously. But 
not familiar with Great Northern's own 
administrative routines. 
PROCESS: Backing Little conflict, union weak, 
opposition removed. 
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The elucidation of concepts for dependent variables followed a 
similar path. Essentially, these variables described various 
aspects of implementation outcomes. They were noted as before and 
again attributed to particular respondents. 
This was a speedier process since the number of deduced concepts 
was considerably fewer and most concepts were similar across all 
cases. 
An example of Analysis Sheet IV is depicted in Table 6.5 below, 
the plus and minus signs indicating whether informants felt that 
outcomes were positive or negative. Notes were made on the sheet to 
link concepts with the data and this served the same function for the 
dependent variables as Sheet III did for the independent variables. 
Table 6.5 Analysis Sheet IV - Concept-elucidation : deDendent variables 
Great Northern Mail Order Company - ComDuterisation 
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Key * As for Analysis Sheet 11, see Table 6.3, page 145 
st 
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This process of elucidation took many months and much 'thinking 
time' was required. Even then, there was still a very large number 
of concepts to deal with. Definitions were continually being 
modified throughout data analysis to develop more precisely worded 
variables. 
Another reliabilitY test was carried out here and this is 
reported below. 
Third reliability test 
As before, the research supervisor undertook to carry out a 
direct check on the data early in this stage. This Involved an 
in-depth consideration of one case (Easyshop computerisation was used 
once more for this) to test methodology and groupings of independent 
variables. As previously, he checked the concepts against the data 
using Analysis Sheets III and IV. Further suggestions were made and 
the reliability of the methodology was confirmed. 
The raw data was then once again reviewed in its entirety in 
order to try and ensure completeness and accuracy. 
To summarise then, modified and refined 'working definitions' of 
concepts had been derived from the deduced concepts suggested by the 
Content Frequency reports. These had been listed using Analysis 
Sheets II, III and IV. In doing this, an attempt had been made to 
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standardise concepts across cases and to combine them where it seemed 
that they referred to similar factors, and the positive or negative 
effects of independent variables had been summarised. 
6.6 Paired comparisons and case rankings 
The working definitions of variables were still provisional. 
The final step was to turn them back upon the data once more, ranking 
the cases on them so as to simultaneously achieve a comparison of all 
cases on all variables, and a set of tried and stable definitions. 
The variables used were those which had been shown to be the most 
significant in shaping implementation processes and denoting 
implementation outcomes. They seemed to be the ones to which more 
data from more informants referred, and which informants indicated 
were more influential in the final success or failure of 
implementation. 
Each variable was considered in turn. A short statement was 
written for each case to illustrate the degree to which the variable 
in question featured in the case: Analysis Sheets III and IV were of 
assistance here. 
Cases were then compared with each other two by two (paired 
comparison) to assess which was higher or lower on each variable. 
Hence for the variable 'Familiarity', Great Northern's computer 
- 152 - 
Table 6.6 Analysis Sheet V- Ranking of cases on variables 
Independent Variable : 'Familiarity' 
Case Description Position Ranking 
Great Northern: Decision-makers had already installed a I Higher 
computer complete new system in their previous 
company. Did have to learn Great 
Northern's routines but not too different. 
SID Chemicals: Already running their own transport systems 2 Higher 
transport/distr. so knew what had to be done, and had made 
some use of outside hauliers before, though 
not to this extent. 
Central Water: Already built other water treatment 3 medium 
Langen works but used some new treatment 
processes here. 
Vale University: Used the original boiler company to effect 3 Medium 
heating/EMS boilerhouse improvements. Consultants 
conversant with Energy Management Systems, 
but exact specification was new to them, 
Central Water: Introduced a new technology though carrying 5 Medium 
CAD out familiar tasks - i. e. draughting. 
Great Northern: Using new technology in warehouses at present 5 Medium 
warehouse but not built a warehouse of this size or 
sophistication previously. 
Vale University Academics and architects had not developed I Medium 
building a university before, though academics had 
experience of them and architects had used 
CLASP building system in schools. 
Wharf Chemicals Had amalgamated some companies during 7 Medium 
merger formation but carried out rather 
superficially with little integration. 
Easyshop General lack of experience and knowledge 9 Lower 
of new technology. 
S10 Chemicals General lack of experience and knowledge 9 Lower 
of new technology. 
Wharf Chemicals No-one had previous experience here. 9 Lower 
company formation 
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installation clearly demonstrated Higher Familiarity than Wharf's 
merger of two divisions, since their management had done something 
like it before. It therefore ranked higher than Wharf's merger on 
this variable. Analysis of Vale's Heating decision showed that it 
was less familiar than Great Northern's computer case, but more 
familiar than Wharf's merger, so it was placed between the two. And 
so on. Tied cases were permitted. Cases were then labelled as 
being Higher/Medium/Lower according to their position in the ranking, 
as shown in the example in Table 6.6 on page 152. 
This method of paired comparison was adapted from Green & Tull 
(1978). Since Green & Tull's form of analysis only allowed for 
Higher/Lower distinctions and did not permit tied placings, 
modification was required. 
The complete process of ranking cases across variables was 
carried out several times to try and ensure accuracy and reliability 
and further reliability tests are described below. The final 
classification of cases on both independent and dependent variables 
is shown in Table 6.7 on page 154. Individual case rankings will be 
explained in detail when the variables are described and illustrated 
in the next chapter. 
The ranking highlighted variables that were still poorly 
specified, and others which did not distinguish differences 
sufficiently to be useful in comparison. This enabled modifications 
to be made to the list of variables and their definitions. By the 
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Table 6.7 Classification of cases on independent and devendent variables 
Independent variables Dependent-variables 





Langden M M M M M L L M L M L M M M 
CAD M L M M M H H H M M M M H M 
Easyshop 
Computer H M M M L M L L L M L L L L 
G. Northern 
Warehouse M M L M M M M H N H M H M H 
Computer H H H H H L H H H L H H H H 
51D Chems 
Transport L L M K H H H M N M M M M M 
Computer H M M M L M M M M M H L M M 
Wharf 
Merger L L L L M M L L M M M L M M 
Formation x M L L L M L L M M L L M L 
KEY: H: Higher M: Medium L: Lower 
independent variables: - 
Complexity; Priority; Specificity; Assessability; Familiarity; Resource Availability; 
Structural Appropriateness; Cultural Appropriateness; Propitiousness; Flexibility; Backing 
Dependent variables: - 
Completion; Achievement; Acceptability 
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end of this stage of the analysis each variable had been defined by 
one statement, which described what 'Familiarity', 'Complexity' or 
whatever referred to. In addition, three further statements emerged 
from the paired comparisons to define Higher Familiarity, Medium 
Familiarity and Lower Familiarity, and so on. 
Fourth and fifth reliability tests 
Since these rankings were to be used to provide the main results 
of the research project it was important that they were as reliable 
as possible. Because of this corroborating tests were carried out in 
addition to the re-rankings by the researcher already mentioned. 
Firstly, the research supervisor was given the case statements 
and asked to rank them on each variable. This was reassuring in 
that the majority of rankings agreed on most variables. In just a 
couple of cases there was disagreement between Higher and Medium, or 
Medium and Lower. There was no instance where a case ranked by the 
researcher as being either Higher or Lower, was then ranked opposite, 
Lower or Higher, by the supervisor. There were difficulties 
encountered in rankings on two variables which required modifications 
to the operational definitions. 
It was then decided that although this check had shown 
overwhelming agreement it would be desirable to test these findings 
by using someone unconnected with the project to rank cases. 
- 156 - 
Accordingly a lecturer in another institution (a psychologist) 
was approached. She was given the full implementation biographies 
and a list of variables and their definitions (with the 
Higher/Medium/Lower categories defined). A copy of Analysis Sheet V 
for each variable, with the cases moved around so that they were not 
in rank order, was provided. The lecturer was asked to place the 
cases in Higher, Medium or Lower categories on each variable, 
according to the fit between the case statements and the variable 
definitions. It was a task that took her the best part of a day. 
The vast majority of rankings agreed with those of the researcher 
and supervisor. Of the fourteen independent and dependent 
variables, rankings on 2 were exactly the same, 2 had one difference, 
7 had two differences, and 2 had three differences. The variable of 
Priority had 6 differences and this required modification. 
However, again disagreement was only by one category. As before, no 
case was moved from Higher to Lower, or vice versa. Disagreement 
usually indicated that the case statements required slight amendment. 
Although some variables required further clarification, the main 
conclusion was that the analysis could be understood and carried out 
successfully by independent assessors. This helped to lessen the 
anxiety that the results of case study work are too much the sole 
interpretation of the researcher, and as such cannot be confirmed by 
a third party. 
of course, as always, there should be a note of caution here. 
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The biographies and Analysis Sheets used for the independent check 
were formulated by the researcher and consequently shaped the 
rankings. Any bias or distortion in this material would be 
undetectable by the checkers since it was inherent in data 
collection, though it should be emphasised that the biographies had 
been examined by organizational informants previously. 
Notwithstanding the above, stable and sufficiently clear 
definitions of variables had now evolved. 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter has reported the various forms of analysis which 
were employed to reduce the mass of raw data, and derive from it 
eleven independent and three dependent variables. In addition, 
reliability checks have been described which were carried out to test 
assumptions and results of analysis. The way in which the initial 
deduced concepts were derived, developed into concepts and 
subsequently refined into defined variables has been catalogued. 
These variables are now discussed in detail. 
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CHAPTER 7 
VARIABLES SUGGESTED BY DATA ANALYSIS 
Having evolved the variables, this chapter explains each in turn, 
first the dependent variables (section 7.1) and then the independent 
(section 7.2), showing how each was modified by or came from the case 
data, and giving their final definitions. In this chapter reference 
will again be made to the original framework presented in Chapter 4, 
which provided the initial focus for data collection. The reasons 
for subsequent modifications to the framework will be suggested and 
explained. Chapter 8 will present a more detailed analysis of how 
the independent variables may affect the dependent variables, and may 
be used to explain them. 
It must be emphasised that the variables developed out of an 
interaction between the empirical data and the original concepts, 
each both stimulating - yet limiting - the other. This method 
follows the prescripts of 'grounded theory', the intention being to 
replace one theory by a better one (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 28). 
Chapter 4 distinguished five dependent variables and four 
independent variables. The final set of variables comprises three 
dependent and eleven independent variables. So empirical evidence 
has Identified fewer meaningful separate attributes of 
implementation, but more reasons to explain them. 
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7.1 Dependent variables: the success of implementation 
The five dependent variables in Chapter 4 (Table 4.1 on page 98) 
were completion, success, legitimacy, acceptability and ease. 
As a brief reminder, 'completion' referred to how far the 
decision was implemented; 
objectives; 'legitimacy' ti 
followed the path prescribed 
the degree of satisfaction 
outcomes of implementation; 
in implementation as perceived 
Isuccess' to the achievement of 
o the degree to which implementation 
by decision-makers; 'acceptability' to 
felt by interests in the method and 
and 'ease' to the degree of difficulty 
by the authorising body. 
Although not an exhaustive set of criteria, these variables were 
an attempt to encompass what seemed to be the most significant 
aspects of implementation. The empirical study would show which of 
these were the more important and which might have to undergo 
modifications. 
During the analysis of data it gradually became clear that all 
these variables, not merely the variable that had been called 
'success$, represented degrees of implementation success. The 
original framework left the overarching concept of 'implementation' 
as a rather vague and undefined term, but once it had been recognised 
that all the dependent variables were signifying success, they became 
a more meaningful category and this sharpened the whole focus of the 
research. 
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So this was a vital step in several ways. Firstly It 
categorised the 'outcomes' of implementation for each case and thus 
made this data more manageable. It also provided a firmer basis for 
the beginnings of a theoretical model. But additionally, and perhaps 
most importantly, it meant that the dependent variables could be used 
to form general propositions about the success of implementation, 
going beyond the usual criteria of profit maximisation, cost 
reduction, growth in market share or whatever. 
The dependent variables are now described in detail, commencing 
with completion, achievement and -acceptability, which are retained, 
and then explaining why legitimacy and ease are discarded. 
COMPLETION - fulfilling implementation tasks, on time 
One obvious aspect of success is whether the decision was 
Implemented in full, or only in part, or even not at all. 
However, in studying the eleven cases it became clear that this 
concept of completion was rather too simple. Some cases 
demonstrated a high degree of completion (see Table 6.7, page 154) 
while in others all the necessary tasks had not yet been done at the 
time of finishing the study. So, for example, Vale University had 
finished the implementation of its heating and energy decision, but 
Easyshop was still waiting to fully implement its new computer 
systems and Wharf Chemicals had still not finished all the tasks 
involved with forming the company or merging the two divisions. But 
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that is not to say that these outstanding tasks would not be fully 
implemented at some time in the future. They might well be 
implemented in due course, later than expected perhaps, and after the 
research had finished. 
So a crucial time dimension had to be incorporated into this 
variable. The issue was not just one of fulfilling all, or the 
majority, of the tasks of implementation, but doing this within an 
expected time frame. 
A couple of points ought to be made here. It must be recognised 
that in some respects implementation tasks may never finish. 
Strategic decisions are multi-faceted and consequential and may often 
require additional fine-tuning and adjustment even when they have 
been substantially implemented. So this idea of completion does not 
require that every single trivial task has to be absolutely 
finished. A decision may be considered to be completed to a high 
degree if the majority of the more significant implementation tasks 
have been carried out, in the time period anticipated. 
This leads to another issue. Who is to say what tasks form part 
of implementation and what a reasonable, expected time frame is to 
be? Perhaps different people in the organization will have 
different views about what needs to be done and how long a particular 
decision may take to implement in full. 
This is a difficult issue to handle empirically. But because 
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one of the main aims of the study was to ask as many people as 
possible for their views it was an inevitable one. Eventually, for 
the purposes of this study, it was decided that the researcher should 
assess the degree of completion from a consideration of all the 
information available. 
For the most part this was not difficult since there was broad 
agreement between informants. However, there was one exception. 
In both cases at Wharf Chemicals there was some difference of opinion 
between senior decision-makers and others in the organization about 
how long implementation took. Both implementations here involved 
implementation tasks which centred on transforming separate units 
into one cohesive whole. The problem was that the two senior 
executives saw this as a relatively straightforward matter, primarily 
concerned with sorting out the legal and corporate framework. But 
for the operational managers and staff (the implementors and 
implementees) the real task was to try and combine different 
attitudes, cultures, and ways of working. Thus these senior 
managers gave themselves a much easier task which could be easily and 
quickly completed. The real job of implementation was much more 
subtle, complex and time-consuming. For this reason Wharf was given 
a low completion score. This scoring was verified when the cases 
were independently ranked, as recounted in the previous chapter. 
This case emphasises the need to question informants at all 
levels of the hierarchy. 
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The definition of completion finally arrived at was: - 
", the deqree to which everything intended to be glone is done, 
within the expected time period. " 
As described in the previous chapter, statements were evolved 
during data analysis to define higher, medium and lower completion as 
fol lows: - 
higher completion: - most things intended to be done, were 
done within the expected time period. 
medium completion: - many things intended to be done, were 
done within the expected time period, but a few were not. 
lower completion: - many things intended to be done, were 
not done within the expected time period. 
ACHIEVEMENT - making things work 
Strategic decisions are made with a view to achieving certain 
outcomes. The original framework recognised this and saw successful 
decision-making primarily as the achievement of objectives. 
The definitions of achievement which were finally arrived at are 
as follows: - 
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"the degree to which what was done performs as intended. " 
higher achievement: - most things that were done performed 
as intended, or better. 
medium achievement: - many things that were done performed 
as intended but a few did not. 
lower achievement: - most things that were done did not 
perform as intended. 
This is a rather more general statement than the specific 
goal/objective attainment model. It follows on from the completion 
aspect of implementation to address questions about its 
consequences. It is possible to implement a decision completely and 
yet it still not be successful if it does not get results. So this 
aspect of success refers to whether what was implemented worked in 
the way expected. 
The intentions investigated here as a criterion of achievement 
are those of the 'authorisins body'. This follows on from the 
original definition of success discussed in Chapter 4. However, the 
assessment of the level of achievement against these professed 
intentions was made by the researcher after taking the views of all 
informants into account. 
It is difficult to be absolutely precise about how many aspects 
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have to perform poorly for the case to be classed as lower or medium 
along this variable. A judgment can only be made relatively by 
comparing a number of cases and it must be said that the independent 
checkers did not find this a problem. 
Some examples may make this clearer. In Great Northern the 
computer system performed as intended and the majority of those 
interviewed were in agreement about this. Whilst at Vale, the 
heating/energy management system performed even better than intended 
which was a pleasant surprise to decision-makers and implementors 
alike. These cases therefore scored highly along this dimension. 
At S&D Chemicals, neither case achieved quite its full 
potential. The decision to introduce third party transport made 
savings but left the company with problems of control over outside 
hauliers. The computer installation too performed very poorly at 
first and required much reworking. These cases scored Medium on 
this variable. 
Wharf Chemical's score was also medium on both cases. The 
company was making profits and competing fairly successfully in the 
marketplace after rationalisation but there were still significant 
problems in integrating staff and systems, and many operating 
managers privately expressed the view that performance was being held 
back by these internal issues. 
The only case to obtain a low score was the Easyshop computer 
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installation where almost nothing performed as intended. Completion 
was also low on this case, but even systems which were supposedly 
complete showed numerous software problems and were unacceptably slow 
in their operation. 
Thus, achievement is a performance-related variable, indicating 
how far what is done lives up to what was hoped for. Indeed, it is 
often the only aspect of implementation about which management seems 
to care. But this is a short-sighted view as will be shown below. 
A decision may be implemented completely, it may even achieve more 
than was expected or hoped, nevertheless it may not be acceptable 
throughout the organization. 
ACCEPTABILITY - satisfaction with implementation processes and 
outcomes. 
The brief discussion of this variable in Chapter 4 referred to 
whether the implementation process and outcomes were acceptable to 
organizational members. The final definition remains the same. 
"the degree to which the method of implementation and outcomes 
are -satisfactory- 
to those involved in, or affected by, 
implementation. " 
hiqh6r acceptability: - the method of implementation and 
outcomes were considered to be satisfactory by most of 
- 167 - 
those involved in, or affected by, Implementation. 
medium acceptability: - there were mixed feelings about the 
degree of satisfaction with the method of implementation and 
outcomes. 
lower acceptability: - the method of implementation and/or 
outcomes were considered to be unsatisfactory for a 
significant proportion of those involved in, or affected by, 
implementation. 
Individuals in the organization will have different experiences 
of the implementation process and its consequences will not 
necessarily be the same for everyone. Implementation may be 
complete and achieve its objectives but still be undertaken in a way 
which causes dissatisfaction, or leads to outcomes which may not 
appeal to all organizational members. Acceptability is an indicator 
of success on another, more human level. 
That the computer installation at Great Northern was considered 
to be highly acceptable is perhaps surprising, since the decision was 
taken centrally, without consultation and in the midst of 
redundancies and upheaval. Nevertheless, both the computer 
personnel who installed the new systems and the staff whose jobs were 
affected by them realised the seriousness of the organization's 
position and accepted the radical solutions offered. So, some 
allowances were made because of the special 'crisis' circumstances. 
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The fact that management worked alongside employees and provided 
encouragement helped restore morale and enthusiasm. 
Central Water's building of Langden Water Treatment Works was of 
medium acceptability. Here there were problems with the external 
contractors and some antagonism between the Operational and 
Development sections within Central Water. Although most senior 
management were satisfied with both process and outcomes, there was 
some dissatisfaction among implementors and implementees. 
The formation of Wharf Chemicals and Easyshop's computer 
installation both illustrate lower acceptability. At Easyshop there 
was widespread frustration at all levels about the conflict and 
disruption during the process of implementation and the unsuccessful 
outcomes. At Wharf great dissatisfaction with the complete lack of 
consultation during decision-making continued into implementation. 
Even managers who agreed broadly with the decision found themselves 
overstretched and with little help available from the centre. it 
is no surprise that the overall feeling among all those other than 
the two main decision-makers was one of discontent. 
Legitimacy and Ease 
Le-qitimac was concerned with whether the authorising body 
considered implementation to have followed the course which it 
prescribed. It was found that decision-makers did not always have a 
clear idea of the path of implementation, which made it difficult to 
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ascribe legitimacy to cases. Though it proved to be impracticable 
here, the concept of itself might still be appropriate for future 
research. 
The concept of ease was intended to refer to the degree of 
difficulty involved in implementation. Here again it was not 
possible to obtain pertinent data. When informants were asked about 
ease of implementation they talked either of the problems encountered 
or the degree of personal satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The 
problems referred to indicated degrees of success or failure and so 
were represented by completion or achievement. Levels of 
satisfaction were represented by acceptability. No separate 
variable of ease could be operationalised. 
Having discussed the criteria for successful implementation the 
independent variables will now be examined. 
7.2 Independent variables: factors influencing success 
Whilst the dependent variables were being reduced in number, the 
independent variables were increasing In number, as mentioned 
earlier. The data suggested more reasons why implementation should 
or should not succeed than could be covered by the four categories of 
variables tentatively put forward in Chapter 4. These were the 
effects of complexity, priority, specificity, assessability, 
familiarity, resource availability, structural appropriateness, 
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cultural appropriateness, Propitiousness, flexibility and backing. 
Once again making use of Whipp, Rosenfeld & Pettigrew's (1987) 
framework introduced in Chapter 6 and modified to fit this study, the 
first four of these variables are classified as 'content' variables 
in that they are to do with the topic to be implemented; 
familiarity, resource availability, structural appropriateness and 
cultural appropriateness are concerned with the 'inner context' of 
the organization itself; propitiousness is located in the 'outer 
context'; and flexibility and backing are 'process' variables. More 
will be said about this in due course. 
Each of the variables will now be discussed in turn. 
COMPLEXITY - the intricacy and interrelatedness of ImDlementation 
tasks 
This is a new variable which emanates from the empirical 
research, rather than the early ideas outlined In Chapter 4. It is a 
content variable, describing the matter or topic being implemented 
and is defined as: - 
"the degree to which implementation tasks encompass intricate 
and/or interrelated elements". 
higher complexfty: - implementation tasks are very 
complicated and require the coordination of many sub-units 
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throughout the organization. 
medium complexity: - implementation tasks are relatively 
uncomplicated and require the coordination of some sub-units 
throughout the organization. 
lower complexity: - implementation tasks are mostly 
straightforward and require the coordination of few 




encompasses two components - intricacy and 
which appear to work together to produce 
S&D Chemical's transport decision was a relatively 
uncomplicated matter to implement. Although implementation did 
impinge on the activities of some departments such as Warehousing and 
Logistics (the latter is concerned with stock control and order 
processing), it mainly fell within the ambit of the Transport 
department. So other departments were involved only peripherally, 
and extensive coordination was not required. In addition, the 
Implementation process itself was straightforward and 
comprehensible. There were no radical new technologies to devise or 
make sense of, the major activities were to set up administrative 
routines and manage the human relations aspects. 
The most complex implementations resulted from decisions to 
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introduce new technology. Great Northern, Easyshop, and S&D 
Chemicals all had to manage implementation processes which involved 
the coordination of a large number of organizational departments. 
The decision affected every section in a critical way, and so each 
had to be involved during these post-decision processes (although 
they were not necessarily always consulted during decision-making). 
And the complex nature of the matter for implementation meant that 
much intellectual energy was expended in trying to understand and 
sort out what had to be done. The whole operation was intricate, 
complex, and organization-wide. 
It is significant that both Easyshop and S&D suffered 
disastrously during the early period of implementation. In fact, 
both installed computer systems which failed almost totally before 
achieving some degree of success. Yet Great Northern's computer 
installation was an unqualified success, and it appears that one of 
the reasons was senior management's degree of familiarity with 
computer systems of this type. In this case the level of 
familiarity was sufficient to reduce the potential problems of 
complexity. 
The concept of familiarity will be developed in more detail 
further on. However, this last point is important. It has been 
shown that complexity is a factor which can influence 
implementation. This complements the findings of the Bradford 
Studies (Hicks on et al, 1986) where it was demonstra ted that 
complexity was also o ne of the twin determinants of the 
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decision-making process. However, the present study suggests a 
qualifier to this. It seems that even complex implementations can 
be made easier if the people involved have relevant experience. 
Familiarity can render complexity less of an obstacle. Generally 
speaking, high complexity is disadvantageous only if there is also 
low familiarity. If people know what they are doing they can cope 
with considerable complexity. 
But lower complexity does not guarantee success. Both the 
transport decision at S&D Chemicals and the merger of two divisions 
at Wharf displayed lower complexity but they were only moderately 
successful. So success, or the lack of it, would seem to be due to 
a combination of factors. 
PRIORITY --the urgency of implementation 
Perhaps 'priority' should have been distinguished at the outset 
in Chapter 4. For once the cases were analysed it became an obvious 
inclusion. It denotes how far the matter in hand is given 
precedence among current managerial concerns. It is defined as: - 
"the degree to which implementation is given precedence in the 
organization. " 
higher priority: - implementation takes precedence over all 
else in the organization. 
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medium priority: - implementation takes precedence over many 
other things in the organization. 
lower priority: - implementation takes precedence over some 
things in the organization. 
The first point to make here is that since all the cases studied 
were described as being strategic decisions, they were inevitably of 
more importance than most. Nevertheless, there can be degrees of 
priority within this broad range of decisions, some being considered 
more urgent than others. Some may need to be carried out 
immediately, others can be left a while without jeopardising the 
organization. 
Higher priority gives added impetus to the chosen implementation, 
resources are likely to be made more readily available (sometimes 
they may even be taken away from other projects) and energy will be 
exerted to ensure that this decision is implemented. This appears 
to improve the chances of a successful implementation. 
The two cases where implementation was clearly the number one 
priority were Great Northern's computer installation and the building 
of Vale University and campus. At Great Northern informants 
confirmed the urgency of this decision and its priority status in the 
organization. Since all the other administrative systems hinged on 
the successful installation of the computer it was obviously a 
necessary first step. At Vale no other activities could commence 
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until the university was in existence. 
In both cases higher priority helped to channel effort and 
commitment. This certainly had a bearing on success but there must 
be a note of caution here. For Vale's heating/energy implementation 
was scored as low priority but still achieved high success. As will 
be shown, a reason for this is that this case also enjoyed some 
chance good fortune which helped success, and also established a 
relatively flexible implementation process which allowed this 
propitiousness to be taken advantage of. So, once again, a simple 
mono-causal relationship between the urgency afforded and final 
success is not suggested. What is clear is that, for the most part, 
priority gives the process a head start. 
SPECIFICITY - detailing tasks and processes 
The third variable connected with the content of implementation 
Is 'specificity'. Although ideas about the precision of 
policy-making (Bishop, 1981; Baier et al, 1986) had been examined 
(see Chapter 3), it was not originally considered that this would 
play a part in the implementation of strategic decisions. However 
it was recognised during data analysis that there was a disparity in 
the degree to which tasks were defined prior to implementation, and 
this appeared to affect the final levels of success. 
Specificity is defined here as: - 
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"the degree to which precise details of implementation tasks and 
activities were decided beforehand. " 
higher specificity: - the majority of implementation tasks 
and activities were precisely specified beforehand. 
medium specificity: - the main implementation tasks and 
activities were specified but not with precision. 
lower specificity: - implementation tasks and activities 
were only loosely specified, if at all. 
Those involved in upgrading the heating system at Vale University 
had a relatively precise idea of what had to be done, and in what 
order, during implementation, as did those involved with implementing 
Great Northern's computer system. Conversely, both of Wharf 
Chemicals' implementations were left unspecified, details of how 
these reorganizations were to be effected being remarkable by their 
absence. 
Similarly, the building of the new warehouse at Great Northern 
was unspecified, but in this case that was intentional. Even when 
the decision was made to go ahead and build a new warehouse no-one, 
not even senior management, had any clear idea of what equipment and 
systems would be used in any of the multifarious operations, how big 
an area each process would require, and the exact cost of any of the 
systems. All that was known was an estimate of the final size and 
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cost of the warehouse - and both of these were to change during 
implementation. But unlike the decisions in Wharf, in this case it 
was deliberate management policy to delay decisions on these issues 
so that changes could be incorporated into the design and process 
details right up to the very last minute. A time-scale was drawn up 
and major activities noted, but the whole accent was on flexibility 
(another variable, to be discussed further on) during the processing 
of this decision. 
The question is, does it matter either way, and if so how does 
specificity, or the lack of it, affect final success? 
The answer to this is not straightforward. It seems that in some 
cases, as in Great Northern's computer installation and Vale's 
heating alterations, specificity can help. Everyone involved in 
implementation - decision-makers and implementors - knows what has to 
be done and has a fairly clear idea of where they are going. 
Whereas the lower specificity at unsuccessful Wharf did appear to 
leave operational management in a state of bewilderment, all having 
to make their own, individual decisions about how best to go about 
implementation. 
Against that, Great Northern's other implementation appeared to 
actually benefit from deliberate low specificity. Employees and 
building contractors were given great autonomy in which to work and 
bureaucracy was minimised. Implementors could make important 
decisions about budgets and systems with very little interference, 
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and although regular meetings were held these were primarily to 
coordinate efforts and track progress, not to check up on 
subordinates. Having said this, it must be mentioned that although 
many implementors found this challenging there was some apprehension 
about being given this much freedom. Operational managers had 
little experience of these responsibilities and even the building 
contractors found the experience a little daunting. 
But at Wharf their low specificity was not an intentional policy 
but rather an unintentional outcome of senior management not having 
thought through the requirements for implementation. operational 
managers needed guidance from the centre which was Just not 
forthcoming. 
These contrasts suggest that rather 'loose' decisions can be 
implemented successfully, providing that low specificity is 
complemented by enough flexibility. It may well be that in the 
fast-changing world of systems technology this is a good way of 
making sure that you get the latest techniques available. That is, 
unless you happen to have already installed them somewhere else very 
recently and are therefore certain of what is required. 
In summary then, specificity can have either a negative or 
positive influence on the implementation process and on final 
outcomes. Its effect on the various attributes of success may be 
mediated by other factors, most obviously by flexibility. In 
addition, it appears to be closely linked to another variable, 
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'assessability', which is discussed now. 
ASSESSABILITY estimating the deg ee of success in 
implementation 
This is the fourth and last of the content variables and is 
somewhat different from the preceding three. 
Complexity, priority and specificity all purport to have some 
influence on the level of implementation success. Priority seems to 
be helpful, complexity may be harmful and specificity can have 
varying effects. Assessability though, concerns the degree of 
precision with which final success can be determined. It does not 
affect success directly but is an indication of how easily, and with 
what degree of confidence, the extent of success can be 
recognised. It is not a criterion of success since greater 
assessability does not itself mean greater success. 
Assessability is defined as: - 
"the degree to which the success of Implementation can be 
evaluated with precision. " 
higher assessability: - the success of implementation can be 
precisely determined, probably by quantifiable criteria. 
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medium assessability: - the success of implementation can be 
determined, but some criteria are more subjective. 
lower assessability: - the success of implementation can 
only be vaguely known. 
The building of Vale university and campus is a good example of 
lower assessability. Although a fairly detailed Development Plan 
for the building and evolution of Vale was drawn up by the Architects 
(in consultation with the Vice-Chancellor and Registrar), it 
contained rather vague aspirations. The Plan described the various 
social and academic objectives which it was hoped would be achieved 
through the medium of the campus construction and layout. But aims 
such as the social integration of academics and undergraduates and 
the provision of pleasant memories for students are difficult to 
operationalise, and their degree of success is therefore inevitably 
rather indeterminate. 
On the other hand, Vale's other decision, the heating 
modifications, was far easier to assess. What helped here was the 
fact that precise objectives to be achieved and the time-scale were 
set out In detail beforehand. It was therefore a relatively easy 
matter to estimate their success afterwards. If an agenda is drawn 
up and precise details of tasks are specified, then it is easier to 
see whether they have achieved the desired results. 
Two cases where there is a less clear correlation between 
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specificity and assessability are those of Great Northern's new 
warehouse which scored lower on specificity and medium on 
assessability, and the building of Vale University which displayed 
medium specificity and lower assessability. 
At Vale it has already been argued that the nature of the topic 
itself meant that it was innately difficult to assess. While at 
Great Northern the low specificity was a deliberate management 
policy. This made it less assessable than it might otherwise have 
been, but it was still possible to evaluate the success of the 
various warehouse systems. The lack of specificity reduced 
assessability, but the characteristics of the topic still rendered it 
feasible to evaluate success in some way. 
There was no instance of a case scoring higher on one of these 
variables and lower on the other, and a situation where this might 
arise is difficult to imagine. It would be hard to think of an 
example in which implementation tasks were very precisely specified 
and yet not assessable, or the implementation was able to be 
evaluated precisely from a vague specification. In fact all other 
cases correlated exactly on these two variables. As far as this 
research goes, they remained conceptually distinct, but it is an 
unanswered question whether in future research it is worth including 
both. 
FAMILIARITY-- going along the learning curve 
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This, too, is a new variable suggested by the cases. It is one 
of the four 'inner context' variables, being concerned with whether 
there is any relevant experience available within the organization to 
help cope with implementation. The concept is similar to that used 
by Hickson et al (1986) in their analysis of decision-making 
processes. 
The full definition is as follows: - 
"the de-qree to which those involved have experience relevantAo 
implementing the matter for decision. " 
higher familiarity: - those involved have previously 
implemented the same, or a very similar, decision. 
medium familiarit :- those involved have some experience 
relevant to implementing the matter for decision, although 
there may be aspects of implementation with which they are 
unfamiliar. 
lower familiarity: - those involved have little experience 
relevant to implementing the matter for decision. 
As already described, the most obvious instance of higher 
familiarity is the case of Great Northern's computer installation. 
The decision to instal a computer system and related software was 
taken and implemented by a new managing director who had recently 
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come from a rival mail order company, bringing with him about 20 
staff, mainly computer personnel. They had already set up a new 
system in their previous company and so were very aware of the 
potential problems and pitfalls of the new technology. Although they 
had to get used to Great Northern's own administrative systems and 
routines, had to write new programmes specifically for this 
operation, and actually installed a different system in Great 
Northern from the one in their previous company, the fact that they 
had relevant experience meant that they were already quite a long way 
along the learning curve. This saved time and reduced uncertainty. 
The other case which demonstrated higher familiarity was S&D 
Chemical's decision to use outside hauliers, rather than its own 
transport system. Here, although the company had not implemented a 
complete third party transport system previously, the matter for 
decision and implementation was largely known to decision-makers and 
implementors. They were dealing with movement of materials which 
they already transported themselves, through areas of the country to 
which they already delivered. They were familiar with haulage 
vehicles and delivery methods, locations and routeings. The decision 
was really about finding other firms to take over this part of the 
company's operation. Implementation basically involved reducing S& 
D's own transport fleet (some wagons were still kept for local 
deliveries) and setting up a system to monitor service and costs. 
So, although the decision to go to third party operators was new, S& 
D were already implementing their own system. They certainly had 
experience which was directly relevant, and this gave them a good 
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idea of what had to be done. 
In contrast, the computer installations at S&D Chemicals and 
Easyshop were hampered by low familiarity. Since both 
implementations were concerned with new technology, this brought with 
it risks and uncertainties. Both suffered similar fates in terms of 
mistakes and lack of early success. 
So relevant experience is a help here. However, one must be 
careful not to suggest that such experience renders implementation 
routine and straightforward. It must be remembered that these are 
strategic rather than programmed decisions (Simon, 1960) . They are 
still complex and consequential. Relevant experience does not render 
such decisions unstrategic, nor routinize their implementation. 
Again, familiarity alone does not lead to success. Though both 
Great Northern and S&D Chemicals were highly familiar with their 
topics, only Great Northern scored highly on the dependent variables. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 8, correlations between independent 
and dependent variables are ambiguous and complex. The fostering of 
success is again demonstrated to be multivariate. 
RESOURCE AVAILABILITY - scarcity or sufficiency 
It will be remembered that this variable was one of the four 
distinguished in the earlier framework and, unsurprisingly perhaps, 
empirical research confirmed its significance in affecting 
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implementation success. 
In Chapter 4 it was suggested that problems might ensue if the 
level of resources required failed to match those available. It is 
something of a truism to say that if resources such as finance, 
personnel and time are needed then their lack will be detrimental. 
Indeed, adequate resourcing is one of the main factors which most 
text books cite as helping to ensure-satisfactory implementation. 
The first point to make is that not one of the cases failed 
completely because of a lack of resources. Sometimes there was 
scarcity but never such as to cause implementation to fail 
outright. But the unexpected finding is that it is not necessarily 
the cases which have the most resources which are the most 
successful. Indeed, one of the most successful cases, on every 
dimension of success, was Great Northern's computer installation 
which in fact had the least resources available to it, being short of 
everything - manpower, finance and time. 
Of the cases where resources were in abundance (comparatively 
speaking) - Vales's heating case, the S&D transport/distribution 
decision and Central Water's CAD installation - Vale and Central 
Water were very successful, but S&D achieved only moderate 
success. 
Lower resource availability did appear to hinder Central Water's 
Langden Water Works case, and the formation of Wharf Chemicals. In 
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both manpower was stretched, in Langden time was also short. 
Nevertheless, as the case of Great Northern testifies, all these 
vital resources can be In short supply and yet implementation can 
still be completed and perform as intended. 
It is crucial that resources must not be lacking completely. 
People can be over-stretched, money may be hard to find and time may 
be short, but there must be a sufficiency. Implementation can be 
successful on a shoe-string, provided there is a piece of string at 
1 east. 
As mentioned, one variable which may have a bearing on the 
success of implementation in circumstances where there are scarce 
resources is priority. The success of Great Northern may be partly 
explained by the fact that the limited yet sufficient resources were 
channelled into this high priority implementation. Enough is enough 
if it has priority. 
Resource availability is defined as follows: - 
"the deg ree to which resources for Implementation. --such as 
manp ower , finance and time, are available. 
" 
higher Eesource availability: - all resources are in 
abundance. 
medium resource availability: - some resources are 
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in short supply. 
lower resource availabil-ity: - the majority of resources are 
in short supply. 
STRUCTURAL APPROPRIATENESS-- - facilitating or inhibiting 
implementation 
The third context factor is again a new variable. It refers to 
the Issue of whether the structure of the organization - the way the 
organization itself is organized - helps or hinders implementation. 
This variable was suggested when it became apparent that in some 
contexts the structure of the organization under study caused 
problems for implementors. One case, that of Easyshop, provides an 
apt illustration of this situation. 
The principal problem at EasyshoP was that because of antagonism 
from the Computer Director and data processing staff, the upgrading 
and reorganization of the computer systems were placed under the 
auspices of the Sales Administration Director. The main task of 
writing the software was given to a new Sales Systems Manager who was 
consequently placed in the Sales Administration section, rather than 
the computer department. 
This meant that the primary implementors were faced with a very 
difficult situation, trying to implement what was essentially the 
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computer department's decision while being located in another 
department. To be able to write the software the Sales Systems 
Manager needed access to all kinds of data - programmes, manuals etc. 
- which were in the Computer Department, and he found that not being 
in the right place hindered his work. Of course the hostility of 
the Computer Director compounded this problem, at times making it 
almost impossible for the implementor to carry out his job. 
Structural arrangements in Central Water also impeded the 
building of Langden Water Treatment Works. There were basically two 
departments heavily involved in this project - the Development 
section who were responsible for designing the new works, and the 
operational section who would be responsible for its operation and 
maintenance once Langden was built. Although these different roles 
were meant to be clearly demarcated, in practice the boundary lines 
were rather blurred, and there often appeared to be a struggle over 
authority issues. There were some areas where each section held 
opposing views (over the type of water treatment process itself, and 
the processing of sewage sludge) and the situation was not helped by 
the fact that no one manager seemed to have overall control. It is 
interesting to note that Central Water has now introduced new 
structural arrangements in such cases and operates a Project 
Management system which provides clear chains of command and lessens 
the likelihood of such confusion. 
In contrast, the other decision studied at Central Water - the 
establishment of a CAD system - benefited from a structure which was 
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specifically modified to facilitate implementation. This case 
involved only the Development sections of which there were five (one 
in each region) which operated largely autonomously in most 
matters. During the CAD implementation however strenuous attempts 
were made to bring them together to provide communal support and 
advice, and help with problem-solving. To this end several groups 
were set up at different levels in the hierarchy. There was a Users 
Group for the CAD operators, a Management Group for CAD managers, a 
Standardisation Group which looked at the technical implications of 
CAD, and a Steering Group which initiated and monitored systems 
during the commissioning stage. A representative from each regional 
area sat on each group, and each group reported to the one above so 
that a continuous chain of communication was set up. In 
discussions, most Informants mentioned the usefulness of this kind of 
arrangement. This structural modification, although temporary', 
helped to ease potential implementation problems. 
As a final point it should be noted that structural conditions in 
Wharf Chemicals also played a significant part in its lack of 
implementation success. In this company the issue was not so much 
one of appropriateness as a distinct 'lack' of structure. Here the 
fact that neither Wharf Holdings nor Wharf Chemicals had yet had time 
to set up their own structure impeded the implementation of both 
decisions. No clear systems, routines or lines of authority were in 
place and this lack of control and direction from the centre led to 
confusion and uncoordinated sub unit activies. 
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It is not easy to be precise about the exact ways in which 
success may be helped or hindered, although it is clear that 
inappropriate structures are not favourable conditions in which to 
reap success. Definitions of structural appropriateness are given 
below: - 
"the degree to which organizational structure facilitates--the 
process of implementation. " 
hiqher structural aDDroDriateness: - organizational 
structure is highly facilitative for the process of 
Implementation. 
medium structural appropriateness: - organizational 
structure is moderately facilitative for the process of 
Implementation. 
lower structural appropriateness: - organizational structure 
is not facilitative for the process of implementation. 
CULTURAL APPROPRIATENESS - having the right climate 
In many ways this variable follows the same thread of argument as 
that for structural appropriateness and it can be defined in the same 
way: - 
"the degree to which organizational culture facilitates- the 
process of imDlementation. " 
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higher cultural appropriateness: - organizational culture is 
highly facilitative for the process of Implementation. 
medium cultural appropriateness: - organizational culture is 
moderately facilitative for the process of implementation. 
lower cultural approDriateness: - organizational culture is 
not facilitative for the process of implementation. 
The concept of culture is not easy to define and there Is much 
ongoing debate about whether culture is primarily a set of norms and 
behaviours which can be actively managed (Peters & Waterman, 1982; 
Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Gagliardi, 1986) or a more intangible process 
whereby reality is created and re-created as it is enacted by groups 
and individuals (Turner, 1986). 
Turner (1986) uses Ott's (1984) distinction between these 
Iculture magicians' and 'honest grapplers'. The former "offer 
their clients the tempting possibility of a magical culture 
transformation using ideas of heroes, sagas and myths"; while the 
'honest grapplers' "recognize that organizations have a cultural 
dimension, who see problematic features associated with this 
dimension, and who attempt, using whatever current approaches in 
social science seem to them to be appropriate, to increase 
understanding of this aspect of organizations" (Turner, 1986). 
This present study would like to be considered as an attempt to 
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further the cause of the 'grapplers'' The complexity and subtlety 
of culture is appreciated as are the problems associated with 
understanding and defining cultural dimensions. The notion that 
cultural features might affect implementation was not considered 
initially, but the significance of culture became plainer as research 
progressed. It appeared that different organizations do have 
different norms and values which may predispose them to accept change 
more or less readily. 
In some instances it became clear that senior management can 
influence the prevailing organizational culture, magically or 
otherwise. For example, informants interviewed at Easyshop 
mentioned that the senior managers there were all rather conservative 
and wary of risk. So radical changes, such as the 
re-computerisation decision were hard to get accepted. Even when 
the decision was made, the necessary impetus from the top of the 
hierarchy was missing and implementation stagnated. 
This contrasted with Vale university where everyone questioned In 
connection with its building mentioned the drive and personality of 
the first Vice-Chancellor, who set the tone for the climate and will 
to succeed. But often it was a change in culture which was remarked 
upon. So, in Great Northern a new managing director and management 
team effected radical changes without too much trouble. A new, 
forward-looking Chairman came to Central Water and actively promoted 
new ideas and training. The Development Manager at Central Water 
who was the 'idea champion' for CAD had been unsuccessfully trying to 
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get the scheme off the ground for years. But things only started 
moving when the new Chairman took office. 
These are instances of a 'new broom sweeping clean'. The idea 
that new managers can carry out policies where other managers would 
fail. At Great Northern one senior manager who had seen both the 
old days and the new maintained that computerisation would never have 
been carried out under the previous management team. He remarked 
that the company had definitely been in need of 'new blood'. The 
situation at Easyshop provides evidence for this assumption. There, 
implementation only regained its impetus when a new managing director 
was brought in. 
In other cases it is less obvious how cultural features may have 
affected implementation. Nevertheless, strategic decisions are 
taken at the top and senior management are in a particularly powerful 
position to frame the work attitudes and norms of the organization. 
of course they usually have sufficient influence to make their 
desires known in any case but it is not just a question of throwing 
their weight behind a decision. Their own values and preferences, 
whether for change or for the status quo, influence the rest of the 
work force. In an intangible way the organization can be said to be 
pre-disposed for change or inertia, so that implementations may 
either fall on stony or fertile ground. 
PROPITIOUSNESS - the effect of 'chance' on implementation 
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This 'outer context' variable is to do with the effect of the 
environment on implementation. It is defined thus: - 
"the degree to which any unforeseen external occurrences favour 
implementation. " 
higher propitiousness: - any unforeseen external events 
which occur generally favour implementation. 
medium propitiousness: - any unforeseen external events 
which occur are of mixed favourability for implementation. 
lower propitiousness: - any unforeseen external events which 
occur are generally unfavourable for implementation. 
It was assumed from the outset that implementation might be 
affected by chance events which could have a favourable or 
unfavourable effect upon implementation outcomes. Not everything 
can be foreseen and there is always a possibility that unplanned 
occurrences can impinge upon post-decision processes. This study 
confirmed that such happenings can and do occur and that the results 
may be for good or ill. 
The original concept of 'unforeseen eventualities' has been 
re-named to emphasise that the accent in this project is on how 
favourable such events are for implementation. It is used in a 
similar way to that of Rodrigues (1980). 
- 195 - 
From the cases it can be seen that Vale's heating decision was 
one of the most fortunate. Vale was able to take advantage of an 
unexpected offer made by the Gas Board to provide cheap gas to the 
university. This greatly increased the achievement dimension of 
success, as Vale was able to obtain even better savings and economies 
than were predicted, as well as having the flexibility of a dual fuel 
option if required. 
In a sense Great Northern's computer system was also fortunate, 
not because anything happened to enhance success, but because nothing 
in the least untoward occurred to spoil their carefully laid plans. 
Compared to these cases, other implementation processes endured 
mixed propitiousness. Vale's campus building suffered in the early 
stages from local council apathy and labour shortages in the building 
industry, but was helped by the acquisition of a convenient site; 
Great Northern's new warehouse scheme was also greatly helped by 
locating a local greenfield site, but hindered by a 'hung' local 
council which delayed authorisation to make use of it. 
Cases which suffered from lower propitiousness include Central 
Water's Langden development. Almost immediately after the plant was 
commissioned, the EEC upgraded water quality standards which rather 
'moved the goalposts' for Langden. In addition, during 
implementation the quality of the raw Pennines water it was treating 
deteriorated sharply, which made it more difficult to process. At 
Easyshop too, a takeover bid from a rival mail order firm delayed the 
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computer installation by almost two years. 
In summary, unexpected events do seem to occur in most 
implementation processes. It very much depends on the nature of the 
occurrence as to the effect it may have on the success of 
implementation. 
Great Northern's computer installation alone seemed untouched by 
such surprises - pleasant or otherwise. Perhaps there is a point 
here about the tight control that Great Northern management held over 
the process. Potential interruptions were simply not taken notice 
of - nothing was allowed to interfere. But the converse may also be 
true on occasions. It was the flexibility of Vale's Heating 
implementation which allowed management to take advantage of 
unexpected events when it was clear that they would help ensure 
greater success. 
So perhaps the message for managers is to expect surprises - not 
to be surprised by them - and to incorporate enough 'looseness' into 
implementation programmes to be able to exploit favourable events and 
fend off unfavourable ones. Flexibility certainly seems to play a 
useful role in this respect in some situations and this variable is 
now investigated in more detail. 
FLEXIBILITY adapting to changing circumstances during 
implementation. 
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This variable is placed under the process category and is one of 
those derived directly from data. It is defined as follows: - 
"the degree to which the implementation process can be adapted to 
accommodate chanqinq circumstances. " 
higher flexibility: - the implementation process is highly 
adaptable to changing circumstances. 
medium flexibility: - the implementation process is 
moderately adaptable to changing circumstances. 
lower flexibility: - The implementation process is not 
adaptable to changing circumstances. 
Some mention has already been made of the potential effects of 
this variable. In discussing the independent variable 'specificity' 
it was remarked that in the building of Great Northern's new 
warehouse, lower specificity could be accommodated partly because of 
higher flexibility which enabled changes to be incorporated into the 
implementation process as and when desired. 
Again, as Vale's heating case demonstrates, the chance good 
fortune of being offered a cheap fuel alternative could only be 
accepted because the implementation process itself had left the 
university room to manoeuvre. This was in spite of the fact that 
implementation tasks had been highly specified prior to 
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implementation. As the Bursar commented, the real secret of their 
success was that fact that they continually monitored and reviewed 
the situation during implementation. They were therefore "not put in 
a straightjacket" because of this specificity but could assess and 
take advantage of changing situations. The Bursar maintains that 
this flexibility was a deliberate policy - both in this decision and 
in the original building of the university. 
So it seems that the dictats of many management text books to 
plan such schemes carefully and methodically is only partially 
appropriate. There also must be room for a change of direction if 
this is deemed necessary. 
In some ways this finding complements the early research into 
decision-making by Braybrooke & Lindblom (1963) recounted in Chapter 
2. They advocate a measured and sequential process of 
decision-making which allows for adjustments to decisions to be made 
if required. The method of 'successive limited comparison' means 
that alternatives are chosen which differ only marginally from the 
status quo. This is slightly different to Vale's flexible 
implementation where a radical change was decided on immediately, 
after weighing up all the options at the beginning. However, the 
emphasis on the constant review and reassessment of circumstances 
does appear to be a productive technique in both decision-making and 
implementation. 
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BACKING - support for implementation 
The final independent variable to be discussed, another process 
variable, is that of backing. This draws upon ideas contained in 
Chapter 4 under the variable labels of 'interests' and 
'alternatives'. 
As expected, the influence of interest groups was found to be a 
crucial factor in determining implementation success and failure. 
But essentially, it is the cumulation of influence which is important 
in helping to determine the successfulness of implementation. It is 
the amount of influence 'for' and 'against' implementation which 
decides what happens. Roughly, the amount of favourable influence, 
less the amount of unfavourable influence equals the amount of 
backing. Higher backing means that implementation stands more 
chance of success, lower backing means a greater possibility of 
failure. In this respect backing subsumes notions of effort, 
energy, commitment and support. 
The full definitions are: - 
"the degree to which influence patterns favour implementation. " 
higher backin :- influence patterns favour implementation. 
medium backing: - influence patterns are balanced for and 
against implementation. 
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lower backing: - influence patterns do not favour 
implementation. 
In the research the two most successful cases (Great Northern's 
computerisation and Vale's heating decision) had strong backing from 
all decision-makers, and most implementors and implementees. In 
Great Northern's case, this arose out of a mixture of feelings, the 
fear, desperation and disillusion of some of the implementors and 
implementees, as well as the firm commitment and resolve of the main 
decision-makers. In Vale, backing was less equivocal, all the 
decision-makers and implementors supported the scheme. Only the 
operators in the boilerhouse were less favourable, but they were too 
few and their influence too weak to change the course of events. 
Although it would seem to be true that the influential 
decision-makers must provide backing to make implementation 
successful, the study of cases with lower backing highlights further 
distinctions. Easyshop's computer difficulties were exacerbated by 
the actions (and inaction) of the Computer Director and data 
processing department. The Computer Director was on the Board, and 
was a senior decision-maker, who used his influence to hinder 
implementation by withholding information and resources. 
But in the formation of Wharf Chemicals and in the building of 
Central Water's Langden works, though the decision-makers were in 
complete accord about what had to be done, the implementors were less 
certain. At Langden there was open conflict between several of the 
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implementors (both inside and external to the Authority), and in 
Wharf there was hostility from several of the newly displaced company 
managing directors. At Wharf too there was uncertainty about how to 
carry out implementation (as noted by the low specificity score). It 
may be that it is particularly difficult to give backing when you are 
not really sure what it is you are meant to be supporting. 
In this study implementees did not significantly influence the 
process: they just responded to it as it came upon them. To be 
successful what you need is backing from decision-makers and 
implementors. Decision-makers may be highly influential and 
highly favourable, but if there is little backing from implementors 
success may be jeopardised. Of course you may be successful in the 
end. But the results show that completion may take longer (although 
the fixed deadline set by the Chairman of Central Water with regard 
to Langden was notionally met), with fairly low acceptability and 
only moderate achievement. 
A further point is that backing can be very active, as with the 
decision-makers at Great Northern who worked day and night with their 
employees to implement their computer systems, but it can also be 
'inactive' as with Central Water's Chairman, or the Vlce-Chancellor 
and Bursar at Vale who just let it be known that they approved of the 
new heating schemes. Because they were influential Individuals 
within their organizations, this was enough to ensure the cooperation 
and effort of others. 
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As a final point in connection with this variable it should be 
noted that initial ideas about the existence of alternatives have 
been subsumed under the notion of backing. After due consideration 
of the data it was decided that there was not enough evidence to say 
whether the existence of alternatives had any particular bearing on 
events. In many ways the computer installation at Easyshop was an 
example of a case where influential interests viewed the decision 
unfavourably. It is hard for the researcher to say whether the other 
alternatives proposed (such as not re-computerising) were really 
feasible or not. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Computer 
Director and data processing department had their own reasons for 
creating disruption and delaying matters. It is not really so 
important to know whether this was because of the existence of 
feasible alternatives - their lack of support affected implementation 
whatever their reasons. Squabbles about alternative choices can be 
viewed as a reason for low backing. 
7.3 Summary 
In this chapter each dependent and independent variable has been 
defined, described and illustrated. Appropriate examples from the 
cases have been used to explain to what the variable refers and why 
it was selected. A complete list of variables and definitions is 
given in Table 7.1 on page 204. 
Knowing that Great Northern's success in some way resulted from 
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implementations characterised by familiarity, priority, specificity 
and appropriate culture and structure, and that Easyshop's disastrous 
computer installation was somehow the consequence of being 
unfamiliar, having a relatively inappropriate culture and structure, 
weak backing and low propitiousness, leads straight to the general 
question of relationships between variables. Which variables are 
the most important in determining success, and what are the links 
between these independent variables themselves? Some links have 
already been suggested, such as the interaction between specificity 
and assessability, between flexibility and specificity, and between 
priority and resource availability. But are there more, and do 
particular independent and dependent variables correlate with each 
other? Does higher familiarity guarantee higher completion and/or 
higher achievement, and does lower backing inevitably lead to lower 
acceptability? More generally, are 'content', Pcontext' and 
'process' variables all equally influential? 
The variables having provided a language with which to contrast 
and compare implementation processes, it is now possible to go on to 
explore the circumstances under which implementation may be more or 
less successful. Some of the authors mentioned in Chapter 3 (for 
example, Bardach, 1977) have maintained that generalisations about 
implementation success or failure can not be made, as the set of 
circumstances surrounding each process is too specific. The next 
chapter tests out these misgivings and suggests that they are overly 
pessimistic. 
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Table 7.1 Final list of dependent and independent variables 
Dependent variables 




The degree to which everything intended to be 
done, is done, within the expected time period. 
The degree to which what was done performs as 
intended. 
The degree to which the method of implementation 
and outcomes are satisfactory to those involved 
in, or affected by, Implementation. 
Independent variables 















The degree to which implementation tasks encompass 
intricate and/or interrelated elements. 
The degree to which Implementation is given 
precedence in the organization. 
The degree to which precise details of 
implementation tasks and activities were decided 
beforehand. 
The degree to which the success of implementation 
can be evaluated with precision. 
The degree to which those involved have experience 
relevant to implementing the matter for decision. 
The degree to which resources for Implementation, 
such as manpower, finance and time, are available. 
The degree to which organizational structure 
facilitates the process of implementation. 
The degree to which organizational culture 
facilitates the process of Implementation. 
The degree to which any unforeseen external 
occurrences favour implementation. 
The degree to which the implementation process can 
be adapted to accommodate changing circumstances. 
The degree to which influence patterns favour 
implementation. 
- 205 - 
CHAPTER 8 
TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION OF IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESS 
Using the variables identified, this chapter explores how they 
can help to provide some general explanations for implementation 
success. Although it would always be desirable to have as large a 
sample as possible to work from, eleven cases is a relatively large 
number with this degree of detail. It provides a data base 
substantial enough to justify this attempt at explanation, whilst 
recognising that future studies on an even greater scale are needed 
to develop the ideas further. 
8.1 The fostering of success - 'Realizers' and 'Enablers' 
It has been argued that there are eleven factors which influence 
the success of implementation, but so far these are an 
undifferentiated list, as if there were a uniformity of effect upon 
success. The question is, are any of these generally more 
significant than others in helping to ensure a high degree of success 
as indicated by the dependent variables? 
From Table 8.1 on page 206 it can be seen that cases vary in 
their overall levels of success. For example, Great Northern's 
computer implementation scores highly on all dependent variables, 
while Easyshop's score on -each is low, and S&D Chemical's 
transport case scores medium. Thus Great Northern managed a highly 
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successful implementation, Easyshop had only minimal success (or in 
other words suffered a relative failure), and S&D was partially 
successful. 
In order to rank cases in terms of their degree of success, 
points were awarded to cases on the basis of their placings on each 
dependent variable (3 points for a higher placing, 2 for medium and I 
for lower). The resulting ordering is shown in Table 8.1 below. 
Great Northern goes in first place, with its successful 
computerisation, while Easyshop's computer case is the least 
successful, in eleventh position. 
Table 8.1 Rankinq of cases according-to level of success 
CASES DEPENDENT VARIABLES POINTS RANKING 
Completion Achievement Acceptability 
Great Northern - Computer H H H 9 Ist 
Vale University - Heating H H H 9 Ist 
Great Northern - Warehouse H M H 8 3rd 
Central Water - CAD M H M 7 4th 
Central Water - Langden M M M 6 5th 
SID Chemicals - Transport M M M 6 5th 
Vale University - Building M M M 6 5th 
SID Chemicals - Computer L M M 5 8th 
Wharf Chemicals - Merger L M M 5 8th 
Wharf Chemicals - Formation L M L 4 loth 
Easyshop - Computer L L L 3 Ilth 
KEY: - H: Higher M: Medium L: Lower 
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Once cases are ranked in this way it is possible to begin to 
distinguish the independent variables which are common to highly 
successful cases and those which are common to less successful ones. 
'Realizers' 
The two most successful implementations are clearly Great 
Northern's computerisation and Vale's heating improvements. Great 
Northern completed everything by the deadline, the computer system 
performed as intended and the majority of personnel were satisfied 
with the process and outcomes. At Vale, the heating and energy 
management systems were finalised within the expected time period, 
they achieved even more than was expected, and satisfied most people. 
Referring to Table 8.2 on page 208 which shows the cases ranked 
in order of success and their placings on each of the independent 
variables, it can be seen that both cases have high specificity, high 
assessability, high cultural appropriateness, high-propitiousness and 
high backin . So it is these five independent variables that are 
associated with the highest level of success in implementation. Of 
these five, specificity and assessability concern the 'content' of 
what is being implemented (Whipp, Rosenfeld & Pettigrew, 1987), 
cultural appropriateness is an aspect of an organization's 'inner 
context', propitiousness is an 'outer context' factor and backing is 
a feature of the implementation process. Here is a pattern covering 
what is being done, the circumstances in which it is done, and who 
wants it done, that leads on to success. 
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Table 8.2 Ranking of cases according to level of-success, showing placings 
on Realizer and Enabler variables 
Rank an 
Realizer variables Enabler Yariables success 
CASES Spec. Asses C. A. Prop, Back. Prior. Fam. Res. A S. A. Flex. comp. 
G. Korthern - Computer H H H H H H H L H L H lst 
Vale Univ. - Heating H H H H H L N H M H M Ist 
G. Korthern - Warehouse L K H K K N N K M H M 3rd 
Central Wtr - CAD K N H N M L N H H M N 4th 
Central Wtr - Langden N M M L L K M L L M M Sth 
S&D Chems - Transport N M M N N L N H N N L Sth 
Vale Uniy. - Building M L H N H M N M H K Sth 
SID Chems - Computer N M N M M M L M M M H 8th 
Wharf Chems - Merger L L L M M L M M L 8 L 8th 
Wharf Chems - Formation L L L M L M L M L N M loth 
Easyshop - Computer M N L L L M L N L M H lith 
xEY: - N: Higher N: Medium L: Lower 
Realizer variables: - Specificity; Assessability; Cultural Appropriateness; Propitiousness; Backing. 
Enabler variables: - Priority; Familiarity; Resource Availability; Structural Appropriateness; 
Flexibility. 
comp.: - complexity 
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This can be interpreted as meaning that to complete 
implementation, achieve everything which is intended, and do all of 
this in a way which is acceptable to the majority of organizational 
members, you need to be clear about what you want to do 
(specificity), able to see success when it is achieved 
(assessability), enjoy favourable conditions inside the organization 
(cultural appropriateness), have a little luck - or at least no bad 
luck - (propitiousness), and also have a favourable political climate 
(backing). It is a favourable pattern that appears to work as a 
whole. No single factor or pair of factors carries implementation 
along to success, but the combined effect of the pattern of five 
factors working together. 
These five variables have been labelled 'Realizers' because, if 
favourable, they work together to help the organization realize the 
very highest level of success. These should be the first concern 
of researchers exploring why or why not decisions are carried out 
effectively, and of managers whose aim is to carry them out. 
The effect of the Realizer variables is shown diagrammatically in 
Figure 8.1 on page 210. This depicts two implementation zones - the 
failure zone and the success zone - and it can be seen that the first 
arrow containing the Realizers carries implementation much further 
into the success zone than the second group of Enabler variables. 
This finding is confirmed by the fact that, whilst the next two 
cases (Great Northern's warehouse and Central Water's CAD system) 
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also score highly on cultural appropriateness, this alone is not 
enough to give them a fully successful implementation. Moreover, 
the middle or low success cases are placed low or medium on these 
variables. So successful implementations are associated with a 
higher placing on these five variables. 
'Enablers' 
Leaving aside 'complexity' for the moment and examining the other 
five variables - priority, familiarity, resource availability, 
structural appropriateness and flexibilit - it appears that they do 
not have the same import for success. Though they may be useful, 
they do not carry implementation far enough. These have been given 
the label 'Enablers'. This is a term borrowed from Daft & Becker 
(1978) who use it to refer to organizational characteristics which 
facilitate the decision to adopt innovations (p. 14). Here it is 
used differently to refer to variables which facilitate the 
implementation of all kinds of strategic decisions, not just 
innovatory ones. 
These variables are not significant in carrying implementation to 
the very highest level of success. of course, being familiar with 
the topic helps, as does making it a priority, providing at least 
sufficient resources, having a favourable organizational structure, 
and implementing in a flexible way. However, these are not enough 
on their own. These five variables are factors which can enable an 
organization to travel some way along the road to success but they do 
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not, by themselves, carry it all the way there. To finish the 
journey management needs the Realizers in its favour. Figure 8.1 
illustrates that the Enablers do help to move implementation out of 
the failure zone, but they can only take it a short distance into the 
success zone. 
This is confirmed by looking at Table 8.2. Great Northern made 
the implementation of its new computer system a top priority, was 
highly familiar with what had to be done, and also had an 
organization structure which facilitated success. All this 
undoubtedly helped. But Vale's heating system was of relatively low 
priority and the case was only placed medium on both familiarity and 
structural appropriateness. So high placings on priority, 
familiarity and structural appropriateness are not crucial for high 
success. The same can be said for resource availability and 
flexibility. Vale was placed highly on both of these but Great 
Northern was the exact opposite, having only just sufficient 
resources and a relatively inflexible process of implementation. 
once again, it is clear that these variables are not pre-conditions 
for successful implementation. If favourable, they may help, but 
unfavourableness does not necessarily spell disaster. 
In support of this, although statistical techniques are not 
strictly appropriate for a sample of only eleven, Spearman's Rank 
correlation coefficient shows a stronger pattern of correlations 
between the Realizers and the dependent variables than the Enabler 
group of variables and the dependent variables. Cultural 
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appropriateness and backing correlate particularly strongly with all 
the performance variables. However, using this technique, 
familiarity and structural appropriateness both show a stronger 
association than might have been expected. This might lead to 
questions as to why these variables are not also considered to be 
Realizers. The reasoning behind their exclusion is that neither are 
highlighted as common factors in the four most successful cases. 
So, although they may be considered to be somewhat on the borderline 
between the groupings, a decision was made to treat them as Enabler 
variables. 
The contrast between Realizers and Enablers leads to the 
conclusion that although implementation can be held back by a broad 
range of factors, it is really only a select few which can actually 
push it forward far enough to reach the final goal. 
Thus far, the independent variable of 'complexity' has been left 
out of the discussion. Preliminary analysis of the case studies had 
suggested that this might be a factor which did influence success, in 
that high complexity could be disadvantageous for implementation. 
This seemed particularly true of the cases which involved the 
installation of new technology, where complexity can be damaging. 
But in these instances it was found that familiarity could be crucial 
in helping to overcome the problems of complexity (more will be said 
about the implementation of this kind of decision when different 
topics are discussed in section 8.3), and when analysing the data 
further it seemed that there was after all no consistent association 
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between complexity alone and success. 
The most successful case had higher complexity but still 
succeeded - helped, it is suggested, by a commensurate level of 
familiarity. In contrast, Easyshop and S&D Chemicals, also 
involved with installing major new computer systems, were both faced 
with highly complex implementations, but they were much less familiar 
with them. As a consequence, they were both fairly unsuccessful. 
Other cases involving Implementations of moderate or lower 
complexity ranged from those which enjoyed highly successful outcomes 
(Vale's heating case and the new warehouse at Great Northern), to 
those of middling success (Central Water's Langden works and S& D's 
transport reorganization) to those at the bottom who enjoyed little 
if any success (both cases at Wharf Chemicals). 
So the effect of complexity has no clear pattern. This variable 
does not obviously fall into either Realizer or Enabler groups. it 
looks as if it may be of less significance than the other ten 
variables in that on its own it tells us little, and that it has to 
be taken in conjunction with familiarity. If management knows what 
it is doing, complexity does not appear to be such a problem. 
The 'failu're zone' 
Implementation is helped towards a successful outcome when there 
is a high pattern of scores on the Enabler variables, and, more 
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crucially, on the Realizer variables. But what happens when the 
scores are lower? 
The formation of Wharf Chemicals' and Easyshop's attempt at 
computerisation rank in 10th and 11th place respectively on success 
and both have low positions in terms of cultural appropriateness, 
backing, familiarity and structural appropriateness. Indeed they 
both are placed only low or medium on all the Realizer and Enabler 
variables. Further, the next two low ranking cases in Table 8.2 
(Wharf Chemicals' merger and S& D's computer installation) also 
score low or medium on each of these ten variables. 
It is clear that if a case has a low pattern of scores on the 
Realizer and Enabler variables a fully successful implementation is 
very unlikely - it is in the failure zone, shown in Figure 8.1. 
6 
So the general finding appears to be that if there is a low 
pattern of placings on all the ten variables, implementation is 
likely to be relatively unsuccessful. If the placings tend more 
towards the medium then implementation stands more chance of success, 
but this success is only likely to be moderate. But to be really 
successful, higher placings on a particular group of variables - the 
Realizers - are what is needed. 
8.2 Links between variables 
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This section explores potential associations among the 
independent variables. It may be that within the Enablers and 
Realizers some factors are linked together. 
Firstlyý, it is suggested that sometimes there may be 'trade-offs' 
between variables so that, for example, making implementation a high 
priority may compensate for a shortage of resources, so that at least 
those resources which are available are channelled in the right 
direction. It will be remembered that this happened with Great 
Northern's computerisation scheme, although the total level of 
resourcing was still only just adequate. 
In addition a relationship has been suggested between specificity 
and flexibility, in that giving only general guidelines (low 
specificity) prior to implementation may be a positive factor 
provided high flexibility during implementation then allows 
unforeseen changes to be accommodated (as in Great Northern's new 
warehouse). Reciprocally, high specificity prior to implementation, 
provided what has to be done can be clearly foreseen, may make high 
flexibility less of a necessity when the decision is carried out. 
It can be seen from Table 8.2 that there is some correlation 
between specificity and assessability. All but two of the cases are 
placed the same on each variable. This has already been commented 
on and discussed in the last chapter when it was suggested that if 
implementation tasks and processes are clearly spelled out prior to 
implementation it Is reasonable to believe that this will aid the 
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evaluation of final success. 
There also appears to be an association between cultural 
appropriateness and backing. Once again, this would seem reasonable 
in that a facilitative climate is likely to enhance general 
support. This may be especially true if, as suggested, changes are 
brought about by a new powerholder. Backing their implementation 
may then be a way for other managers and personnel to demonstrate 
their allegiance to the new regime. 
The association between propitiousness and backing, where all 
placings for each case except the formation of Wharf Chemicals are 
the same on each variable, is harder to interpret. There seems no 
good reason why the occurrence of favourable chance events should 
coincide with increased support; unless it should be that when 
things are going well the waverers are drawn in. What would be 
interesting here would be to carry out further longitudinal research 
to see how and when backing changes over time during 
implementation. It might then be possible to see if backing 
increased after such chance events. In the absence of more data 
this result must be left open to conjecture. 
There are no clearly negative associations between any of the 
independent variables. So a high amount of one variable does not 
correlate with an accordingly low amount of any other. They all 
act in one direction, which reinforces the view that both Enablers 
and Realizers act positively on success. 
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With regard to associations between the dependent variables, 
Table 8.1 does suggest that all are strongly mutually related. 
Placings are the same on each dependent variable for six out of the 
eleven cases. There may be several potential explanations for 
this. Obviously there exists the possibility that the variables may 
not be conceptually distinct and in fact are measuring the same 
characteristic. This depends on the intrinsic meaning of the 
concepts as defined. Completion refers to the actual carrying out 
of implementation tasks, acceptability is to do with reactions of 
organizational members to the implementation process and outcomes, 
and achievement to the final performance which results. They are 
all intended to refer to distinct aspects of successful 
implementation. Support for their 'distinctiveness' may be drawn 
from the fact that independent 'checkers' had no difficulty In 
distinguishing them and ranking cases accordingly on each dimension. 
In these first two sections it has been demonstrated that of the 
eleven variables highlighted in Chapter 7, five - the Realizers - are 
of greater importance in helping to secure the most successful 
implementation. Whilst a second group of five - the Enablers - do 
facilitate success to some degree, it is argued that they cannot, by 
themselves, carry implementation through to the same high point of 
success. Alone, they are not sufficient. Some conclusions have 
been drawn about associations between particular variables. 
The following sections explore the question of whether, over and 
above the effects of the Realizer and Enabler variables, the actual 
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topic for implementation, the organization itself, or the combined 
pre-decision and post-decision processes have any bearing on success. 
8.3 The topic for implementation 
The topic label in the Bradford Studies (Hickson et al, 1986) 
gave some indication of the type of decision-making process which was 
likely to result and is therefore worth examining here. The issue 
of concern in this study is whether what has to be implemented, the 
topic, plays a similar role in shaping the success of 
implementation. For example, is the carrying out of decisions 
concerning new technology likely to be Inherently more or less 
successful than, say, the implementation of new building programmes? 
In order to answer questions like this it is necessary to 
classify the cases by topic. 
find groupings in a sample of 
small. However, by chance, th, 
which were broadly the same and 
common features, although any 
the small numbers. 
It is acknowledged that to attempt to 
11 cases renders each group extremely 
e sample did contain numbers of topics 
it was therefore feasible to look for 
conclusions should take into account 
The cases were divided into 3 classes or groups, those concerned 
with the implementation of new technology, those to do with new 
building works, and a final group which involved new organizational 
structures. Sometimes cases incorporated aspects of more than one 
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class and any such overlappings are indicated. The groupings and 
the success levels for all the cases are given in Table 8.3 on page 
221. 
As a first point it will be noted that the five cases concerned 
with installing new technology between them cover the range of 
success possibilities - higher, medium and lower. So whilst it is 
possible to instal technology completely and achieve everything 
required in an acceptable way, there is always the possibility of 
failure, or at least of a very unsuccessful implementation. 
Referring back to Table 8.2 on page 208, it can be seen that 
three of the five cases in this group suffer from higher complexity, 
and Central Water's CAD system and Vale's heating improvements are 
ranked as being of medium complexity. If the two other cases listed 
as being partly concerned with this kind of topic are included, these 
too are ranked as having medium complexity. It would seem that this 
kind of topic is generally complex, comprising many complicated and 
interrelated elements. There was no case where installing a major 
new system of this kind was found to be simple and straightforward. 
A further interesting point arises from this. In each of the 
four cases specifically concerning the installation of computer 
systems (Great Northern, S&D Chemicals, Easyshop and Central Water) 
the score on familiarity is exactly the same as that for the 
dependent variable of completion. In other words, there is an exact 
correlation between familiarity and completion. So Great Northern's 
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Table 8.3 Grouping of cases according to topic 
GROUP 1: Cases concerned with the installation of new technology 
Success 
Completion Achievement Acceptability 
Central Water - CAD Medium Higher Medium 
Easyshop - Computer Lower Lower Lower 
Great Northern - Computer Higher Higher Higher 
S&D Chemicals - Computer Lower Medium Medium 
Vale University - Heating Higher Higher Higher 
Also some aspects in the following cases: 
Central Water - Langden Medium Medium Medium 
Great Northern - Warehouse Higher Medium Higher 
GROUP 2: Cases concerned with building works 
Success 
Completion Achievement Acceptability 
Central Water - Langden Medium Medium Medium 
Great Northern - Warehouse Higher Medium Higher 
Vale University - Campus Medium Medium Medium 
Group 3: Cases concerned with new organizational structures 
Success 
Completion Achievement Acceptability 
S&D Chemicals - Transport Medium Medium Medium 
Wharf Chemicals - Formation Lower Medium Lower 
Wharf Chemicals - Merger Lower Medium Medium 
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computer installation was very familiar to senior management and they 
completed all they intended. On the other hand, Central Water's 
management were familiar with what had to be done to some extent, but 
not absolutely, and so they did not quite manage to get everything 
finished, while in Easyshop and S&D Chemicals there was lower 
familiarity and they did not complete the implementation. 
So the golden rule of computer installations would seem to be to 
make sure that you know what you are doing; there must be enough 
expertise and knowledge to facilitate completion. If this does not 
already exist within the organization then you are in the risky 
potential failure zone. The answer then might be to recruit extra 
personnel, hire consultants or carry out smaller pilot projects 
first. In short, computer and equipment installations are high risk 
and carry a significant chance of failure unless management know what 
they are about. But given that, they can be strikingly successful. 
It is quite a different story when it comes to new buildings of 
one kind or another. Here these comprise the building of a 
university campus, a warehouse and a water treatment works. These 
are all of medium complexity and medium flexibility, even though two 
of them incorporate new technology to some extent. All these cases 
are of medium or high success. So designing and putting up new 
buildings, even when these embody new ways of working as all these 
do, would appear to be relatively less risky. Perhaps a reason for 
this is that they seem more 'defined', easier to make sense of and 
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less complex. The evidence suggests that if you want to implement a 
building decision then you stand a much better chance of being 
reasonably successful, though less chance either of notably high 
success or of relative failure. You can feel secure, confident that 
a moderately successful outcome is likely. 
Finally, we look at the group of cases concerned with changing 
organizational structures. These three cases (Wharf Chemicals' 
company formation and divisional merger and S&D Chemicals' 
transport reorganization) all attained only low or medium success. 
All the cases were considered to be only medium or lower priority and 
they were all relatively uncomplicated. As with the computers, the 
conclusion must be that these are fairly high risk implementations, 
and that although that fact is not given much prominence in 
organizational affairs, there is a considerable danger of failure. 
A really highly successful structural change seems on this evidence 
to be virtually impossible. Avoiding failure and reaching a 
moderately successful outcome is all that can be hoped for. 
It is interesting to note that for all cases In this 
organizational group the scores on the specificity and assessability 
variables are either lower or medium. This confirms an Impression 
that of all the topics these were the least 'definable'. Success 
was difficult to evaluate because people were not quite sure what the 
exact parameters of implementation were - what had to be done and how 
to do it. 
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As a final comment here it will be noted that the scores on 
backing and acceptability are also either lower or medium. This may 
lend weight to the oft-contended view that 'people don't like change' 
- especially when it directly affects themselves. This study 
suggests that they may not support such change during implementation 
and feel less than happy about the way things are done and their 
subsequent outcomes. 
Some general implications may be drawn from the foregoing. 
Implementations involving the installation of new technology, 
especially the installation of major computer systems, are highly 
complex, high risk topics. They can be a great success, but they 
require a correspondingly high level of knowledge and expertise in 
order to have that chance of success, otherwise failure is more than 
likely. Implementations of building programmes are less complex, 
easier to define and much less risky. There Is a reasonable 
probability that they will be fairly successful (but not more than 
that). Finally, changes to the structure of an organization are 
less easy to define and evaluate. Because of that they also carry 
quite a high risk of failure, and very little chance of being more 
than moderately successful. 
Perhaps one of the most salient points to emanate from this 
research is one which has thus far been overlooked in the mass of 
analytical detail. This is the observation that different 
organizations can have different processes, even when implementing 
the same kind of decision. Hence, a building programme may be 
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highly successful in one organization and less so in another. The 
reorganization of organizational structure may be a disastrous 
failure in company X and a resounding success in company Y. 
Evidence which highlights this dramatically is provided by the 
almost exact matching of computer implementations in Great Northern 
and Easyshop, that has been alluded to several times before. Here 
were two companies both with the same administrative and financial 
problems; both arriving at the same solution to solve them and 
therefore both attempting to instal major new computer sytems. They 
were even carrying this out at the same time - in the early 1980's. 
The levels of success, however, could hardly provide a greater 
contrast. While Easyshop was still struggling to finalise 
installation after 7 years, Great Northern enjoyed complete success 
after 6 months. The full stories are contained in Appendix B where 
the cases are given in greater detail, but the fundamental point is 
obvious. The topic for implementation does not absolutely determine 
the success of the process. This finding provides an effective 
answer to the question posed in the first paragraph of this section, 
how crucial is the topic itself. The topic is a factor, but it is 
not necessarily the most crucial. 
For managers trying to make sense of organizational processes, 
the above may represent some of the more useful findings of this 
research so far. 
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8.4 The effect of organization 
The preceding section showed that different organizations could 
attain different levels of success even when implementing the same 
kinds of decision. What therefore, if anything, can be said about 
the effect of organizational factors? 
To examine this further, it is useful to compare how each 
organization fared with each of its two decisions. (Easyshop has to 
be left out of this analysis since it has only one case. ) This is 
done below In Table 8.4 (page 227), showing the placings on each 
dependent success variable, and also those on independent variables 
which are the same for both decisions. What is being examined is 
whether there are any points in common between the variables for each 
case in the same organization. 
It must first be reiterated that cases were not selected in order 
to be representative of the decisions implemented in any one 
organization. As described in Chapter 5, an attempt was made to 
study one relatively straightforward and one more difficult 
implementation in each institution to provide some degree of 
contrast. However the cases thus selected are not proportional to 
the total amount of straightforward/difficult or even 
successful/unsuccessful implementations in each organization. The 
level of difficulty as perceived by the Chief Executive, as shown in 
Table 5.2 on page 113 is also given in Table 8.4. 
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Table 8.4 Levels of-su. ccess and common scores on independent variables for each organization 
Level of 
Curon scores cn Success difficulty as 
indewdent variables Completion Achievement Acceptability given by C. E. 
Central Water - Langden Medium Complexity Medium Medium Medium Easier 




Great Korthern - Warehouse Higher Cultural Approp. Higher Medium Higher Easier 
Great Korthern - Computer Higher Higher Higher Less easy 
S10 Chemicals - Transport Medium S; ecificity Medium Medium Medium Easier 
S10 Chemicals - Computer Medium Assessability Lower Medium Medium Less easy 




Vale University - Heating Medium CcIplexity Higher Higher Higher Easier 
Vale University - Building Medium Familiarity Medium Medium Medium Less easy 
Medium Structural Approp. 
Higher Cultural Ap; rcp. 
Higher Flexibility 
Wharf Chemicals: Merger Lower S; ecificity Lower Medium Medium Easier 
Wharf Chemicals: Forration Lower Assessability Lower Medium Lower Less easy 
Medium Resource Avail. 
Lower Structural A;; rcp. 
Lower Cultural Aprop. 
Medium Propitiousness 
Medium Flexibility 
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It will be seen that generally one case is more successful than 
the other in every institution but of course the effect of comparing 
each case with all the others may blur the distinction. This is 
because cases which appear to provide a marked contrast within one 
organization when looked at in isolation, may appear little different 
from each other when ranked alongside very successful or unsuccessful 
cases from the rest of the sample. 
In Vale, S&D Chemicals and Wharf Chemicals the implementations 
suggested by the Chief Executive as being 'easier' are also more 
successful but the difference is only marginal in the two chemical 
companies. In Great Northern and Central Water the positions are 
reversed with the less easy cases being slightly more successful. 
As previously discussed in Chapter 5, one reason for this may be that 
senior decision-makers are not aware of the particular problems 
encountered by others when trying to implement strategic decisions. 
Another explanation may be simply that there is no correlation 
between levels of ease and degrees of success. 
In no organization was there one spectacularly successful case, 
and one dismal failure. These organizations have a mix of 
implementations which are either highly successful and of middling 
success, or of low and middling success. Great care must be taken 
here because any extrapolations from a $sample' of two 
implementations are dubious to say the least. Nevertheless Great 
Northern and the chemical companies give just a hint that some 
organizations may be able to implement a range of decisions with a 
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level of success that has some degree of consistency about it. 
The importance of topic has already been discussed so it may be 
that this can go some way towards an explanation. The fact that some 
organizations were just 'unlucky' enough to be implementing high risk 
technolýgy decisions or whatever, may influence results here. Yet 
one of Great Northern's two successful implementations was installing 
a new computer system, so there may be additional factors at work. 
Part of the answer may lie in the fact that in each organization 
except Central Water, the placing on the variable of cultural 
appropriateness is the same in both cases, and to some degree matches 
the level of success. So Great Northern has higher cultural 
appropriateness and higher/medium success; Vale too has higher 
cultural appropriateness and higher/medium succes; S&D Chemicals 
has medium cultural appropriateness and medium success, and Wharf 
Chemicals has lower cultural appropriateness and lower/medium 
success. This variable has already been cited as being highly 
correlated with success so this does seem to conform to expectations. 
Briefly running through the case histories again, it will be 
remembered that the right culture at Great Northern was provided by 
the various 'new brooms' which were brought in. The new managing 
director and his team could provide a climate in which change was 
accepted and could flourish. At Vale too a new Vice-Chancellor and 
staff could help an organization at the start of its life cycle and a 
favourable climate was deliberately fostered amongst staff to help 
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the heating decision through. In both of these implementations at 
Vale the external climate was also of assistance. The 1960's saw a 
wave of expansion and good will towards universities, and there was 
an increased consciousness of the need to save energy and money in 
the cost-cutting 1980's. Thus 'culture' may be shaped by 
environmental influences. 
At S&D the culture was not particularly influential either way, 
certainly there was no clear evidence that a noticeably favourable 
climate existed, or was created, to help implementation along. At 
Wharf Chemicals the culture actually hindered implementation. Wharf 
was also a 'new' organization but here appeared to suffer from the 
'liability of newness' (Stinchcombe, 1965), trying to create new 
organizational forms but all the while still trying to make a 
profit. The difference between Vale and Wharf here is that for 
Vale, creating their new organization from nothing was the goal, 
while for Wharf the creation of the organization and divisions out of 
an existing prior structure was a drain on time and resources, 
distracting from the real business of making and distributing 
chemicals. 
So cultural appropriateness is an important organizational 
variable which may help to influence the level of success across 
different types of organizations and implementations. Why then is 
Central Water different? The answer to this is that each case in 
Central Water was located in a different, geographically separate, 
division which operated largely autonomously within the 
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organization. In this way Central Water is a collection of 'mini' 
organizations each of which may have had different cultural 
attributes. It is true that the new Chairman did provide impetus 
for the CAD system in North-East division, in which he took a direct 
interest. But Langden, in Southern division, had begun before he 
took office and although he influenced the project by insisting on a 
deadline date for finalisation, this did not greatly alter the 
existing cultural climate. 
What about what the organization does and who owns it? Does it 
make a difference whether it is involved in service or manufacturing, 
or whether it is publicly or privately owned? Cases are 
distinguished in this way in Table 8.5 on page 232. 
On the face of it, this table would suggest that public 
organizations are more successful than private ones, and that 
organizations in the service industry are more successful than 
manufacturers. But the small number of cases in each group gives 
rise to doubts about the validity of comparisons here. In addition, 
It may be argued that the influence of the topic being implemented in 
each organization rather outweighs the effect of sector or industry. 
It is perhaps more meaningful to use Table 8.3 on page 221 which 
controls for topic. With regard to public/private sector contrasts, 
comparisons within Group 1 and Group 2 do tend to confirm the 
suggestion that publicly owned organizations are at least as 
successful as private ones. So, contrary to popular wisdom, it is 
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Table 8.5 Organizations grouped by-ownership and industry 
Success 
Completion Achievement Acceptability 
Private sector 
Great Northern Higher Medium Higher 
Higher Higher Higher 
Easyshop Lower Lower Lower 
S&D Chemicals Medium Medium Medium 
Lower Medium Medium 
Wharf Chemicals Lower Medium Medium 
Lower Medium Lower 
Public sector 
Central Water Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Higher Medium 
Vale University Higher Higher Higher 
Medium Medium Medium 
Service industr 
Easyshop Lower Lower Lower 
Central Water Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Higher Medium 
Great Northern Higher Medium Higher 
Higher Higher Higher 
Vale University Higher Higher Higher 
Medium Medium Medium 
Manufacturing industry 
S&D Chemicals Medium Medium Medium 
Lower Medium Medium 
Wharf Chemicals Lower Medium Medium 
Lower Medium Lower 
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not just privatized firms which necessarily get the best results all 
the time, public organizations can be every bit as successful in 
implementing top level decisions. 
With regard to distinctions between types of industry, 
unfortunately there is only one comparison within the three groups. 
This is S&D Chemicals with the other technology cases in Group 1. 
This does add to the view that manufacturing management is not 
necessary better than service management at implementing this kind of 
topic just because they are in technical organizations. 
The Bradford Studies (Hickson et al, 1986) suggest there is a 
marked contrast between public manufacturing firms and other 
organizations in the way they arrive at decisions. This does not 
appear to follow at the implementation stage, but it is acknowledged 
that results from the present study are too tentative to allow firm 
conclusions to be made. 
There is little more that can be confidently claimed for these 
findings, although this would be an interesting area to pursue in a 
larger study. 
8.5 Pre-decision and post-decision processes 
The final area to be looked at which may affect implementation is 
the general nature of the processes that occur both when making 
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decisions and when implementing them. This study has tended to 
concentrate on post-decision processes, partly because the main 
interest has been on what happens after a decision has been made, but 
largely because constraints of time and effort in case study work 
force the PhD researcher to be highly selective about what is studied 
and how this is carried out. However, it is recognised that 
organizational activities and contexts operate within, and are 
created by, a continuous flow of social processes. Attempts to cut 
out a segment of 'action' for study, whether by decision-making 
researchers or implementation researchers are always selective, but 
unfortunately, always necessary. 
This section represents an attempt to link together such 
'before' and 'after' events, forcibly separated by the research 
process. Specifically, it investigates the particular effects 
which pre-decision processes (the making of the decision) may have 
upon implementation. 
It was mentioned in Chapter 3 that participation in 
decision-making and implementation has often been cited as 
contributing to implementation success. The Human Relations school 
has long advocated consultative methods of managing, and writers such 
as McGregor (1960), Likert (1961), Vroom & Yetton (1976), Mayo 
(1977) have all contributed to this theme. More recently, Nutt 
(1989) has studied how strategic plans are put into effect and has 
suggested that participation might be one method of implementation 
(others are persuasion, intervention and edict). 
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So decision-making and implementation processes in this study 
were categorised in terms of their degree of participation. 
Participation in decision-making refers to being involved in making 
the decision, while participation in implementation means having some 
say in how the decision is to be implemented. 
Subsequent to the analysis reported so far in this thesis, the 
researcher assessed the degrees of participation in both pre- and 
post-decision processes, and these are shown in Table 8.6 on page 
236. Cases are arranged in order of success. 
Participation is defined as: - 
"the degree of involvement in decision-making or implementation 
processes". 
higher participation: - many people other than senior 
management were involved in making the decision or deciding 
about implementation tasks and processes. 
mediuM__participation: - some people other than senior 
management were involved in making the decision or deciding 
about implementation tasks and processes. 
lower Participation: - no-one other than senior management 
was involved in making the decision or deciding about 
implementation tasks and processes. 
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Table 8.6 Levels of participation in decision-making and imPlementation processes 
Partici pation in decision- Success 
making (ON) and im plementation (IN) Completion Achievement Acceptability Rank 
processes 
Great Northern - Computer DR - Lower Higher Higher Higher Ist 
IN - Lower 
Yale University - Heating DR - Medium Higher Higher Higher 1st 
IN - Medium 
Great Northern - Warehouse DR - Lower Higher Medium Higher 3rd 
IN - Higher 
Central Water - CAD ON - Medium Medium Higher Medium 4th 
IN - Higher 
Central Water - Langden DR - Lower Medium Medium Medium 5th 
IN - Medium 
SID Chemicals - Transport ON - Medium Medium Medium Medium 5th 
IN - Lower 
Vale University - Building ON - Lower Medium Medium Medium 5th 
IN - Medium 
SaD Chemicals - Computer ON - Lower Lower Medium Medium 8th 
IN - Medium 
Wharf Chemicals - Merger DR - Lower Lower Medium Medium 8th 
IN - Lower 
Wharf Chemicals - Formation DR - Lower Lower Medium Lower 10th 
IN - Lower 
Easyshop - Computer DR - Lower Lower Lower Lower 11th 
IN - Lower 
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With regard to decision-making it is unsurprising to note that 
strategic decisions are usually made in a highly centrallsed way with 
low levels of participation. Strategic decisions are, by 
definition, 'top decisions', and are made or at least ratified by 
senior management. Differences occur where 'fact-finding' or 
project teams are set up in order to provide information for a 
decision. This happened with S&D Chemicals' transport decision, 
and at Vale university consultants were involved to provide technical 
expertise in the heating decision. Sometimes the decision has an 
'idea champion' who becomes involved because of a personal interest, 
although he or she must still wait for senior sponsorship if such an 
idea is to bear fruit. An example of this is the Development Manager 
at Central Water who pioneered the CAD system. In these instances 
decision-making may be said to be of medium participation. 
Influence by implementors and implementees during implementation 
varies more widely over the cases studied here. Implementation was 
imposed with little or no participation, In five out of eleven 
cases. Of these five cases, Wharf Chemicals' merger and formation 
and Easyshop's computer installation are ranked in the bottom three 
places in terms of success. The fourth case with lower 
participation, S&D Chemicals' transport reorganization, was also 
only moderately successful. 
This begins to look as though lower participation during 
implementation is associated with relatively poor success. However 
the remaining case, Great Northern's computer installation was one of 
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the most successful. 
Explanations for Great Northern's success have been suggested 
earlier in this thesis. At the time of decision-making and 
implementation Great Northern was in crisis, time was short and the 
main source of expertise lay with the new management. This rendered 
negotiation redundant. Such a situation fulfils the conditions 
cited by Nutt (1989) as being appropriate for edict-type 
implementation strategies. Furthermore, what has been called the 
'new broom' syndrome facilitated a change of organizational climate 
to one which was more amenable to radical change. The lesson here 
may be that organizations can get away with lower participation in 
implementation during situations of crisis when everyone realizes the 
threat and gives their support regardless. 
But, the usual prescription is that there should be a high level 
of participation. The popular view is that people should be 
involved in making decisions and putting them into effect. This 
lessens resistance to change and aids successful implementation. 
It is true that in this study some of the implementors and 
implementees who had been left out of consultations did feel 
neglected and resentful when it came to implementation. The 
boiler-house operatives at Vale, the tracers in Central Water's CAD 
programme, the managers and operatives at Wharf all bear witness to 
the hostility which can be aroused by the lack of participation in 
change processes. And of the cases where there was higher or medium 
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participation during implementation, all except S&D Chemicals 
computer case enjoyed a higher or medium level of success. As has 
been demonstrated, S&D suffered in trying to implement a new 
technololgy decision which was highly complex and unfamiliar, and 
this was the primary cause of the company's lack of success. 
For Great Northern's new warehouse much of the responsiblity for 
implementation was devolved directly to middle management, which 
ensured their participation. In effect, they had to make many 
crucial sub-decisions about what plant to buy and how to instal it. 
Although implementation was successful some implementors did complain 
at this increased responsibility and many felt under pressure during 
implementation. So even though participating in what is done may 
facilitate success it can bring additional stresses of its own. 
But the question of whether to encourage participation or not 
assumes that there is a choice about this. Is this always the 
case? For Central Water, attempting to implement CAD in its 
Development sections, participation was an inevitable part of the 
implementation process. Draughtspeople had to be trained to use the 
system which was to be an intrinsic part of their own jobs and 
skills. So it was a personal and interactive process, and one which 
could only be imposed upon them unwillingly with a great deal of 
difficulty. The various levels of committees and 'user groups' were 
set up deliberately to smooth the path of change by getting people 
involved and finding communal ways to sort out technical and social 
problems. And Central Water had the time and finance to enable it 
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to take a slower, more patient course. A less participative course 
could have been chosen by senior decision-makers but this would have 
alienated workers immediately. So, though choices may exist, In 
reality the question of the degree of participation is influenced 
considerably by the situation and topic of implementation. 
So the main conclusion would appear to be that, generally, higher 
levels of participation during implementation are conducive to 
success. Getting people involved in what has to be done, asking 
them for information and opinions, and devolving responsibility and 
authority to lower levels in the hierarchy may be ways of helping to 
ensure cooperation and commitment from employees. However, there 
are two provisos to this. Firstly, management should recognise that 
this may bring additional stress to employees. So extra training 
may be necessary, and hard-pressed managers may need to delegate some 
of their operational duties in order to cope with increased work 
loads. Secondly, higher participation may not be necessary, or 
desirable, if the organization is in crisis and the expertise lies 
with senior management. In these circumstances, a centralized, 
'edict-type' implementation process may be more effective. In the 
final analysis, much depends upon what has to be implemented and the 
context in which it has to be done. 
There is no indication of any pattern between levels of 
participation during decision-making and implementation. Lower 
participation pre-decision can be followed by higher participation 
post-decision, while a moderate level of participation during 
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decision-making may be linked to an implementation process in which 
there is little participation. 
The main conclusion is that often the chances of success appear 
to be reduced when people are not involved in post-decision 
processes. But there are important exceptions to this when 
organizations are in crisis. Under certain circumstances, 
organizations may need to take and implement decisions with minimal 
participation, and may receive strong backing from organizational 
members for doing so. In some ways it can be argued that this puts 
paid to the assumption that highly centralised management is always 
wrong and participation is always right. Admittedly this ignores 
the arguments of the human relations school that participation is 
always 'a good thing' in itself, irrespective of its influence on 
performance. What it does show is that, sometimes, participative 
management is an inappropriate method. 
8.6 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to use the results of 
analyses described in Chapter 7 to help to explain implementation 
success. 
The most significant finding has been to isolate two groupings of 
variables - the Realizers and Enablers - which affect the success of 
implementation in different ways. It has been shown that while both 
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facilitate success to some degree, Realizer variables appear to 
import the bigger impulse to the greatest level of success. 
While the above is generally true for all cases in all 
organizations there is a suggestion that the topic for implementation 
itself also has some bearing on the chances of success. It has been 
shown that strategic decisions to instal new computer systems or 
equipment are particularly risky but nonetheless can be very 
successful, that decisions connected with new building programmes 
whilst much less risky are unlikely to be quite so successful and, 
finally, decisions related to changes of organizational structure 
carry a relatively high risk of failure and little chance of being 
notably successful. 
In addition, there is tentative evidence to suggest that some 
organizations may be generally more successful than others at 
implementing decisions, and that one reason for this may be do with 
having an appropriate culture. Furthermore, success may be linked 
to a higher level of participation during implementation, except 
where a crisis situation threatens the organization. 
Perhaps one of the most striking features of the study is the 
diversity of ways in which broadly similar topics can be 
implemented. Such diversity may be confusing to theorists and 
practitioners alike, however the identification of Realizer and 
Enabler factors begins to make it possible to explain differences in 
what is accomplished. 
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CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This final chapter will encompass a number of objectives. The 
primary aim is to discuss and synthesise the results of the research, 
to affirm the main findings and review their significance. Because 
such findings spring from a particular set of activities and 
assumptions it is appropriate to begin the chapter with an appraisal 
of the methodology used. The aim here is to assess how the way 
things were done affected what the results might be. The final 
objective is to consider how the findings may be of help to 
practising managers. 
9.1 Doing the research and doing it better 
"All research is bad research, inasmuch as it 
could always be done better and there is always 
more to do. " (Hickson, 1987) 
This is of course an accurate if somewhat disheartening 
statement. But it need not be depressing. It can prompt an honest 
acceptance of the problems of research and invoke attempts to 
overcome them. But one of the main stumbling blocks is that it is 
only when research has been completed that you get the best view of 
the weak spots. Nevertheless it is still a useful, if salutary, 
exercise to point these out - if only to get in with them before 
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someone else does! 
This study of implementation was based on various assumptions 
about what was to be investigated and the best methods of 
investigation. Although these initial ideas were set out at the 
beginning (and discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5), a project of 
this kind goes through an evolutionary process during its three or so 
years, so that some of these necessarily undergo some change. It is 
important for the researcher to maintain a degree of flexibility to 
allow new ideas and perspectives to develop as research progresses. 
Any changes are not usually too dramatic, the subject remains largely 
the same, but there are inevitably some adjustments to be made as the 
research questions are brought into sharper focus. And this focus 
is really only achieved in the process of doing the research. As 
Barsoux (1988) argued in a recent article in the Times Higher 
Education Supplement: - 
"Often, in social science PhDs, the researcher has 
only a vague idea of where he or she might be 
heading. 
Viewed negatively this implies a lack of 
analytical rigour - particularly if one takes the 
controlled conditions of scientific research as 
the norm. But in a positive sense, 
open-endedness enables the researcher to be 
opportunistic and take tricks as they present 
themselves. " 
Nevertheless, having done it once, one might expect to have some 
insights to offer about how to do it better next time. So what are 
the strengths and weaknesses of this project and what improvements 
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might be suggested? 
The case study approach was chosen to provide as comprehensive as 
possible an understanding of implementation. To a large extent this 
was achieved. The case biographies are detailed accounts drawn from 
a wealth of information on implementation in eleven instances. The 
decision to use multiple informants was vindicated in that each 
individual was able to add to the general story of implementation, 
building up the layers of meaning and filling out the broad brush 
strokes with colour and depth. 
The intention was always to go beyond the initial questioning of 
a chief executive, on the assumption that his view would be an 
individual perspective from a unique position in the organizational 
hierarchy. The danger in extending such questioning to relevant 
others is that the stories will not match up. In the event, this 
was not a problem. The chief executive usually provided the broad 
outlines of the case which were subsequently fleshed out by other 
respondents in the organization. Where informants did disagree, 
this often indicated areas of conflict. These might be reasons for 
lower backing during implementation or lower acceptability 
afterwards. But, generally speaking, the broad facts of the case 
were corroborated. 
However, the point should be made that because senior management 
were not involved directly in implementation, they were often unaware 
of the particular problems and successes encountered along the way. 
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This meant that they did not always know in detail why some 
implementations worked better than others. When questioned, most 
chief executives gave general reasons such as 'good teamwork' or 
'participation' for successful implementation. The research 
presented here indicates that the subtleties of implementation often 
escape senior executives. It is not suggested that they should 
become closely involved with such matters at the grassroots level, 
this is not their province, but it does underline the utility of 
these research results in providing useful guidelines for such 
managers. It also reaffirms the desirability of collecting data 
from more than one respondent. Research which is based entirely on 
information gathered from one manager is clearly making use of a very 
small, and therefore peculiarly restricted, data base. 
one methodological issue which this study could not fully resolve 
was the potential for 'hindsight bias'. This occurs when past 
opinions and events are re-shaped, sometimes but not always 
deliberately, in the light of current circumstances. Although it 
has been argued that case material was generally corroborated by 
respondents it is still possible that events were sometimes 
selectively recalled in order to show individuals or their 
organization in a favourable light. In this way, mistakes, 
uncertainties and self-interested behaviour might be re-appraised or 
embellished to present a certain, disinterested and logical sequence 
of events. Such behaviour could be identified when stories did not 
tally (as in the different accounts given by the Computer Director in 
Easyshop and those of his colleagues) but this may only have been 
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evident in instances of serious anomaly. What cannot be ruled out 
is that what happened in the past got changed a little in the telling 
- either by emphasis, distortion or omission. The use of multiple 
informants from more than one level in the hierarchy lessens this 
risk, since they are unlikely to all be biased to the same degree in 
the same direction, but the risk remains. 
This potential difficulty was inevitable given the fact that past 
events were to be investigated, constraints of time dictating that 
decisions had to be more or less implemented by the time fieldwork 
began. The potential for such error may be lessened when carrying 
out 'real time' research, although even so, the researcher cannot be 
everywhere at all times and must still rely on subsequent reports of 
what happened. The time span involved in recall may not be so long, 
but selectivity may still operate for the reasons mentioned above. 
The way in which data were collected was therefore not without 
problems, but it is felt that these were of relatively low 
significance. One might have wished for a different selection of 
organizations or examples of implementation but 'samples' in this 
kind of research are seldom ideal. By and large it was felt that 
the selection of each was fortuitous in providing variety and 
opportunities for comparison. 
A main objective of the study was to conceptualise and explain 
implementation rather than just describe a series of processes. This 
was achieved and various reliability tests used to confirm the 
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meanings of the concepts being developed. The independent and 
dependent variables that were defined do conceptualise the 
implementation process and outcomes in a way which enable contrasts 
and comparisons to be made within and across organizations. It is 
now more possible than before not only to describe but to explain 
some of the reasons for the level of success in implementation. 
This does go a long way towards fulfilling the objectives of the 
project but it is now apparent that that are still areas where 
additional data would provide useful information. Ideally, more 
detailed information is needed about the temporally sequential 
aspects of implementation - the precise stages in the process: the 
numbers of meetings, how information was collected, the entrances and 
exits of participants, and the pace and flow of activities and 
events. Although some of this is known, it is not sufficiently 
complete for the process to be traced through time to show how the 
original decision and final outcome were created and recreated by 
organizational members. 
One reason for the scarcity of data here is that the time 
involved in collecting such detail would be very great. Perhaps the 
best way of attempting this would be to carry out a longitudinal 
study concentrating on a fewer number of cases. What has therefore 
been sacrificed in tracing as many as eleven is some of the dynamics 
of the process, the charting of the ebb and flow of implementation 
which can help explain how change takes place. What this research 
does show is how the ship reaches its destination. The skill and 
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backing of the crew, the difficulty and urgency of the mission, and 
the chance fair winds or storm are all shown to have a part to play 
in the way the ship arrives at port. What is less clear is how 
these factors interact to make for a certain kind of journey - 
choppy, smooth, straightforward or circuitous - and how sub-decisions 
are taken along the way which create the journey itself. 
As always, it is a matter of learning from this study to be able 
to do better in the next. 
It should be remembered that this thesis concentrated on 
strategic decisions only. The results were developed from the study 
of nonprogrammed decisions (Simon, 1960), and hence may not describe 
so accurately the implementation of more programmed, routine kinds of 
decisions. 
However, within the restrictions imposed by the size of the 
sample, the range of organizations studied was quite large, 
encompassing manufacturing and service, public and private. Thus 
conclusions may be hoped to be relevant to organizations in general, 
and are not confined to any one type as are many other 
decision-making and implementation studies discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3 (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; Cohen et al, 1972; Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973; Barrett & Fudge, 1981). 
Another area where more attention might have been fruitfully 
given is in the pre-decision stages. It was argued in Chapter 2 
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that much of the decision-making literature tended to ignore 
post-decision events and that this neglected the fact that 
organizational activities have a life beyond the decision. It could 
well be maintained that the current study for its part might have 
paid greater attention to the pre-decision stage. Although 
informants were specifically questioned about the involvement of 
interests during decision-making and some view of the way the 
decision was made was formed by the researcher, more could have been 
found out given more time, or even with better use of the time 
available. 
Chapters 2 and 3 have addressed the debate about the desirability 
(and feasibility) of separating out pre- and post-decision 
processes. Some authors (Baier, March & Saetren, 1986; Barrett & 
Hill, 1983,1984) have considered the two to be so intertwined that a 
separate investigation of either is not possible. The question 
therefore remains if it makes sense to do what this study has done 
and focus on the one aspect. 
Although the primary focus of this study was on post-decision 
processes, it was recognised that what comes before the decision can 
affect what happens afterwards. For example, the influence of 
interest groups was found to be an important feature of both 
decision-making and implementation processes. The amount of backing 
during the latter stage could be a powerful determinant of success, 
when coupled with other Realizer variables. But backing at the 
implementation stage is viewed as emanating from pre-existing social 
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relationships. Patterns of influence are continuously created by 
interest groups in an organizational setting, and the concept of 
backing represents a particular series of patterns over the period of 
implementation. A good example here is that of the computer 
installation at Easyshop where the influence of the Computer Director 
was felt both during decision-making and implementation, with 
especially grave consequences for success. 
The Bradford Studies (Hickson et al, 1986) highlighted complexity 
as being a major determinant of the decision-making process. In 
this present study complexity is also found to be important during 
the implementation process, although the definition of the concept is 
not exactly the same. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, the common 
view that both stages may be affected by the scope and nature of the 
tasks to be accomplished is largely borne out. But the main 
difference is that during implementation other factors may offset the 
impact of complexity. The two computer cases in Great Northern and 
Easyshop demonstrate conclusively that matters which are equally 
complex may have very different outcomes. In particular, 
familiarity can overcome potential problems here. As long as 
management knows what it is doing, the threats posed by high 
complexity can be avoided. 
However, in terms of participation, the pre-decision and 
post-decision processes can be quite separate. It was shown that 
the way in which a decision is arrived at, in terms of level of 
participation during the decision-making process, does not predispose 
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the implementation process to follow the same pattern. It is 
possible to have less participation during decision-making than 
implementation, and vice versa. Furthermore, the degree of 
participation during either does not absolutely determine the final 
level of success, although lower participation during implementation 
may well lower the chances of reaching a very successful outcome. 
Crucially, it should be re 
_! 
ýýsed that no informants found any 
difficulty in distinguishing between decision-making and 
implementation processes. Managers on the ground readily thought in 
these terms, which is a validation of their aptness. But the answer 
on whether drawing a line between what happened before the decision 
and what happened after it makes any sense, really lies in the extent 
to which this study is able to provide explanations for the success 
of the decisions under investigation. If the data collected during 
implementation only marginally illuminates the research question and 
leaves much variance to be explained, then it is clear that further 
evidence is required. Attention then might profitably turn to 
encompass more of the pre-decision processes. If, as seems to be 
the case, final success can be largely explained by focussing on 
implementation processes, then it is hoped that this is reason enough 
to investigate them in greater depth. 
The use of power in decision-making and implementation was also 
addressed in Chapters 2 and 3 when the view that such activities 
should be primarily viewed as political processes was examined. The 
concept of backing was defined to refer to the level of influence 
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during implementation. However, just as the identification of 
covert influence is a problem in decision-making research (Bachrach 
and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974) it is also a problem at the 
implementation stage, and for similar reasons. The ways in which 
subtle, or unobservable power play may be discovered are not clear, 
so because the researcher cannot argue convincingly that such 
behaviour does not exist, it must be acceded that it might. It may 
even be supposed that since 'non decisions' or quasi-decisionmaking 
(Hickson et al, 1986) are a feature of pre-decision processes, then 
there may be 'non-implementations'. That is, some decisions may be 
taken without being put into effect. Unsurprisingly, this study did 
not locate any of these because finalised implementations were 
requested and other examples were not sought. 
So it is acknowledged that some instances of political behaviour 
may not have been identified by this research. In this respect the 
method of tracking implementation retrospectively may have made them 
harder to detect, but the problems inherent in trying to pick up 
actitivies which are deliberately pushed underground have been well 
documented. 
As demonstrated, there are ways in which this research might have 
been improved. However, some of the problems, especially those 
concerned with the examination of political behaviour, remain 
particularly hard to resolve. 
We now look more closely at the central theme of the thesis, to 
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examine what this research has to say about implementation. 
9.2 Defining implementation and explaining its success 
Chapter 3 dwelt on the thorny definitional issues which 
characterise this field of research. In this study, the term 
'implementation' has been used to refer to two areas of enquiry - the 
process and its outcome. Firstly, the way in which strategic 
decisions have been put into effect has been examined, so this is a 
study of the implementation process. Hence the case study material 
has been scrutinized to suggest independent variables with which to 
conceptualise the enactment of a decision. Secondly, the success of 
implementation - its outcomes - has been described using three 
dependent variables. The 'Processual' features identified thus 
provide an explanation of the outcomes. 
It Is hoped that the set of variables enunciated in this way will 
be of utility in reducing some of the confusion and ambiguity in this 
area. The building of concepts is a necessary first step in helping 
to achieve greater clarity and a more focussed consideration of the 
precise area which is being investigated. 
Potential concepts had to be collected from a range of scattered 
sources, gradually tested, refined and formed into an explanatory 
framework. This conceptual exploration took the greatest time and 
effort, deducing and defining as the data were clarified. This now 
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means that a way of comparing one case with another, rather than only 
describing cases, has been made available. 
The definitions of these concepts vary in the precision 
attained. Most apparently, the terms structural appropriateness and 
cultural appropriateness cover definitions that are especially 
vague. The question has to be faced whether it is helpful to say 
that pappropriateness' helps success, without specifying which 
structural or cultural dimensions are important and what arrangements 
of each are to be considered appropriate, or otherwise. Would it be 
prudent to say nothing about both structure and culture unless and 
until what is said can be said with greater confidence and clarity? 
There is something in this of the debate surrounding contingency 
theory and its emphasis on maintaining a level of 'fit' with the 
environment. The problem has always been how to obtain such 
congruence and how to recognise it when it has been obtained. 
But this study has thrown up examples of ways in which structural 
arrangements and cultural attributes can affect the success of 
implementation. With regard to structure, in Easyshop's computer 
installation the removal of the main implementor from the computer 
department led to a blurring of roles and functions, impeded the 
normal lines of authority and communication and restricted access to 
information and equipment. This contributed to an unsuccessful 
outcome. In the building of Langden at Central Water, the lack of 
clear responsibility and authority fuelled conflict and confusion 
between the Development and Operational sections. This caused 
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problems during the implementation process and reduced the final 
level of success. It was suggested that the introduction of project 
management teams eventually mitigated such difficulties here. 
Similarly, at Wharf the absence of a well-defined structure was a 
handicap. Here, roles and functions were poorly defined, often 
overlapped, and areas of responsibility and authority were not 
clearly demarcated. In effect, the organization was still in the 
process of organizing Itself. Conversely, the high degree of 
structuring at Central Water during the CAD installation was deemed 
to be helpful because it clarified what people had to do and provided 
effective channels of communication between them. 
On this evidence it would seem that a low level of structuring is 
detrimental. The chances of success would appear to be enhanced by 
unambiguous and relatively 'tight' structural arrangements. But 
this is not always the case. During the building of Great 
Northern's warehouse, lines of authority and communication, and to 
some extent the delegation of tasks, were left somewhat 
'unstructured'. Managers said that this was a deliberate attempt to 
avoid an overly bureaucratic process of implementation and give 
implementors *room to manoeuvrel. Furthermore, during the 
installation of Vale's heating system, complaints were made that the 
Maintenance department was too highly structured. 
So the findings are contingent. A higher level of structuring 
can be helpful, but not always. A lower level of structuring may 
hinder, but not every time. The relationship between structure and 
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success is conditional upon the circumstances and upon what is being 
done in ways that this study has been unable to formulate. The 
matter being implemented, and who the implementors and implementees 
are, are self-evidently significant, but exactly how and under which 
conditions is frustratingly complex and elusive. 
There is similar uncertainty about the exact way in which culture 
affects success. Examples of 'new brooms' coming in to facilitate a 
change in organizational culture have been described and in most 
instances this seems to have had a positive effect. It can inject 
vitality and dynamism into organizations, making the situation more 
open to change, thus giving implementation more chance to succeed. 
Likewise, in Easyshop employees mentioned that one reason for the 
lack of success was that the prevailing culture was conservative, 
with an emphasis on maintaining stability and not taking risks. 
This explained why managers chose to computerise all existing 
administrative routines rather than re-organize or rationalise 
them. They preferred to act very cautiously and found themselves 
unable to undertake the more radical steps which were necessary for 
successful change. Significantly, the introduction of a new 
managing director provided the necessary impetus to get things moving 
once more. But it is not always 'new brooms' which promote 
change. During Vale's heating reorganization the much-publicised 
National Energy Initiative led to an increased awareness of the need 
for energy conservation. This environmental stimulus helped to 
shape norms and values in the university which made energy-saving 
'fashionable' and in line with current national thinking. 
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However, it is not the case that any new culture is beneficial. 
It cannot simply be said that for implementation to succeed, a fresh 
outlook is needed. This depends In some way upon the kind of 
culture. For example, the new senior managers at Wharf introduced 
an alien culture which other organization members found hard to live 
with. It was based on an aggression, power, and ruthlessness which 
many found unappealing. Employees became entrenched in two camps 
and wary of any changes that senior management introduced. This 
hindered the process of implementation and so damaged Its final 
success. 
It would appear that both structural and cultural appropriateness 
are manifested in different ways, and do not always have the same 
effect each time. Different aspects of each seem likely to have 
differing conditional effects that complicate their associations with 
ultimate success. Within what this study could accomplish, that 
remains an unresolved problem. For this reason they remain 
funder-specified'. Whilst the word 'appropriateness' which has been 
used with each contains within it an Implicit notion of structure and 
of culture 'fitting' the process of implementation, which therefore 
Is likely to attain a higher level of success, it has not been 
possible to go beyond this general implication. 
It may be that future work will show that additional variables 
are required to pinpoint specific aspects of each. These concepts 
and others among the independent and dependent variables will be used 
in further research based on the Bradford Studies (Hickson et al, 
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1986), and it is both gratifying that some of the work contained in 
this thesis is already bearing fruit and challenging that its 
thinking may be taken further. 
Perhaps the most significant result of the present research Is 
the formation and distinction of two groups of variables - the 
Realizers and Enablers. These groups are shown to affect the level 
of implementation success In different ways. 
Enabler variables help towards successful Implementation. But 
making Implementation a priority, having relevant experience, enough 
resources, an appropriate organizational structure, and maintaining 
some flexibility, appear only to take a decision to a partially 
successful implementation. To get further, favourable Realizers 
seem to be needed. Setting clear, assessable aims, having a 
favourable climate in which to Implement and good support from the 
right members of the organization - plus a bit of good luck, or at 
least no misfortune - are what are really important to implement 
fully successfully. 
But why should Realizer variables have this affect? Is there an 
underlying reason why particular variables, when taken together, 
provide such import for success? And why others do not? At this 
stage any theory must be speculative but one possible explanation may 
be offered. It can be suggested that having a favourable common 
cultural background - whatever that may be in the particular 
circumstances - can weld organization members together in a way which 
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not only ensures support for implementation, but also gives 
individuals the scope and confidence to clarify the final goal and 
spell out what has to be done in order to realize it successfully. 
It is this favourable climate which fosters a will to succeed, and 
enables the tasks of implementation to be specified In advance 
sufficiently to arrive at a successful conclusion which is 
recognisable to all. Thus, four of the Realizer variables 
complement each other to produce the best chances of success, 
especially when the fifth, propitiousness, is high. 
In contrast, it may be supposed that the Enabler variables are 
more heterogeneous and so do not work together in such a synergistic 
way. Although it has been suggested that there may be a link 
between making implementation a priority and allocating sufficient 
resources, and it is conceivable that being familiar with what has to 
be done can help devise a suitable structure, beyond this there is no 
apparent connection across all five Enabler variables to the extent 
that there may be with the Realizers. The comparative heterogeneity 
means that their combined effect is not as powerful and, unlike the 
Realizers, the resulting impact is not enhanced by the "sum of the 
parts". 
This 'nascent theory is little more than informed conjecture at 
this point, and calls for further thought in tandem with further 
empirical work. 
In addition to distinguishing the variables that became grouped 
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as Realizers and Enablers, it has been found that some types of topic 
are likely to be more risky to implement, and require attention to 
specific issues. Decisions about the implementation of new computer 
technology or similar complex equipment are likely to carry 
significant risks of failure and it is important to be familiar with 
what has to be done. When it comes to building programmes what has 
to be done is easier to define, less complicated and less risky, and 
such decisions have a fair chance of reasonable success, but as 
little chance of resounding success as of abysmal failure. 
Implementations which are concerned with changes to the structure of 
an organization are more amorphous in nature and are harder to define 
and evaluate. So although they are higher risk topics like the 
technology cases and share with them the higher chance of failure, 
they, like building programmes, are unlikely to be a resounding 
success - they can fail and the chances of being very successful are 
not high. On the whole they are an unattractive venture for 
management. 
In short, there are potentially high risk, high gain cases (new 
technology); low risk, low gain cases (building programmes) and high 
risk, low gain cases (structural reorganizations). Senior managers 
might like to bear this in mind when deciding which changes to 
introduce during their time in office! 
But a further finding was that different organizations can 
implement similar topics in different ways, the cases of Great 
Northern's and Easyshop's contrasting computer installations being 
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used to illustrate this point quite starkly. So success in 
implementation is determined by a combination of attributes and 
circumstances in the organization that yields enough Enablers and 
Realizers - not solely because the topic happens to be about this or 
that, or because the organization is in the public or private 
sectors, engaged In manufacturing, service or whatever. 
This does go beyond the simple 'recipe book' approach of do's and 
dont's presented and criticised in Chapter 3. Certainly the concept 
of backing supports the idea that motivation and commitment are 
required (Brunsson, 1985; Radford, 1986) and the implementation of 
Central Water's CAD system in particular suggests that the formation 
of implementation teams (Daft, 1986) and finding of 'idea champions' 
(Skivington & Daft, 1988) is a useful tactic. Yet the whole issue 
of participation, much invoked by human relations thinking, is not 
pivotal to implementation. Schilit's (1987) research stressing the 
importance of involving middle level managers at the formulation 
stage is shown to be contingent. In a crisis that is visible to 
all, implementation can be pushed through almost regardless of who 
knows about and accepts it because everyone wants 'something' to be 
done, as the computer installation in Great Northern showed most 
dramatically. 
The availability of resources is another general theme and 
although these were deemed to be important, again their abundance is 
not crucial. Decisions can be implemented very successfully even 
when resources are scarce, although no cases in this study suffered 
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from totally inadequate financing, time or manpower. Enough Is 
enough; a sufficiency will do. 
Stephenson (1985) and Alexander (1986) both discussed the problem 
of uncontrollable external factors affecting implementation. The 
concept of propitiousness used here confirms the significance of 
this. Obviously, Easyshop's takeover bid and the 'moving of the 
goalposts' by the EEC during the building of Langden Water Treatment 
Works illustrate how such inopportune factors can hinder 
implementation. It must be remembered though that fortuitous events 
can also occur - such as the offer of a cheap gas supply during 
Vale's heating changes. The beneficial effects of uncontrollable 
factors are not ones which are usually given much prominence in the 
literature. The unforeseeable can be vital. 
So some of the factors which other authors deem to affect 
implementation have been confirmed. Even the attention drawn to the 
potential ambiguity of implementation (Baier et al, 1986) and the 
potential failures of the 'briefing' process (Bishop, 1981) is to 
some extent addressed in this study where it was found that the clear 
specification of tasks could facilitate success. It should be noted 
that Baier et al suggest that there is little managers can do to 
actually increase specificity because they see ambiguity as being an 
endemic, often deliberate, part of policy-making. It is accepted 
that further work is required to show whether the level of 
specificity can be increased as part of a planned management 
strategy, or whether the politics of making decisions prevent that 
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more often than not. 
But it is suggested that this study does do more than just offer 
a list of factors. It is able to discriminate between them to 
distinguish those which are of more importance in achieving the best 
outcomes. Moreover, it is the combination of factors working 
together which affects implementation success, it is the pattern of 
variables as a whole which is significant, not the effect of 
individual variables in isolation. It is Enablers plus Realizers, 
plus the right kind of topic in the right setting. Bardach's (1977) 
comment on p. 82 of this thesis that the world is too fragmented to 
develop a general theory of implementation is therefore challenged. 
Individual situations and circumstances in organizations do produce a 
variety of processes and outcomes. But the variety is not Infinite 
and there are identifiable patterns. The world of implementation 
Is not full of dark, illogical chaos, but there is some kind of 
causal connection in operation which links together process and 
outcomes, and which may be repeated in more than one organizational 
setting. 
This means that managers have some means of predicting, at the 
time of decision-making, whether implementation is likely to be 
successful. Since success requires favourable degrees of Realizer 
and Enabler variables then the probable levels of success may be 
postulated in advance and steps taken to resolve potential 
deficiencies. 
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The present study goes beyond the all too familiar emphasis on 
the dire problems of implementation to offer constructive 
information, not just about how to avoid them, but how to take 
opportunities for success. Thus, the accent is more on the 
positive, proactive aspects of implementation, not merely on reacting 
to perceived difficulties. 
What then would be suitable advice for practising managers? The 
following list suggests some pointers. 
Be clear about what you want to do. Specify the tasks to be 
carried out and think about how they will be assessed prior 
to beginning Implementation. 
2) Try and foster an organizational climate which favours 
change. This may mean bringing in new staff to top 
management positions, especially if change is seen to be 
radical. 
3) Be prepared for surprises during Implementation - and take 
advantage of them if possible. It helps if Implementation 
is fairly flexible and the situation is monitored 
throughout. 
4) Make sure you have enough support to carry things through. 
You will need to get support from implementors. One way of 
doing this may be to involve them in discussions about how 
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Implementation will be carried out. 
5) If you are dealing with new technology you need to be sure 
you have enough knowledge about what you want to do. If you 
do not have enough you will need to enlist expertise either 
from elsewhere in the organization or from external sources. 
There is no doubt that these strictures are not easy to achieve, 
and that in all cases somebody may be disadvantaged by what is 
done. This research has not been able to chart in minute detail how 
each organization managed, by luck or good management, to arrive at a 
favourable culture or the right backing. Critical factors were 
identifed after the event when trying to explain the level of 
success. Much more work is obviously needed before the process of 
changing from a low level of say, backing or familiarity, to greater 
backing and familiarity, is really understood. That must await 
future research. 
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APPENDIX A 
LETTER TO ORGANIZATIONS REQUESTING 
PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH 
Dear Mr. Smith, 
For the past ten years this Management Centre has been 
undertaking research into strategic decision-making. Research so 
far has concentrated on the processes of decision-making, that is, 
how such decisions are made and who makes them. The conclusions 
have been both interesting and important and have resulted in the 
publication of a book on executive decision-making entitled 'Top 
Decisions' and a number of research papers. Practical aspects of 
the findings have been incorporated Into management training. 
We have now moved on to look at how decisions are put into 
effect. We are interested in the problems of implementation as they 
confront management and administrators. 
Would you consider talking to us about your company? I would 
like to talk to you for about an hour, perhaps going on to see some 
of your colleagues in due course. I would like to discuss some 
decisions which have had a major impact on your company and which you 
have been involved in. It would be useful to contrast one decision 
which was relatively easy to implement and one which was more 
difficult. 
I will telephone you in the next few days and will be pleased to 
provide further details if you wish. 
The assistance of experienced managers such as yourself is vital 
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Vale University is one of the 'new' universities set up in the 
1960's in response to the expansionist doctrine prevailing in higher 
education at the time. 
In fact though, it had its beginnings much earlier when two 
(abortive) attempts were made to enlist Government support for a 
university in the 17th century. An approach made to the University 
Grants Committee (UGC) in 1947 was also rejected but the proposers 
were encouraged to go away and prepare their evidence in greater 
detail in case the UGC changed its mind. It did so in 1960 when 
approval was finally given. 
Today the university has about 3,800 full and part-time students 
and 14 academic departments. The Interesting question of how Vale 
came to be what it is today forms part of the second case studied - 
the decision to develop a university at Vale. Throughout its 25 
year history the university has evolved and matured, continually 
Interpreting and re-defining those early hopes and objectives which 
were set out in the original Development Plan. 
The first decision studied for this research is the attempt to 
conserve energy and save heating costs by updating the university's 
boiler house and heating systems. This reaped unexpected rewards 
and proved to be more successful than anticipated. 
Heating and energy conservation at Vale 
One of the unforeseen consequences of the design of the 
university, built In the days of cheap fuel in the 1960's, was the 
problem brought about by spiralling oil prices in the 1970's and the 
cuts in university budgets. 
When Vale was built it made use of a large and sprawling campus, 
much of it geographically separated by an artificial lake. Although 
pleasing in an environmental way, containing as it did expanses of 
landscaped lawn and trees, the campus was a very inefficient and 
voracious user of energy. Pipes and ducts carrying water and heat 
had to travel the length and breadth of the site and many outlying 
buildings on the perimeter were often inadequately served. 
In 1980 the university set up an Energy Conservation Working 
Party, comprising 3 academics, the Chairman (also an academic), one 
senior member of the university administration (the Assistant 
Bursar), plus an energy consultant from the university architects 
(the same architects who had designed the university back in the 
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1960's). Among the many schemes suggested by the Working Party the 
one studied for this research was the most important, in terms of 
expenditure, savings and organization-wide effects. 
Heating for the university was generated centrally by a 
steam-driven boiler which used heavy fuel oil. In 1981-2 expected 
fuel consumption was 3.4m litres of oil. The boilers were then 
17-18 years old, with a life expectancy of 20 - 25 years, and they 
were no longer able to meet the needs of the university. 
Additionally, the on-site controls in the buildings - the valves and 
thermostats installed in 1965 - were outdated and insuffiently 
responsive. Alterations to the boiler house and controls were 
budgeted to cost E400,000 running over a 2-year programme, with a 
5-year payback period. 
There were many fuel options available and a sophisticated 
economic appraisal was put forward by the Economics department. One 
of the options considered was to change from heavy fuel oil to gas 
but at this time the Gas Board maintained they did not have enough 
spare capacity to supply the university. Coal would have been the 
cheapest option but supply was not always stable and there were 
problems in receiving and handling. Even methane gas was 
considered, but in the end, on the basis of the appraisal, they opted 
for retaining the heavy fuel oil supply, but with complete updating 
of the boiler system. They therefore changed from steam operation 
to a system of fully-flooded high pressure which gave greater 
stability in operation. This proposal was accepted by the Finance 
Committee and the original boiler manufacturers undertook to carry 
out the necessary modifications. 
Work began in February 1982 with the preliminary pipework and 
fabrication but they had to wait until June to carry out the major 
work when, being summertime, the students had mostly disappeared for 
the holiday, and they could turn the heating off. They had a 
deadline to meet, the system had to be working by the time the 
students returned, that is, by September 1982. The university 
incorporated severe financial penalties into the contract to ensure 
that the contractor met these targets. Because of the specialised 
boiler items which had to be designed the price for this part of the 
project increased from E200,000 to E225,000. 
However, in 1983 there came a whisper from the Gas Board that 
they would, after all, be prepared to supply Vale with gas. 
Coincidentally, a large company which was a heavy consumer of gas in 
Vale had recently closed down, and this might have induced the Gas 
Board to become active in its search for other outlets. Since heavy 
fuel oil prices were once again beginning to bite Vale reconsidered 
their position. They decided to convert their 2 boilers to a dual 
fuel operation. This cost E53,000 but had only a one-year payback 
period. The Maintenance Manager negotiated a favourable deal, 
obtaining an 'interruptible supply' at an extremely competitive price 
per therm. Since the Gas Board could only interrupt the supply for 
63 days maximum in any one year and would have to give notice (when 
the university could use its standby fuel) this was very 
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satisfactory, especially as the Gas Board provided all the supply 
work free of charge. 
This proved to be a great bonus for Vale and illustrates how luck 
can sometimes play a part in success. If they had chosen the coal 
option then a dual fuel operation would not have been possible. 
The other part of the decision - to make the on-site controls 
more responsive - was also altered along the way. At first the plan 
had been merely to update switches and thermostats In the college 
buildings. However, in 1982, new technology was beginning to change 
the picture and attention began to be focussed on a completely 
centralised 'energy management system'. It was therefore decided 
mid-way through the contract to increase the budget by 980,000, 
consolidate all the stand-alone controls and to locate these 
centrally. 
From a list of 20 potential manufacturers, a shortlist of 10 was 
compiled and of these 5 were investigated thoroughly. In the end 
they chose the company which was already providing 70% of the 
university's existing controls. This was an important factor In 
helping the maintenance staff to overcome any initial wariness about 
new technology. Since they were already familiar with this 
particular manufacturer it was hoped that they would perceive the new 
computer-controlled systems simply as an extension of the previous 
operation. 
Although university staff feel that this was effective the nature 
of the work of the three boilermen did change. Now that the system 
was computer-controlled they had less to do with the actual running 
of the boilers but were part of the general maintenance team, looking 
after pumping equipment and air conditioning as well. Although it 
could be argued that their jobs now held more variety, the general 
feeling seemed to be that they preferred working in the 
boilerhouse. However, they were few in number and the majority of 
people involved were pleased with the change. 
The university considered this part of the decision to be very 
successful. Even though they were now spending E80,000 more, the 
predicted payback period had reduced from 5 years to 4.2, since the 
savings would be much greater. The final system is more 
controllable, heating and light can be regulated from the maintenance 
department and requirements programmed for weeks ahead, while changes 
can be made on a day-to-day basis. Additionally, areas which were 
poorly served prior to the installation of the energy management 
system have now been brought into line with the rest of the 
university. 
A factor which undoubtedly helped this to be a success was the 
vigorous publicity campaign mounted by the Energy Conservation 
Working Party which stressed that all university members should be 
more energy-conscious and help to report problems as soon as they 
arose. Inevitably, there were some Initial adjustments to be made 
as particular buildings or rooms were reported as being either too 
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hot or too cold, and It took the students some time to become used to 
having the heating turned off at midnight. Nevertheless, once a 
pattern was established the university considered the rewards well 
justified the expenditure. 
Buildin-q of the university and campu 
Vale university was founded by a small group of prominent local 
citizens who together formed Vale Academic Trust. With the help of 
a charitable trust set up by a local manufacturer a large site was 
purchased and when this group approached the UGC In 1960 they could 
claim both financial backing and a physical site. Once permission 
for the university had been granted a Promotion Committee was set up 
which comprised local authority representatives and other interested 
members. An Academic Planning Board was also established and it 
chose the first Vice-Chancellor In 1961. In addition, other key 
staff were appointed, notably the Bursar, Registrar, Librarian and 
some professors. 
Architects were then appointed and they proved to be of immense 
help in these early days of the university. Many earnest 
discussions were held between the senior academics and the architects 
about the nature of a university and its objectives. These were 
encapsulated in the 1962 Development Plan which set forth the aims of 
the university, as well as the physical plans in the shape of 
buildings and overall design. 
It was decided to build the university using the CLASP 
(Consortium of Local Authorities' Special Programme) system which had 
previously been mainly used to build schools. Two reasons for this 
predominated, first the need to build swiftly and cheaply in order 
for the university to be ready for students in 1963, the second was 
connected to the shortage of building labour in the environs which 
meant that a pre-fabricated system such as CLASP was infinitely 
preferable In Its labour-saving method of construction. 
Many assumptions were made by the architects and their client 
about the nature of such an institution, the number and type of 
students it would attract and they way they would live. All were 
projections about an uncertain and unknowable future. Therefore, 
one of the first priorities was to have a flexible plan for building 
and for development, which could incorporate and adapt to change as 
required. 
Another fundamental concept which was formulated at this early 
stage was that the university would be collegiate. This, the 
Vice-Chancellor stressed, was not in order to ape the venerable 
institutions of Oxford and Cambridge, but was a serious attempt to 
harmonise and integrate the university. In Vale's collegiate system 
it was intended that there would be 8 colleges, each comprising a 
unit of 300 students (although not all would live on campus). This 
figure of 300, it was assumed, was the maximum number with which any 
one person could form social relationships. Staff and students 
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would be mixed in the colleges, as would teaching, eating and 
recreational areas. Academic disciplines would be spread throughout 
the colleges, thus creating a blend of people and interests. This 
objective of creating a community of social intercourse was intended 
to be furthered by the building of numerous walkways and paths which 
traversed the campus, intersecting to ensure the maximum of social 
contact. The whole university was designed to accord with the 
principle that undergraduates should remember their time at 
university as a uniquely memorable and enjoyable experience. 
The physical building of the university was largely successful. 
The use of CLASP meant that no building was ever late or over 
budget. The aesthetic appeal of CLASP is more questionable and many 
have complained about the drab, grey cladding of the university. No 
ivy-clad walls for Vale. Even the Queen is reputed to have 
commented adversely on this aspect when she visited in 1964. 
However, the flexibility of the Development Plan seems to have 
stood the test of time. Although 8 colleges were planned, lack of 
funds has meant that only 6 have been erected. Nevertheless, with 
some extensions, each now accommodates twice the intended number of 
students. 
The college system, though initially providing a few irritations, 
has survived largely intact, though some of the rules have been 
eroded over the passage of time. For example, the Insistence that 
college members only take dinner In their own college dining room was 
soon ignored by the students. It is also complained by some that 
the system is wasteful of resources, since it means such aspects as 
canteens and lecture theatres have to be provided in every college, 
rather than being located centrally. 
Some irritations are more troublesome. One consequence of the 
collegiate principle was that there should not be a separate 
Students' Union building. It was felt that this would precipitate 
an undesirable splintering of the university. Throughout the 
university's history there has therefore been a sustained campaign by 
students to get a Union building. So far, they have not succeeded 
but it is a constant source of frustration, especially for Union 
officials. 
The idea of the university as a community of discourse has also 
taken some battering from the very early years as far as academic 
disciplines are concerned. Even in the early 1960's there were 
distinct and rather hostile mutterings that the department of 
Economics was much more concerned with developing its own high 
profile than progressing the Social Science department as a whole, of 
which it was a part. 
one factor which was completely unforeseen and which has 
contributed to much of the university's financial stability over 
recent years, is the expansion of the conference trade. Here, the 
collegiate structure of Vale has proved to be of distinct 
advantage. Vale Is ideally suitable for conferences, since all 
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necessary facilities are available In each and every college. In 
1984/5 the university ranked as one of the top 3 universities In 
Britain in terms of income from conferences. A wholly unexpected 
but nevertheless welcome consequence of those early 60's decisions. 
A survey of students carried out in 1983 showed the majority of 
them to be fairly happy with their university. Of course, they have 
little with which to compare it. In many ways this implementation 
is harder to evaluate, as much of the evidence for the success of 
Vale's development is based on people's articulations about how they 
feel about being at Vale. 
CENTRAL WATER AUTHORIT 
Like all water authorities and other sectors of local government 
Central Water has undergone many structural reorganizations over the 
years, particularly In 1973 and 1983, and at the time of research was 
preparing itself for privatisatlon. 
Central Water Is one of 10 Regional Water Authorities responsible 
for the treatment and supply of water and disposal of sewage. it 
serves four and a half million people over a wide geographical area 
and is divided into four local operating Divisions plus a fifth 
Division which looks after all rivers in the area. Total income is 
approximately E320m while operating costs are in the region of E130m 
per annum. 
At the top of the Authority is an executive management team, the 
Corporate Planning Panel, comprising the Chairman of the Authority, 
The Deputy Chairman (who is part-time), Directors responsible for 
Finance and Water Services, the Company Secretary and the 
Solicitor. Each Division then has a Divisional General Manager who 
Is responsible to the Director of Water Services. The Divisions are 
divided into Development and Operational sections. Broadly speaking 
the Development sections are involved with new projects and the 
operational sections maintain and monitor the projects already in 
existence. 
The decisions covered in this research were the building of 
Langden Water Treatment Works and the Installation of a Computer 
Assisted Draughting (CAD) system. I 
The building of Langden Water Treatment Works 
The beginnings of Langden were in 1981. At this time there was 
a growing rumble of complaints from local people and from councillors 
about the unacceptable water quality they were receiving in part of 
Southern Division's area. A local MP in the district had made It 
his hobby horse and was creating political pressure to get something 
done. The water was safe but discoloured, coming as it did from an 
area of peat upland. The main problem was that the water treatment 
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plant then in operation had been built in the early part of this 
century and although it was operating to its original specification, 
this was no longer adequate to meet the more stringent demands of EEC 
and World Health Organization standards. 
Central Authority operates a system in which each Division puts 
forward proposals for Its capital schemes and this project was given 
the go-ahead to proceed. The Policy Resources Committee (no longer 
in existence) then had to accept the proposal, which they did, and it 
was then passed to the Board who 'rubber-stamped' it. 
In 1981 discussions began with external plant manufacturers, by 
the beginning of 1982 they were moving on to the design of the 
treatment works and they began on site in April 1983. There were 25 
major contracts with different contractors to be sorted out. The 
projected total cost of the works was ElOm (partly funded by a 
European Regional Development Grant of E2.185m) and the final cost 
was in the region of E10.4m. The works were planned to be completed 
by July 1985 and a public statement was made to this effect. 
Therefore it was crucial that the Authority met this deadline. In 
fact, they did so, but only after a rather rushed commissioning 
stage, and in reality many matters to do with the operation of the 
works had to be sorted out later, once the glare of publicity had 
died away. 
The implementation of the decision to build Langden was not 
always easy, especially for those dealing with the on-going 
development of the works on site. This was the first water 
treatment plant to be built in Southern Division for 50 years and 
incorporated some untried systems and new technology. 
Firstly, there was not always agreement within the Authority 
about which were the most appropriate systems. For example, there 
was great debate about whether to use a pressing or centrifugal 
system for sludge thickening and also whether to use a two- or 
three-stage process in the treatment of raw water. There was also 
some hostility between the Development section who was overseeing the 
design of the plant, and the Operations section who would be 
responsible for It once it was working. The Operations section 
often felt they were not being given enough say in the design and 
were being saddled with arrangements they did not agree with, but 
would have to operate in the future. 
Since no-one seemed to have complete control over both sections 
it was often unclear who should have the final word In such matters, 
and this allowed the grumblings to go unresolved. It is interesting 
to note that Central Water have now Introduced structural changes in 
the form of a Project Management system which provides much clearer 
lines of authority in such cases. 
In addition to the intra-organizational problems there were also 
some difficulties with the main contractor responsible for the 
treatment plant itself and also with the civil engineering 
contractor. 
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Although the plant went into operation as specified, there were 
teething problems in the first 12 months and some parts of the works 
have needed to be re-developed. Much of the pipework has now been 
replaced because the original piping was unsatisfactory. Langden 
is now working well at last, nevertheless there are still areas of 
doubt. This applies particularly to the site operatives who run and 
maintain the plant. Generally speaking, they feel that they have 
traded an interesting, outdoor job in the old treatment works, for a 
more boring and routine inside job. The new plant is semi-automatic 
and the nature of their work has therefore changed somewhat. 
Installation of CAD syStem 
In many ways the decision to introduce a computer-aided 
draughting system was the result of the enthusiasm of one man in the 
N&E Division of Central Water. Alan Lindsey, a Development 
Manager, became interested in CAD some years previously, in 1982, 
after seeing a system working in another Water Authority. However, 
at this time he seemed unable to raise any support for his idea to 
introduce such a scheme into Central and it was shelved. 
However, the climate of the Authority changed dramatically when a 
new Chairman took over the reins in 1985. The new man was most 
active, taking an interest in all aspects of the Authority. He was 
particularly favourable towards more up-to-date systems, especially 
in the area of new technology, so that the Authority could prepare 
itself and be competitive in the event of privatisation. 
Lindsey voiced his opinions regarding CAD once more and this time 
he found favour at the top of the organization. Both the Chairman 
and Director of Water Services appeared to be interested. In 
addition, the Chief Technology Manager became involved and proved to 
be a powerful ally. He was head of a newly formed Computer 
Technology Department (CTD) which was responsible for coordinating 
and developing computer applications throughout the Authority. As a 
measure of the importance of this department the Chairman insisted 
that the Chief Technology Manager report direct to himself. 
Lindsey and members of CTD travelled the country looking at other 
CAD installations and collecting information. Essentially, the CAD 
system simplified the draughting process by standardising many of the 
drawings and procedures, while at the same time developing the system 
by making it possible to make sophisticated alterations to drawings 
and plans without re-drawing them. 
An external organization, the Construction Industry Computing 
Association (CICA) also became involved and provided specialist 
advice to Lindsey and to CTD. Together they developed a 
specification of what kind of systems and software would be 
appropriate for the Authority's application, plus a series of 
standard 'benchmark' tests with which to assess different systems. 
A shortlist of computer manufacturers was compiled and four 
manufacturers selected and tenders obtained. A Tender Evaluation 
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Group was set up within the Authority comprising people from each 
Division and from the central CTD. One manufacturer was dropped 
immediately because of an extremely high price, one failed the 
benchmark tests and the final system was chosen because of price and 
the sophistication of Its software. 
Once chosen, a joint recommendation for this system by Lindsay 
and CTD was presented to the Corporate Planning Panel and was 
approved. Initially the plan had been to instal CAD in N&E 
Division only but senior management (particularly the Chai man and 
the Computer Technology Manager) pressed for it to go into all five 
Divisions. This is what finally happened and the systems were 
installed in March/April 1987. 
Throughout implementation installation of the hardware, 
software and training of staff -a number of groups were set up to 
'manage' the change. The CAD Users Group in each Division which met 
at first every month, and then every 6 weeks, was very useful in 
giving everyone a chance to meet and air problems. There was then a 
Regional User Group where representatives from each Division could 
meet and exchange information. There was also a CAD Management Group 
for Development Managers which was chaired by Lindsey. Finally, 
there was a Standards Group whose objective was to compile a dossier 
of standard drawings which could be put onto the system for everyone 
to make use of. 
Initially, Lindsey acknowledges that the switchover to CAD from 
manual drawing systems was not easy. They had problems with the 
software from April until September (1987), some of the equipment was 
late in arriving and there were the difficulties inherent In training 
staff, most of whom were completely unfamiliar with the technology. 
There was also the delicate matter of the tracers in the 
Development sections. Tracers (who were usually women) had 
traditionally done little in the way of designing drawings, being 
mainly employed to make copies of drawings compiled by draughtmen. 
This function was no longer required, since CAD could print Its own 
copies and also alter them if necessary. There was therefore the 
issue of either re-training tracers in order to make them into 
'draughtsmen', or giving them other tasks to carry out. In the 
event, although no-one was made compulsorily redundant some tracers 
did opt to leave, finding the transition too difficult to make. 
Although not all Divisions implemented with the same degree of 
ease most achieved good levels of performance. The one trial 
installation in an Operations area was not successful though. 
Generally installation was carried out in about two to three months, 
although it took longer for everyone to build up expertise on CAD. 
The cost was originally in the region of E100,000 but increased as 
the project was expanded to every Division. 
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EASYSHOP MAIL ORDER 
Easyshop was established in the 1890's in the north of England 
and now employs over 3,000 people. From the 1960's to the mid 
1970's, Easyshop, in common with other mail order companies, was 
enjoying expansion and financial success. However the recession in 
the mid 1970's stemmed this and the company began to experience 
harsher times with falling market share and profits. In 1986 
turnover was given as E179m and profit before tax was i8m. Market 
share was 7% in 1979, but this had fallen to 5% by 1986. 
The decision studied at Easyshop was the installation of a new 
computer system. This case had begun as a pilot study when the 
recently retired Managing Director was approached and agreed to 
discuss events to provide background Information for this project. 
However, the story was an interesting one and the case was later 
incorporated Into the main study. But this meant that permission to 
research a second case had to be obtained from the new Managing 
Director. Unfortunately, he was preoccupied with settling into his 
new position and dealing with the fairly serious financial problems 
facing the company, and so permission was not forthcoming. Thus 
only one case of implementation was studied in this organization. 
Installation of a new computer system 
As with other mail order companies, Easyshop's business operation 
depended on extensive administrative arrangements in order to run its 
empire. The way the mail order industry generally works is that the 
company's catalogues are sent out to 'agents', usually housewives, 
who order goods for themselves and friends and earn a small 
commission on each order. Easyshop has about 500,000 agents, each 
of whom may have 5 or 6 'customers', so the number of orders and 
amount of paperwork is huge. At the time of the decision the 
company employed a large number of clerks to receive and process the 
agents' orders, and the whole business was extremely 
labour-intensive. By the 1970's labour-costs were rising and it was 
decided to Instal computerised systems to try and cut costs and 
increase efficiency. 
In taking this step the company was one of the first In the 
industry. But such an initiative also meant that Easyshop had 
little experience on which to plan such an exercise, and this 
resulted in many unknowns with which the company had to cope. For 
reasons of safety and low-risk, managers decided to simply transfer 
all the manual routines straight on to the computer without 
re-organising or rationalising them. This eventually was to mean 
that they were burdened with over-complicated, over-detailed systems, 
which took up vast computer capacity and yet did not provide 
information in a readily accessable or usable form. As the Managing 
Director remarked, they had a "Rolls Royce system for a Ford 
operation", and they were becoming bogged down in the minutiae of 
their activities. 
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In the early 1980's the company was in a very serious financial 
condition, debt recovery procedures were ineffective and profits were 
falling. Even though financial resources were scarce, a decision 
was made to start again and attempt to re-computerise. 
This was not a popular decision as much time and effort had 
already been invested in the existing system. Several members of 
senior management were averse to spending more money in this way and 
the general climate at the top of the organization was conservative 
and wary of risk. 
A feature of this decision was the intense conflict between 
interests at a senior level which began during decision-making and 
continued into the implementation phase. Indeed, the antagonism was 
so damaging that Implementation ceased almost completely at one 
point. This conflict centred around the Computer Director and the 
data processing staff who had spearheaded the existing system and 
were not in favour of another radical change. The job of re-writing 
the systems was taken out of the Computer section and put under the 
auspices of the Sales Administration Director, who was therefore left 
with the unenviable task of trying to Implement one department's 
decision while working in another. In spite of this (or perhaps 
because of it), the Computer Director was able to delay 
implementation for nearly a year by withholding necessary information 
and resources. 
Implementation was especially complex since all the different 
parts of the computer operation (the order-processing section, stock 
control, agency administration systems and so on) interlinked with 
each other, which made it very awkward to try and separate one from 
another in order to upgrade an area at a time. Matters were made 
particularly difficult because the current system had to be kept 
running while the new one was being developed. In addition, staff 
had to be re-trained to use the new equipment. 
Implementation was initially anticipated to take a year (although 
the Sales Systems Manager, who was writing the software, privately 
forecast twice this time). The Internal conflict, and also the 
possibility of a takeover by another large company (whose computer 
systems were already running smoothly and would therefore be 
installing these into Easyshop in the event of a successful bid) 
caused long delays. In the event, the decision was still not fully 
implemented seven years later, although the arrival of a new Managing 
Director and the subsequent enforced departure of the contentious 
Computer Director provided new impetus to implementation. 
GREAT NORTHERN MAIL ORDER 
Great Northern Mail Order company has a long history, with the 
foundations of the company being established in 1912. It began with 
a staff of 3, selling mainly jewellery over the counter, but during 
the first World War a new idea, selling through catalogues, came into 
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being. The company continued to expand, purchasing warehouses to 
house stock, and by 1922 it had 30 staff. By 1934 it was 
despatching 1,500 orders a day. A general boom in the mail order 
industry in the 1950's and 1960's helped this figure to rise to 7,000 
parcels a day In 1950 and 21,000 In 1960. 
The company had a reputation for a paternalistic and caring 
approach and was proud of its traditions. Some of these have lasted 
to the present day - the present Catalogue Director is the son of the 
company's last Chairman and grandson of the founder's business 
partner, who joined Great Northern after the 1914-18 war. 
However, the 1970's saw a check in growth, complacency set in as 
management was lulled into inactivity by the memories of past 
successes. Managers failed to anticipate, and subsequently respond 
to, changes in the retailing world; to increased competition from 
other mail order rivals and from high street shops (who were now also 
offering credit - one of the major advantages of catalogue 
shopping). There were union problems and even a strike, and in 
addition, manpower costs, in what was traditionally a 
labour-intensive business, began to bite. Management had failed to 
update old sytems and invest in new technology. Some attempts at 
computerisation had been made but the systems were uncoordinated and 
performed poorly. By the end of the 1970's the company was in a 
poor position, It was losing money, debt control and recovery systems 
in particular were ineffective and general administrative systems 
were in urgent need of modernisation. 
Then, in 1981 the Chairman brought in a new Managing Director - 
David Jackson - who although young, had considerable experience In a 
larger, rival, mail order company. Jackson brought with him a huge 
number of senior staff from his old company, in all, about 22 people, 
most of whom were computer personnel. Many established Great 
Northern directors and senior managers lost their jobs and one 
department in the computer section was closed completely. 
The first major action taken by Jackson was to instal a powerful 
mainframe computer and transfer the company's major functions onto 
it. This decision forms one of the cases studied. 
The company began to pick up and in 1986 it merged with another 
large retailing organization. In 198T Great Northern despatched 
70,000 orders a day, producing 35 miles of paper in despatch 
orders. Mail order is now called 'Home Shopping' and the company 
continues to run its own major generalist catalogue, plus a number of 
smaller, specialist catalogues directed at specific types of 
customers (teenagers, working women, and higher income bracket 
earners). By exploiting its business expertise in allied areas 
Great Northern has now diversified and owns a laser mailing services 
company, a direct marketing information service, a credit assessment 
company and a company providing micro electronic equipment which 
connects to PABX telephone systems. 
Figures for 1986 (prior to the merger) show Great Northern's 
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turnover to be E226m and profit before tax to be E16m. At this time 
it was fourth out of the five largest mail order companies, having a 
9% share of the market. The top two companies in this industry have 
72% of the market between them and are considerably larger, having 
major interests outside of the mail order industry. The company 
employs over 3,000 people. 
Great Northern has recently built a large new warehouse to hold 
its stock. The warehouse has cost over Mm and Incorporates the 
latest computer and stock handling systems. Covering an area of 51 
acres, it Is one of the largest anywhere in Europe. The building of 
this warehouse Is the subject of the first case described here. 
The buildinq of a new warehouse 
The recognition that the company would soon run out of warehouse 
capacity was highlighted in 1985 when the Corporate Plan prepared in 
1984 was up-dated. The 1984 plan had looked ahead over the next 
three years and found no problem with warehouse capacity. However, 
in 1985, projected growth over the next 5 years showed that the 
company would actually run out of warehouse space in 1988-9. 
A report written and presented to the Board in 1985 by the 
Warehouse Director drew attention to the problem. In May 1985 he 
presented a second paper which outlined four options which the 
company could take to resolve it. 
These were: (a) continue with the current policy of finding 
additional small warehouses to cope with extra demand; (b) build a 
new warehouse (in addition to the ones already operating), but locate 
It in a different part of the country (say the south) to give better 
distribution coverage; (c) add-on to present warehouses already 
being used; (d) move to a local greenfield site and start from 
scratch. 
The Warehouse 
the whole issue. 
pursued this. 
for a greenfield 
already found a 
offices. 
Director was commissioned by the Board to look into 
He himself favoured the greenfield site option and 
In October 1985 the Board agreed that they should go 
site, by which time the Warehouse Director had 
suitable site, just a few miles from the company 
Investigation began into the computer and stock handling systems 
which the warehouse would eventually house. The Warehouse Director 
was determined that the new warehouse would have the most up-to-date 
systems on the market, and he and the Computer Planning Director 
travelled to America, Japan and Europe, as well as the UK, visiting 
other companies to assess their systems. 
Costs were worked out - it seemed that the cost of reclaiming the 
site (which was derelict land) would be in the region of f7m. The 
Board urged that the possibility of council or government grants be 
investigated. Application was made to the local council in May 1986 
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and after some delay the Department of the Environment awarded them a 
Derelict Land grant of E2.8m. They also received the land on 
favourable terms from the council after much negotiation and 
dealing. 
Great Northern formed a Project Team to see through the design 
and building of the warehouse. This comprised about 5 managers who 
were each responsible for a particular area in the warehouse 
operation (for example, the High Bay area where stock was stacked and 
the Packing area where goods were packed prior to despatch to 
agents), plus managers responsible for the computer systems and staff 
training/communications aspects. In addition the company employed 
an external Project Management team and building contractor. 
Monthly meetings were held between the Project Team and Central 
Planning Unit and the Warehouse Director reported to the Board every 
two months on progress. 
The whole accent of the project has been on flexibility. New 
systems and technology are being Introduced all the time in this area 
and the Warehouse Director was anxious not to have a too fixed idea 
to begin with so that changes could be Incorporated along the way. 
This has generally worked but has pushed much responsibility down to 
middle management who have been left to make some fairly major 
sub-decisions on their own. Some have felt quite pressured as a 
result. 
When planning the warehouse area, it was decided that foundations 
would be laid for two extension areas to provide for future expansion 
if required. But by November 1987 one of these was already taken up 
because of the continued growth of the company and the merger. So 
there is now less room for expansion than anticipated. 
The warehouse was planned to be operational by January/February 
1989 and this date was met. 
Installation of a new-computer system 
As in Easyshop, historically Great Northern employed a large 
number of clerks in the agency accounting section who looked after 
the agents, processing their orders and sorting out queries. This 
was labour-intensive and produced a great deal of paperwork. The 
agency accounting section was the heart of the business and linked 
together other areas such as credit control, stock control, 
purchasing and transport. Because this central department was In 
urgent need of a more modern and sophisticated set of procedures this 
had a 'knock on' effect to the whole business. 
There had been attempts to introduce some computer systems in the 
late 1970's but this had been done in a piecemeal fashion. This 
initial up-dating was very messy and was in fact based on a 
specification prepared in the mid 1960's. Essentially the old 
manual systems remained in place, but the clerks were assisted by 
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some limited computerised systems. Many of these used an outdated 
punch card system, the clerks had no screens (VDU's) and the work was 
slow and error-prone. There were many different types of computer 
hardware, software and languages. Because of this, the computers 
were not compatible with each other and the systems could not 
interact. 
David Jackson, the new Managing Director, arrived in 1981. 
Since the computer is so obviously central in the operation of the 
mail order industry it was immediately clear to him that something 
had to be done. The decision to go ahead and upgrade the computer 
systems was therefore made as soon as he took over. In essence, 
the decision was unapposed. Firstly, because most of the old Great 
Northern personnel (directors and computing staff who might have been 
unhappy about such a radical change) were replaced by Jackson's 
people, who included three new directors in the computing area. 
Secondly, it was realised by the staff that the company was in a 
serious position and that desperate remedies were necessary. The 
Board merely ratified the decision after discussions and agreement 
had already taken place. No committees were set up, no reports 
compiled, the new management had no time to waste on such things, and 
anyway, their minds were made up. 
Jackson had already installed a new computer system at his 
previous company, and although he decided not to use the same type, 
he and his colleagues had relevant experience and knew what had to be 
done. Implementation of the decision to computerise Great 
Northern's systems proceeded at a furious pace. The company had two 
computing departments; the Planning and Quality (P & Q) department, 
which was concerned with the maintenance of existing systems, and the 
System and Programming department, which designed new ones. The P 
&Q department was dispensed with by the new management and staff 
here were made redundant. While 20 members of the remaining staff 
(all from the System and Programming department) kept the old systems 
running, 25 others were re-trained by the new personnel and then 
re-wrote the new routines for Great Northern. Even though the 
company benefited from the fact that a similar project had been 
accomplished at Jackson's previous organization, it was not just a 
simple matter of copying all their systems. Great Northern was a 
smaller company with different strengths and weaknesses and the 
programmes had to be tailored accordingly. 
At first the staff were overwhelmed by the enormity of the task 
but gradually morale built up. They had to learn a new, higher 
level language (a form of Cobalt) and then write their up-dated and 
redesigned programmes in it. Then, they had to get used to using 
screens rather than a punch card system. In addition, they had to 
re-think their whole way of working and this was perhaps the most 
difficult aspect. Previously, the company had kept copious 
documentation on each programme and adhered closely to National 
Computing Centre standards which detailed how each system should be 
developed, designed and implemented. All this had to go by the 
board. These methods were detailed but very time-consuming and now 
they did not have enough time to follow such laborious procedures - 
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they had a deadline to meet. 
The new management took over in January 1981, February to April 
was spent in staff training and the first part of the system - the 
order-processing system - 'went live' in July. The mail order 
catalogue changed completely every six months, so if they had missed 
this deadline they would have had to wait another six months. By 
working evenings and weekends without stopping they achieved their 
targets. Management worked alongside employees, around the clock, 
in order to make sure their goal was reached. It was a frenetic, 
difficult and daunting task - but one that was ultimately a success. 
One thing that made life a little difficult was the fact that 
because Great Northern were in financial difficulties they were not 
in a position to borrow money from the bank in order to pay for the 
new equipment. Instead they had to lease it from the computer 
company - and could never afford quite enough computer capacity. 
This meant that they had to be careful when writing programmes that 
these did not take up too much space on the computer. Although, in 
the event, this did not seriously impede implementation it was a 
factor which they had to take into account. The decision 
represented a massive Investment in the company, the central 
computers cost E12m and in addition they purchased 2,000 computer 
terminals. However, they achieved their targets - with fewer people 
and on time. 
S& D-CHEMICALS 
S&D Chemicals, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a large, 
multinational company which is based abroad. It has two operating 
divisions based In the UK - one manufactures and distributes dyes and 
chemicals and is based in the north of England, the other Is involved 
In the pharmaceuticals industry (mainly distribution rather than 
manufacture) and is based in London. A third division looks after 
the finance and administrative systems for the other two and is also 
based on the same site in the north. The turnover of the UK based 
divisions is in the region of E140m and the company employs 800 
people. The main company was formed at the beginning of the 1900's 
and the first overseas operation was established In 1911, In England. 
This research was carried out in the Dyes & Chemicals division 
which manufactures dyestuffs, pigments and additives for the textile, 
leather and paper industries, amongst others. This division is 
twice the size of the Pharmaceuticals section and employs 400 people. 
The organizational structure is a little different to most UK 
companies, in that each division has a Divisional Manager who are all 
equal in status. They sit on an Executive Committee and rotate the 
chairmanship. In many ways they are directors but are not called 
such. The Divisional Manager of Dyes and Chemicals maintains the UK 
based divisions have a fair amount of autonomy in their day to day 
operations but are obviously constrained in some areas by being owned 
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by another company, although this company operates from another part 
of the world. 
Two implementations were studied, one concerning alterations to 
the transport and distribution network, the second in connection with 
the installation of a new computer system. 
The new transport and distribution system 
This decision had its beginnings in 1985 with the intention of 
focussing on a small aspect of the company's distribution network, 
but gradually evolved to form quite a major decision which completely 
reorganized (and partially dissolved) the company's own transport 
department. 
It began with a move to centralise the company's warehousing 
activities. Although the main warehouse was at the Divisional Head 
office in the north, there were also other satellite warehouses and 
associated sales offices spread throughout the country. These were 
served for the most part by the company's own delivery vehicles which 
distributed chemicals and dyes manufactured at Head Office to these 
stockholding branches. Warehouses at Manchester, London and 
Gloucester had been closed previously, which left those at Leicester 
and Glasgow still in operation. 
The Divisional Manager formed a Project Team comprising the 
Logistics Manager, and the Transport and Warehouse Managers. Their 
brief was to have a look at the Leicester operation with a view to 
possibly re-locating this at the Divisional Head Office site. The 
Divisional Manager now maintains this was a "psychological exercise" 
geared to gaining acceptance of a scheme which he already knew to be 
viable. If this is Indeed so, then it worked well. 
When the Project Team began their investigation it was soon 
obvious that if Leicester were incorporated into the Head Office 
warehousing system, this would only leave the Glasgow branch as an 
independent operation. They therefore decided to have a look at 
Glasgow too. After further thought it became clear that what was 
really required was an investigation of the company's complete 
distribution system. They anticipated that their customers would 
soon be demanding a 'next day delivery' service which at present the 
company could not provide. So the decision was made to centralise 
the entire distribution operation and reduce their own transport 
fleet by using external carriers. 
S& D's transport fleet was reduced from 10 commercial vehicles 
and drivers (plus one spare vehicle kept in case of breakdown) to 6 
vehicles and drivers. One company of national carriers was selected 
to take over the smaller consignments (up to 15,000 kilos) and 
deliver on a next day basis. A second company was chosen to deliver 
the heavier consignments over 15,000 kilos which were to be delivered 
in 48 hours. Finally, a third company was chosen to deliver to 
Scotland. 
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The selection of the external carriers took longer than expected 
as the Project team took time to sort out their exact requirements. 
Even though they were familiar with running their own transport 
system, by their own admission they were rather naive in their 
negotiations with the carriers. The carriers often managed to 
out-manoeuvre members of the Project team and secured favourable 
contracts by doing so. In addition, S&D were hampered by not 
having detailed information about their own customer requirements. 
However, the new system was completed by Easter 1987 and did show 
savings. It allowed the company to reduce stockholding from 
approximately k9m to about E7,500,000. Customers received a much 
quicker service and S&D could rid itself of the expense of 
maintaining a complex distribution service and fleet of vehicles. 
But there were some problems with carriers and some contracts were 
not renewed after the first year. Moving part of their operation 
outside of the organizational boundary also meant that S&D were not 
always able to maintain such strict control over the quality of the 
service being offered. 
S& D's own drivers were not particularly happy with the new 
situation. Rumours in the company had been rife and the drivers were 
in a state of anxiety, expecting the worse but being told that 
nothing was happening. In the end one took voluntary redundancy (but 
immediately obtained a job with one of the national carriers), one 
stayed with the transport fleet carrying out short runs rather than 
any long distance driving, and two moved into the warehouse. 
Although this decision did not affect a great number of people the 
atmosphere among the drivers was rather bitter at not having been 
involved in discussions or decision-making. 
Installation of a new-computer system 
In the words of the Divisional Manager, the installation of a 
mainframe computer system over a period of 5-6 years was a 
"horrible experience", although he was out of the country for much of 
this time! 
Things had begun to be put in motion about 7 years previously, in 
1981. At this time S&D had manual procedures in operation for 
their various stock control, order processing and manufacturing 
systems, together with some limited use of computerised cards. The 
Logistics Manager and his Deputy (in charge of stock control) began 
to look at other companies in the same industry who were operating 
much faster and more sophisticated on-line computerised systems. 
The Logistics Manager presented the case for such a system to senior 
management at S&D who agreed that such progress was necessary. A 
presentation was made to the Executive Committee and was accepted. 
This gave formal approval to go ahead and S&D began to 
Investigate different computer systems. The first step was to set 
up a Project Team consisting of the Logistics Manager (who headed the 
team), his Deputy and the Data Processing Manager. The Idea was 
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that the project should be driven by those who were involved in the 
day to day operation of the Division. After the first 3 months the 
team produced a skeleton system on paper which was agreed In 
principle by management. Then, because the system would interlink 
with many departments such as ordering, pricing, transport, stock, 
marketing, and so on, the Project Team asked each department to 
consider what they might want from such a system. 
At this stage the choice about which computer company would be 
used had not been made. S&D had been using ICL computers but they 
also began to talk to IBM, Texas Instruments and Hewlett Packard. 
Because S&D were a little later in adopting new technology than 
other companies in the same field they were able to travel (at home 
and abroad) to see what similar organizations had done. Competitors 
seemed remarkably willing to be of service in this way. 
Gradually they began to develop their own system, staying with 
ICL and developing their software In-house. Then things began to go 
wrong. The Data Processing Manager maintained that everything could 
be done on the existing computer and associated hardware. The 
Logistics Manager had reservations but no real technical knowledge. 
The scheme was budgeted to cost in the region of E30,000, the final 
bill was E100,000 and yet when the time came to test the systems it 
was an absolute disaster. The programmes malfunctioned, nothing 
worked as It ought, response time was unacceptably slow and neither 
ICL nor the Data Processing Manager seemed to have the necessary 
expertise to put things right. 
The Data Processing Manager was close to retiring and obviously 
had not kept up to date with what was, admittedly, a very fast-moving 
technology. So, in 1982 a new, younger man came in to sort things 
out. He had previously belonged to a Management Consultancy company 
which specialised In computing and so he provided some much needed 
expertise. The old Manager was retained until he actually retired 
which meant a rather awkward 18 months for both, but nevertheless, 
the new man was allowed the necessary freedom to sort things out. 
It was soon realised that S&D was trying to develop a very 
complex and inappropriate set of systems on out-of-date equipment 
which lacked the necessary power. 
In 1983 they changed from ICL to IBM computers. Fortunately, S 
& D's parent company now used IBM too, which made the changeover 
acceptable. There was now pressure on the new man to get things 
moving. The Divisional Manager of the Dyes & Chemicals Divisions 
was urging action and a deadline of May 1985 was given. But now the 
company had a more able computer department (now renamed Information 
Services) the software could be compiled internally, and this helped 
to save both time and money. 
With a lot of hard work from everyone in the Information Services 
section they made this deadline, although this implementation 
obviously took much longer than was originally envisaged back in the 
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early 1980's. It is not entirely finished even now, as there are 
aspects of the company's operation which are still being worked upon. 
WHARF-CHEMICALS 
Wharf Holdings, of which Wharf Chemicals is a part, has a trading 
tradition which stretches back nearly 350 years. Beginning its 
activities by London's docks it was involved in food and produce 
importation and storage. In the 1960's when London ceased to be a 
port the company started to acquire other businesses. It is now a 
rapidly expanding private company which employs about 4500 people and 
has an annual turnover of over E500m (1988 Company Accounts). 
The company is divided into six divisions and its activities are 
diverse, ranging from insurance broking and tanker shipping to 
chemical distribution and farming. These different businesses are 
loosely collected into three core activities - Personnel Recruitment, 
Commercial Services and Distribution. Wharf Chemicals (although a 
manufacturer as well as a distributor of chemicals) is located within 
the Distribution section of the company. 
Wharf Holdings has therefore grown rapidly by acquiring other 
companies, often in a seemingly hasty and uncoordinated way. The 
chemical side of the business is no exception to this and one of the 
decisions Investigated in this research is the formation of Wharf 
Chemicals itself, which came about as a result of combining a number 
of these acquired companies, all of which were in the chemicals 
industry. 
The other case described here is linked to this. It concerns 
the merger of two of the divisions In Wharf Chemicals. It makes 
sense to deal with these cases in chronological order, firstly 
detailing the formation of the company and then describing how it was 
subsequently reorganized. 
The formation of Wharf Chemicals 
In the 1980's Wharf Holdings owned four separate companies each 
of which was involved in the chemical industry. In March 1983 they 
made another acquisition, buying Laytons Chemical Company which 
manufactured sulphuric acid among other products. The sales of this 
company were as big as the rest of Wharf Holdings put together and 
they were four times bigger in term of profit. 
What transpired after Wharf acquired Laytons began to seem very 
much like a reverse takeover. The divisional Director of Wharf 
responsible for the division in which Laytons operated left the 
company, and the Managing Director of Laytons, Dennis MarkIngton, 
took his place. The old Laytons' management was very much stronger 
and more aggressive than the Wharf management and gradually many of 
them replaced Wharf people in senior jobs with the parent company. 
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Wharf then bought another chemical firm, Marshalls, a large 
production facility in Cheshire, from B. P. So by 1st May 1984, 
Wharf Holdings had increased its size 8-fold during the previous 14 
months. 
Even after acquisition, these chemical companies had still 
operated largely autonomously. Markington and one of his senior 
managers decided that the time had come to combine them into one 
company - to give the chemical business a corporate identity and a 
more powerful image in the market place. 
Markington easily persuaded the Board at Wharf Holdings that this 
was sound action. Explaining this to the M. D. s of each separate 
company was less easy. Naturally, they did not welcome the idea, 
since it meant they would lose the title of Managing Director and the 
status of being the head of their own company. Although they had 
been taken over, each company had been allowed to keep their old name 
and ways of working. In future companies would have to learn to 
work together as a more cohesive entity, and in recognition of this 
Managing Directors would become General Managers. 
In practice, the decision was communicated fi rmly and swifly. 
The erstwhile M. D. 's found they had very little say in the matter. 
They were not involved in decision-making and since their companies 
were owned by Wharf they had no power to alter the chosen course of 
action. 
On 1st July 1984 all these separate businesses with a separate 
legal identity were transformed into one company - Wharf Chemicals. 
This now had 3 divisions, one of which incorporated the old Laytons 
company and was called Laytons division, another which was largely 
the Cheshire-based company of Marshalls and so became Marshalls 
division, and a third which comprised all the rest of the depots 
which were involved with merchanting (rather than manufacturing) 
chemical products. This last division became known as the Packaged 
Products division. The turnover of the new company in 198T-8 was 
approximately E109m, of which E51m was in the manufacturing side, the 
rest in the distribution activities. 
Combining the companies in name was of course the easy part of 
the decision. Full implementation required a more cohesive and 
integrated company as well. This was harder to achieve. Because 
of the pace of acquisition it was very difficult to integrate all 
these disparate companies. Although they were In the same industry 
there were enormous differences in what each company did and the way 
It operated. Also, there were the very real problems caused by 
geographical separation. Hence, what tended to happen was that 
managers were put In charge of a number of diverse operations (often 
at different sites) and more or less left to get on with it. 
Additionally, because of the speed of events at Wharf, 
centralised machinery for coordination was not yet in place. Few 
administrative systems existed which were genuinely 
'organization-wide'. Most parts of the company worked in their own 
- 289 - 
way, each dealing individually with recruitment and manpower 
planning, budgeting, sales, pricing and so on. The different depots 
and sites were given financial targets to meet and as long as these 
were achieved, managers were largely left alone, untroubled by 
central bureaucracy. This meant that depot managers were very 
often over-stretched, having to cope with setting up administrative 
routines and standardising working practices with little help from 
the centre - and all the while having to make a profit. Staff 
morale was often very low - employees were not happy at being taken 
over and many left, which led to manpower shortages. 
Some attempts were gradually made to introduce some harmonisation 
in administrative and operational practices. To aid integration 
Wharf eventually instituted company colours (to be used on overalls, 
transport, stationery etc. ) and a logo to develop a corporate image, 
but such things take time. Meanwhile new acquisitions were still 
being made. In 1987 the company bought DCD Ltd. which made Wharf 
Chemicals the leading distributer in the UK. From being half the 
size of the leading competitor in their industry, by 1988 Wharf 
Chemicals had outgrown them in terms of UK turnover. 
Over the years many people have left the company. Those who did 
not like the way Wharf managed its business soon fell by the wayside, 
similarly, those who could not stand the furious pace. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, it is the ex-Laytons staff who are very much 
in the driving seat in most aspects of the organization. For them, 
the whole experience has been an exciting opportunity. But the job 
of achieving an integrated, cohesive company is still incomplete, and 
many people have been most unhappy at the way implementation has been 
carried out. 
Merger of Laytons and-Marshalls-divisions 
The amalgamation of these two divisions came about as a result of 
a strategic planning exercise undertaken in 1985 by the parent 
company - Wharf Holdings - which looked at all the company's areas of 
business. 
When the consultants began an in-depth analysis of Wharf 
Chemicals they looked at the Laytons division and then the Marshalls 
division and pronounced them to be logically one business, not two. 
In reality, the products they manufactured were complementary, both 
were concerned with basic bulk inorganic chemicals. Laytons made 
sulphuric acid, hydrochloric acid, and liquid sulphurtrioxide; 
Marshalls made caustic soda, hydrochloric acid and chlorine. They 
both were manufacturing businesses, selling to the same markets. 
At the time Marshalls was against such a merger, Laytons was for 
the proposal, but nevertheless, a decision was taken by the Wharf 
Holdings main Board to merge them into a new Bulk Products 
division. One of the powerful voices on the Board belonged to the 
ex-Managing Director of Laytons Chemicals, and in fact when the 
merger took place Laytons management again secured all the top 
positions in the new division. The chief executive of Laytons 
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division became the head of the newly merged division, so he doubled 
his area of responsibility. 
It is interesting to note that when Wharf Chemicals had bought 
Marshalls, back in 1984, an agreement was made to keep the existing 
management structure in place for two years. Wharf kept to this 
arrangement, but in 1986 when the two years were up the General 
Manager retired and the divisions were then amalgamated. 
So, like the original formation of the company in 1984, the main 
Job of implementation was one of integrating the two divisions, 
standardising working practices, paperwork and administrative 
routines. Each site still maintained its own manufacturing 
operation but it was hoped that eventually it would be possible to 
standardise procedures to such an extent that personnel could be 
freely transferred between the sites. A new Operations Director was 
brought in from outside the company to look after the day-to-day 
operations at the two sites and oversee the practical aspects of the 
merger. 
There were some significant problems to be sorted out. The major 
difficulty was that Marshalls had different working systems and 
standards from Laytons. Marshalls was run in a very structured way, 
with rather Inflexible rules and regulations and many layers of 
management. Many of the managers had been with the company for a 
very long time, in some cases over 25 years, and this made them wary 
of change. It was heavily bureaucratised, not particularly 
concerned about expanding its share of the market, but had extremely 
thorough procedures for maintenance and safety. 
Laytons, on the other hand, was much more customer-conscious. It 
was run along more flexible lines and was known in the industry for 
being dynamic and thrusting. However, Its record on safety was 
poor. The plant had produced several embarrassing and potentially 
dangerous emissions which had caught public attention and had given 
Laytons an unenviable reputation both inside and outside the 
industry. 
So the merger required the harmonisation of two, almost totally 
opposite, cultures and working practices. This was not an easy 
task. Partly because attitudes on both sites were entrenched, 
fearful of change and fairly hostile to the idea, and partly because 
the management of culture is a shadowy, poorly understood skill. 
In addition, there was the more practical problem of having too 
many administrative departments. Since there was now only one 
business entity, several business activities were now duplicated. 
The manufacturing operations could remain separate, but the new 
division now had two sales offices, two accounting facilities and two 
distribution functions. 
At first, the only area to be combined was the commercial side 
which dealt with sales and marketing. The Commercial Manager at 
Marshalls left immediately because of this. Naturally, the 
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Commercial Manager of Laytons was then offered the position and 
became Commercial Manager of the new division. 
The other activities were largely left alone to operate as before 
for the first 3 years. The fact that each site operated in its own 
way and had different wage structures and working conditions made 
amalgamation awkward. These factors also made it impossible to 
transfer staff from site to site if the need arose, and this clearly 
was desirable on occasions. The decision to merge was therefore 
only partially implemented in 1986, and things were to take longer 
than some expected. 
The Operations Director began by reorganizing the staff at the 
Marshalls site, rationalising pay and improving working conditions. 
Some of the more inflexible working practices were changed and a 
number of new, go-ahead managers were brought into the management 
team. He then introduced Marshalls' good safety and maintenance 
procedures onto the Laytons' site. In addition, operatives on both 
sites were dressed in the distinctive Wharf Chemicals' overalls, and 
the company colours and logo began to appear on delivery vehicles and 
on office paperwork. The aim was provide more of a corporate image 
which would override the separatism of each site. 
In terms of resources the fact that Wharf Chemicals was still 
making a healthy profit throughout this change helped, but Laytons 
site often complained of manpower shortages. The new administrative 
procedures which it had been obliged to implement took up much more 
time than before and staff here felt they needed extra help. 
Something which helped matters, in a rather unlikely way, was 
another toxic emission from the Laytons site. This made the 
Introduction of Marshalls' good working practices much more urgent, 
and acceptable to Laytons' workforce. Furthermore, the decision of 
Wharf Chemicals to adopt certain British Standards across all its 
manufacturing sites aided the standardisation and upgrading of 
production and safety measures. 
The merger of the two divisions was finally completed in the 
summer of 1989 when the other administrative areas, Distribution, 
Accounting and Computer Operations, were all moved to the Marshalls 
site. This was the last step of the merger and was much helped by 
the groundwork already prepared by the Operations Director. 
So, more than 3 years after the decision to merge, Marshalls and 
Laytons operate as one Division. This may have taken longer than 
Wharf's senior managers expected, although it can be argued that they 
never fully realised the scale of the job in hand. To these Head 
office decision-makers, a healthy balance sheet was to be the mark of 
success. They were not particularly aware of, or interested in, the 






some ways the decision is not fully implemented even 
may be a while before the old suspicions completely 
Some of the old 'us' and them' attitudes still prevail, 
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but perhaps this is unsurprising. Ingrained antagonisms and 
hostilities are hard to eradicate, especially when employees have 
been subjected to almost continual change over a period of time. 
The harmonisation of cultural differences still presents one of the 
most taxing challenges to managers. 
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APPENDIX C COMPLETE LIST OF INFORMANTS AND DATES OF MEETINGS 
(Note: - d- decision-maker; i- implementor; e- implementee) 
VALE UNIVERSITY 
Heating/energy manapement decision 
Date Informant Status 
25.09.87 Vice-Chancellor d 
03.05.88 Maintenance Manager i/e 
24.05.88 Boilerman i/e 
24.05.88 Consultant Engineer d/i 
13.06.88 Assistant Bursar d 
13.06.88 Economics Lecturer i 
03.08.88 Chairman of Energy d/i 
Conservation Working Party 
01.11.88 Bursar d 
16.11.88 2nd interview Vice-Chancellor d 
30.11.88 2nd interview Maintenance Manager i/e 
Building of university and campus 
Date Informant Status 
25.08.87 Vice-Chancellor i/e 
13.10.87 Bursar d/i/e 
19.10.87 Registrar (retired) d/i 
11.11.87 2nd interview Registrar d/i 
07.01.88 First Vice-Chancellor (retired) d/i 
29.01.88 Architect (London) d/i 
18.02.88 Professor of Politics (A) Ve 
18.02.88 Professor of Social Policy i/e 
and Social Work 
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Date Informant Status 
24.02.88 Professor of Architecture i/e 
08.04.88 Professor of Politics (B) i/e 
15.04.88 Professor of Economics i/e 
(Edinburgh) 
14.04.88 Two ex-students at Vale i/e 
during the first years 
11.07.88 ex-student now Registrar i/e 
at IXI University 
19.07.88 Deputy Chairman, 'Z' Construction d/i 
Company (built Vale) 
19.07.88 Current Student Union i/e 
President at Vale 
01.08.88 Chief Quantity Surveyor, UGC d 
01.11.88 2nd interview Bursar d/i/e 
16.11.88 2nd interview Vice-Chancellor i/e 
CENTRAL WATER AUTHORITY 
Building of Langden Water-Treatment-Works 
Date Informant Status 
30.11.87 Corporate Planning Manager d 
21.01.88 Chief Technical Manager d/i 
12.05.88 Project Manager d/i 
27.06.88 Area Manager, Southern Division Ve 
(previously Project Manager, Langden) 
14.07.88 Principal Engineer, Southern Division i 
20.07.88 Development Manager, Southern Division i 
26.07.88 Divisional Scientific Officer d/i 
26.07.88 Senior Engineer i 
01.08.88 Water Treatment Process Contractor d/i 
(external), London 
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Date Informant Status 
05.08.88 Building Contractor (external) d/i 
25.10.88 Engineering Development Manager i 
02.11.88 Valley Supervisor, Langden i/e 
02.11.88 Operative, Langden e 
17.11.88 Chairman d 
21.11.88 2nd interview Chief Technical Manager d/i 
30.11.88 Development Manager, N&E Division e 
01.12.88 2nd interview Coporate Planning Manager d 
Installation of Computer Aided Drauqhting sy stem (CAD) 
Date Informant Status 
23.10.87 Chairman d 
30.11.87 Corporate Planning Manager d 
19.01.88 Development Manager, N&E Division i/e 
12.02.88 CAD Adminstrator, N&E Division i/e 
15.02.88 Assistant Development Manager, i/e 
Central Division 
23.02.88 Technician, Central Division i/e 
23.02.88 Project Manager, Central Division i/e 
25.02.88 Senior Analyst, Computer Technology i/e 
Department 
07.03.88 Regional Mechanical & Engineering 
Manager 
11.03.88 Assistant Development Manager, I/e 
N&E Division 
21.03.88 Project Manager, Central Division i/e 
08.04.88 Resources and Treatment Officer i 
27.04.88 Computer Technology Manager d/i 
18.05.88 Tracer, Central Division e 
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Date Informant Status 
13.06.88 ex-Operational Computer Technology 
Manager 
17.06.88 Assistant Maintenance Manager, Hull i/e 
20.06.88 Principal Engineer, Rivers Division i/e 
23.06.88 Principal Engineer, Western Division Ve 
11.07.88 Project Manager, Southern Division Ve 
11.07.88 Draughtsman, Southern Division Ve 
17.11.88 2nd interview Chairman d 
30.11.88 2nd interview Development Manager, i/e 
N&E Division 
01.12.88 2nd Interview Corporate Planning Manager d 
EASYSHOP MAIL ORDER COMPANY 
Installation of new computer system 
Date Informant Status 
18.06.87 Managing Director (retired) d 
25.06.87 2nd Interview Managing Director d 
(retired) 
10.08.87 Sales Administration Director (retired) d/i/e 
16.10.87 Personnel Director d/i 
19.11.87 Sales Systems Manager i/e 
22.01.88 Computing Services Director d 
02.03.88 Finance and Customer Administration d 
Director 
03.11.88 Company Secretary d 
11.11.88 Head of Computing i 
18.01.89 3rd interview Managing Director d 
(retired) 
- 297 - 
GREAT NORTHERN MAIL ORDER COMPANY 
Building of new warehouse 
Date Informant Status 
10.11.87 Managing Director d 
24.11.87 Personnel Director d 
24.11.87 Warehouse Director d/i 
08.12.87 Computer & Distribution Director d 
09.12.87 Project Manager, Returns Section i/e 
22.02.88 Computer Planning Director i 
01.03.88 Director (Catalogue) d 
01.03.88 Project Manager, High Bay Section i/e 
09.03.88 Systems Manager i 
09.03.88 Project Engineer i 
15.03.88 Finance Director d 
17.03.88 Manager, Planning Dept., d 
1XI Metropolitan District Council 
24.03.88 Project Manager, Computer Department i 
28.04.88 Personnel Services Manager 1 
16.05.88 Project Manager, Project Management i 
Consultants (external consultants) 
20.05.88 Project Manager, 'Z' Construction i 
Company Management 
20.05.88 Personnel Manager, Industrial Relations 1 
31.10.88 Distribution General Manager i 
31.10.88 Warehouseman e 
24.11.88 2nd interview Computer & Distribution d 
Director 
14.03.89 2nd interview Managing Director d 
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Installation of new computer system 
Date Informant Status 
10.11.87 Managing Director d/i 
24.11.87 Personnel Director d 
24.11.87 Warehouse Director d/i 
08.12.87 Computer & Distribution Director d/i 
08.02.88 Group Marketing Director 8 
22.02.88 Computer Planning Director i 
01.03.88 Director (Catalogue) e 
01.03.88 Data Base Marketing Director d/i 
09.03.88 Systems Manager Ve 
15.03.88 Finance Director e 
24.03.88 Project Manager, Computer Department Ve 
28.04.88 Personnel Services Manager e 
20.05.88 Personnel Manager, Industrial Relations e 
24.05.88 Supervisor, Telephone Orders department e 
24.11.88 2nd interview Computer & Distribution d/i 
Director 
14.03.89 2nd interview Managing Director d/i 
S&D CHEMICALS 
New transport and distribution syste 
Date Informant Status 
01.12.87 Divisional Manager d 
13.01.88 Head of Logistics d/i 
16.03.88 Warehouse Manager d/i/e 
28.04.88 2nd interview Warehouse Manager d/i/e 
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Date Informant Status 
10.05.88 Transport Manager Ve 
10.05.88 Officer Supervisor Ve 
01.06.88 Warehouse Supervisor e 
22.06.88 Manager, Finance & Accounting Division d 
11.11.88 2nd interview Head of Logistics d/i 
06.12.88 2nd interview Divisional Manager d 
Installation of new computer system 
Date Informant Status 
01.12.8T Divisional Manager d 
13.01.88 Head of Logistics d/i/e 
03.03.88 Manager, Information Services Department i/e 
16.03.88 Warehouse Manager Ve 
IT. 03.88 Programmer, Computer Department I/e 
28.04.88 2nd interview Warehouse Manager Ve 
10.05.88 officer Supervisor a 
01.06.88 Warehouse Supervisor e 
08.06.88 Manager, Marketing Department Ve 
22.06.88 Manager, Planning & Controlling d/i 
Department 
22.06.88 Manager, Finance & Accounting Division d 
13.07.88 Manager, Production Planning Department Ve 
22.07.88 Plant Operations Manager Ve 
11.11.88 2nd interview Head of Logistics d/i/e 
06.12.88 2nd interview Divisional Manager d 
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WHARF CHEMICALS 
Merner of Laytons and Marshalls divisions 
Date Informant Status 
25.06.88 Chief Executive, Bulk Products Division d 
13.12.88 Commercial Manager Ve 
13.12.88 Product Manager e 
01.02.89 Operations Director, Marshalls Division Ve 
01.02.89 Production Manager, Laytons Division Ve 
01.02.89 Sales Office Manager Ve 
01.02.89 Assistant Sales Office Manager Ve 
01.02.89 Engineering Manager Ve 
01.02.89 Assistant Operations Manager Ve 
13.03.89 2nd interview Chief Executive, d 
Bulk Products Division 
Formation of Wharf Chemicals 
Date Informant Status 
25.06.88 Chief Executive, Bulk Products Division d/i 
05.08.88 Regional Director, Packaged Products Ve 
Division 
05.09.88 General Mgr, Gomersal I/e 
20.10.88 General Manager, Manchester region Ve 
23.11.88 Regional Director, Belfast I/e 
01.12.88 Chief Executive, Packaged Products e 
Division 
09.12.88 Company Accountant e 
16.12.88 Business Development Manager Ve 
13.03.89 2nd interview Chief Executive, d/i 
Bulk Products Division 
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APPENDIX D 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Makin-q the decision 
How and when did the matter first arise? Which departments or 
individuals first put forward the decision? 
2) Why was a decision thought to be necessary? 
3) Please give details of how decision was reached. Sequence of 
events, main dates. 
4) Please list all the Interests who were involved in making the 
decision. Who authorised the decision? 
5) Rate the influence of each of these interests as follows: - 
A very great deal 5 
A great deal 4 
Quite a lot 3 
Some 2 
Little 1 
How did each exert influence? 
7) How favourable did each interest seem towards the decision? 




Very unfavourable 1 
8) What amount of influence would you have liked your interest 
group to have had in decision-making? 
Much more 5 
A lot more 4 
A little more 3 
As it was 2 
Less 1 
9) How important was this decision for your interest group? 
Extremely important 5 
Very important 4 
Rather important 3 
Quite important 2 
Not very important 1 
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10) What degree of consensus was there within your interest group 
about the decision choice which was made? 
Complete consensus 5 
More consensus than disagreement 4 
Balanced views 3 
More disagreement than consensus 2 
Substantial disagreement 1 
11) What degree of consensus was there between all the interest 
groups about the decision choice which was made? 
Complete consensus 5 
More consensus than disagreement 4 
Balanced views 3 
More disagreement than consensus 2 
Substantial disagreement 1 
12) Were any alternatives put forward to the decision which was 
eventually made? Who supported them? Why were they not 
adopted? 
13) Do you think the decision taken was the right one, or not? 
Why? 
14) What was the decision supposed to achieve? 
15) What did you and your colleagues in your interest group believe 
would be the consequences of the decision? 
16) How was the success of the decision to be judged? Were there 
any specific targets to be met? 
Implementinq the decision 
Please list all the interests who were involved in implementing 
the decision. 
Rate the influence of each of these interests as follows: - 
A very great deal 5 
A great deal 4 
Quite a lot 3 
Some 2 
Little 1 
How did each exert influence? 
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4) How favourable did each interest seem towards the way in which 
the decision was implemented? 




Very unfavourable I 
5) What amount of influence would you have liked your Interest 
group to have had at the implementation stage? 
Much more 5 
A lot more 4 
A little more 3 
As it was 2 
Less I 
6) What degree of consensus was there within your interest group 
about the way the decision was implemented? 
Complete consensus 5 
More consensus than disagreement 4 
Balanced views 3 
More disagreement than consensus 2 
Substantial disagreement 1 
7) What degree of consensus was there between all the interest 
groups about the way the decision was implemented? 
Complete consensus 5 
More consensus than disagreement 4 
Balanced views 3 
More disagreement than consensus 2 
Substantial disagreement 1 
8) What were the implementors required to do? (Is this different 
from what they did? ) 
9) What changes, if any, would your interest group have wanted in 
the way the decision was implemented? Please sum up your view 





Not at all 1 
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10) From your interest group's point of view, how easy was the 
decision to implement? 
Extremely easy 5 
Very easy 4 
Quite easy 3 
Quite difficult 2 
Very difficult 1 
11) How long did people think the decision would take to 
implement? How long did it actually take? Was there a 
deadline? 
12) How did the pace of implementation seem compared with other 
decisions of a similar nature? 
13) How precisely was it laid down how the decision was to be put 
into effect? 
Very clearly specified 5 
Fairly clearly specified 4 
Specfied only in part 3 
Vaguely specified 2 
Completely specified 1 
14) How far was the decision implemented? 
Completely implemented 5 
Mostly implemented 4 
Partially implemented 3 
Very little Implemented 2 
Not Implemented 1 
15) What aspects were not Implemented, and why? 
16) Rate how seriously any impediments impeded the process? 
Extremely seriously 5 
Very seriously 4 
Rather seriously 3 
Quite seriously 2 
Not very seriously 1 
17) Did anything help implementation in any way? Please rate as 
follows: - 
Extremely favourable 5 
Very favourable 4 
Rather favourable 3 
Quite favourable 2 
Moderately favourable I 
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What kind of resources were needed to implement the decision, 
for example financial, administrative, staffing, temporal. 
Please list these in order of importance and rate the 
availability of each as follows: - 
Fully available 5 
Mostly available 4 
Available in part 3 
Mostly lacking 2 
Completely lacking I 






Not at all 1 
Please give reasons for your answers. 
20) How far did the implementation of the decision succeed in 
achieving what was intended? Please give reasons for your 
answers. 
Completely successful 5 
Mostly successful 4 
Largely successful 3 
Mostly unsuccessful 2 
Completely unsuccessful 1 
21) Have there been any unintended consequences of the decision? 
Please describe these and say why you think they have happened. 
22) How has the decision changed things in the organization? Has 
the balance of power been altered as a result? 
23) Was the decision-making process more Constricted, Sporadic or 
Fluid? 
24) Was the implementation process more Constricted, Sporadic or 
Fluid? 




A rather vast and sprawling campus - many blocks of buildings not 
clearly attached to one-another. It is spread out both physically 
and mentally. one gets the feeling of numerous Individual academics 
working separately and autonomously. It seems as though any central 
focus has to be manipulated anew each time it is required, for 
example, by the formation of committees and ad hoc groups - the 
Energy Conservation Working Party being one example. This might 
mean that unless any decision and implementation affects people 
directly they are not aware of it, or are not interested. 
Management style is fairly relaxed; people are very approachable. 
The Maintenance department has a slightly different atmosphere, 
although Individuals are still very helpful. It is rather more 
integrated and seems more like a department in a commercial 
organization. 
Regarding the building of the university and campus, the 
development plan was written originally by a small group of 
academics. It could be argued that they had a rather narrow focus 
and set of experiences in some respects. It has obviously been hard 
for those coming after them to make radical changes to their plans, 
since the buildings and layout are already in existence. However, 
it is the actions and participation of all organizational members 
which make the university what it Is at present, so there is some 
room to manoeuvre. Having said this, the Students Union has been 
trying hard to get a union building of Its own for many years, and 
still has not succeeded. 
The Vice-Chancellor and Bursar have been most helpful and 
informative and I have complete access to anyone else I want to 
see. All staff, both academic and administrative have been happy to 
talk, and I have also met some students - past and present. There 
is plenty of documentation available and one ex-student, who was one 
of the first intake in the 1960's, has allowed me to borrow a boxful 
of his own memorabilia (newspaper cuttings of the opening of the 
university and various events, university newsletters, timetables, 
programmes of social clubs and so on). I do feel I have a good 
grasp of the thinking behind the development plan and early days of 
the university but the inevitable vagueness of these early 
aspirations and objectives make evaluation of success less easy. 
The heating case is certainly much more assessable. 
CENTRAL WATER AUTHORITY 
A large and geographically dispersed organization. Central 
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Water has five divisions: - N&E, Southern, Western, Central, and a 
Rivers division. Each division seems to have outlying regions 
attached to it as well, for example N&E has areas in Hull for which 
it is responsible. Central Water has undergone many reorganizations 
and structural changes over the years (in 1974 and the early 80's in 
particular) and, at the time of research was preparing for 
privatisation. 
Everyone at the Authority has been helpful and informative. The 
Chairman has been most interested in my research. He is a believer 
in management education and has been instrumental in ensuring that a 
large number of managers have attended training courses in recent 
years. 
The headquarters at W. R. House are in a high-rise office block. 
There is a female receptionist who also appears to act as the 
telephonist. You have to 'sign in'. The offices are fairly bright 
and well decorated. But the divisions are all different. N&E 
division is situated in an old and well-appointed building which is 
architecturally interesting. It seems clean, spacious and pleasant 
to work in. However, Southern division is in the centre of Ix' 
city and occupies a high-rise block. The offices here are rather 
dingy and scruffy. 
The managers at Central are all pleasant, amenable and 
forward-looking, but there Is none of the thrusting aggression 
displayed by some of those at Great Northern and Wharf. 
I have been given help and good access throughout. People are 
often pleased to talk and give information and I enjoy my meetings in 
this organization. I often deal with 'professional' people here - 
engineers and scientific officers, who are eager to talk about their 
part in implementation and the problems and challenges they faced. 
I feel I have a good grasp of the organization and the cases, but 
the implementations did seem rather complex initially, partly because 
there are always so many people involved. The CAD implementation 
particularly involved many people at different levels and in 
different capacities. 
EASYSHOP MAIL ORDER 
Easyshop is a rather old-fashioned, conservative company. The 
retired Managing Director was an accountant by profession and the 
company seems imbued with an 'accounting mentality' - careful in 
spending and instituting various cost-cutting exercises. Definitely 
not a dynamic entrepreneurial organization. Managed in a 
paternalistic, traditionalistic way, Easyshop plays the games by 
gentlemen's rules. Strategy is reactive - trying to catch up and 
adjust to new trends when they are eventually discovered, rather than 
initiating new directions. 
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In many ways the company is paying for being successful in the 
past and failing to change its winning formula to meet new 
challenges. At present Easyshop is struggling to manage bad debts, 
and many of the administrative systems are inadequate and out of 
date. 
Easyshop's offices are in the town centre, strung out along 'Z' 
Road. They are all scruffy and grubby and everywhere badly needs 
decorating and refurbishing. Warehousing and the transport depot 
are on the ground floor of one of the buildings, under the 
offices. Even the staff look rather worn out and poorly dressed. 
The secretaries/receptionists are not particularly smart or tidy. 
Reception covers a huge area with large semi-circular desks in the 
corner. Visitors have to sign a security book and wear a lapel 
badge; they sit on battered old chairs to wait to be seen. The 
staff have -a 
'staff entrance' which is equally unwelcoming. 
Nevertheless, the atmosphere inside the company Is fairly congenial 
and is unthreatening to the visitor. The overwhelming impression of 
the organization and its managers Is of a bumbling yet affectionate 
ancient relative. The new Managing Director might be a much-needed 
revitaliser - he certainly gave the computer decision a push to get 
it moving again. But he Is renowned for being reluctant to talk to 
anyone outside the company and will not accept invitations or 
visitors. A French mail order company recently bought 20% of the 
holding - maybe they will inject some pep and vitality. 
My access was obtained through a side door, via the retired 
M. D. Other informants have been helpful, friendly and quite open 
about the shortcomings of the company. Except for the Computer 
Director of course, whose own shortcomings were not mentioned by 
himself. 
GREAT NORTHERN MAIL ORDER 
This company now presents quite a contrast to Easyshop, although 
previously it was somewhat similar. Great Northern had been a very 
traditional, paternalistic kind of company with a similar history. 
It had been very successful in the 1960's and early 1970's - when the 
mail order business itself was thriving - but was unable to 
anticipate or adapt to change when the need arose. Again, there 
were problems with inefficient administrative routines and computer 
systems, bad debts and low staff morale. 
It is now under new management. David Jackson (who came from 
IYI Mail order company and brought about 20 other staff with him) is 
a more dynamic manager. He has updated the company's image and 
style; it is no longer called 'mail order' but 'home shopping'. 
Great Northern has now bought many other specialist mail order 
businesses, which are targeted at the more exclusive sectors of the 
market. It is now evident that the company has some kind of 
corporate and marketing strategy and has more idea where it is going. 
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Jackson is pleasant and confident, if a little intimidating. He 
is young and gives the Impression of being firmly In control. Other 
senior managers are in the same mould. They dress smartly in good, 
well cut suits. They are fairly open and helpful but somehow give 
the impression of not suffering fools gladly. 
The general management style is both directive, yet informal, and 
power is both centralised yet de-centralised. The locus of power is 
unequivocally at the centre, but middle management are given a 
substantial degree of autonomy In decision-making. This is 
exhilarating, but can be frightening for managers who have little 
experience of this. Interestingly, this is echoed by the 
contractors and project management company working on the new 
warehouse site, who would sometimes prefer more contact with Great 
Northern's management. 
It seems that if managers succeed there are good chances with the 
company, but if they fall they are more or less finished. Everyone 
does appear to work very hard, so the motivation is there, but 
perhaps it is partly due to fear! 
The offices are an interesting mixture of styles. The front 
entrance to the building is similar to Easyshop - somewhat 
old-fashioned and scruffy. Male, uniformed, security guards (rather 
than receptionists) take your name and details, and you complete a 
security slip and have to wear a lapel badge. 
The directors' offices have been re-furbished and are full of big 
glass windows (with curtains for seclusion if necessary), huge tables 
and desks. All are exactly the same. There is plush carpeting 
along this section and ornaments and pictures (which might well come 
from their own catalogues) decorate the corridors. Secretaries are 
well-spoken and smart. Glimpses of other areas of the building and 
offices show a contrast to this - especially the part around one of 
the warehouse areas. 
The merger with 'YY' company has had major implications for Great 
Northern. IYY's style is up-market and modern and this has been 
useful In helping Great Northern to target a different section of the 
mail order market. For its part, Great Northern has provided 
expertise in the form of administrative systems, personnel, 
warehousing and transport for 'YY's operation. This has been an 
exciting venture, but has put some pressure on resources. 
In some ways it can be said that David Jackson has done the easy 
bit - making radical changes to wrest a company from disaster - the 
hard part of keeping it running and on course may be yet to come. 
As far as my research is concerned, Jackson has been pleasant and 
helpful and I have been able to see many people throughout the 
company who have all been happy to provide Information. Great 
Northern seems to be particularly hospitable towards researchers; 
there are several others carrying out projects here. I feel 
confident that I have a clear and fairly complete understanding of 
- 310 - 
both cases in this organization. 
S&D CHEMICALS 
Rather a strange organization in some ways. The main 
headquarters of the company are abroad and even the British section 
has a slightly foreign feel to it. The departments and managers 
have rather strange titles (for example, the Logistics Manager). 
The offices are fairly plain, but reasonably well decorated and 
clean. Reception is a huge, airy, windowed room with receptionists 
and a telephonist. You sign in and wear a lapel badge. At the 
second entrance there are male, uniformed, security guards who also 
Issues passes of this kind. The whole plant is quite pleasant, open 
and with green fields around. Process industries being less 
labour-intensive, there is always the Impression of emptiness and 
space. S&D seems to keep its staff, many of them have been with 
the company for a long time. 
It seemed to take me longer to make sense of this company, 
perhaps because the organizational structure is confusing. I took a 
while to understand what each department did and the lines of 
authority. S&D were surprisingly reluctant to let me have any 
documentation on this - organizational charts and so on. They 
appeared not to have any at first, and then some were found, but I 
had to be given 'clearance' before I could receive them. This was 
all very strange, especially since they were so unexcitingl Another 
point is that no-one seems to know anyone else's title, they always 
have to ask someone else if I enquire. 
This was the only organization where I had to go through one 
manager to make appointments to see other personnel. There was no 
actual problem in getting access, only that I was not allowed to 
arrange this myself, as in all the other organizations. Once I got 
to meet staff, everyone was most helpful and willing to talk. 
Both the computer and transport/distribution cases are fairly 
clear, although since the organization has fewer personnel, it is not 
possible to see as many informants as in other organizations. 
WHARF CHEMICALS 
This company has a particularly aggressive style of management 
which seems to permeate the whole organization, although it clearly 
derives from the two senior executives. The Managing Director is 
notoriously impatient and quick-tempered. This image is reflected 
in the way that Wharf conducts its business, and it is known 
throughout the industry for being cut-throat and operating a 'hire 
and fire' staffing policy. It seems only interested in getting 
results, and is not too bothered about the way these are achieved. 
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Middle level managers have a great deal of autonomy in the way 
they manage their own areas. As long as they continue to meet their 
financial targets, they are generally left alone by head office. 
The reason for this is because, as yet, the centre does not have the 
necessary expertise, systems, or time to sort the rest out, so they 
are left to get on with things as best they can. 
Much of the organization is geographically dispersed and I have 
had to travel some distance to see various depot managers. All of 
them have been helpful and informative, and many seem only too happy 
to talk about the trials and problems they have to face. While many 
seem to enjoy the freedom they have and the opportunity to take 
responsibility, there is often a feeling of pressure and being 
over-stretched. Managers are often in charge of depots recently 
acquired by takeover and thus have to cope with a bewildering array 
of working practices and routines, plus demorallsed personnel. 
I have been given complete access to carry out research in Wharf 
and have managed to build up a good understanding of both cases. 
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APPENDIX F 
LETTER TO INFORMANTS CHECKING CASE BIOGRAPHIES 
Dear Mr. Smith, 
You may remember I called to see you some time ago In connection 
with some research I am carrying out for my PhD. 
When we met we talked about the following decisions in your 
company. ...... I have now finished my 
investigation Into the 
implementation of strategic decisions and am busy analysing the data 
I have collected. 
I enclose a brief account of what happened in your company which 
I hope you will find readable and interesting. You will see that 
the actual name of your organization and any personnel mentioned in 
the cases have been changed. 
I would be very glad If you could read it though just to check 
its factual accuracy. Please feel free to make any modifications 
you consider necessary before returning it in the enclosed envelope. 
I am anxious to ensure that the final results of my work are as 





orqanizational-Analysis Research Unit 
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